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ABSTRACT
Increased demands on governments, along with pressure from limited resources of
most countries, including Britain, Australia and N e w Zealand, in recent decades have
resulted in significant reforms to the management of public sector resources and to
the mechanisms by which governments are held financially accountable.
Commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation in the public sector are part of
this reform. Most of the reforms have yet to find their w a y to the Islamic Republic of
Iran which has devoted most of its energies since the Revolution in 1979 to
establishing structures of government.
These reforms, which have been guided by the principles of economic rationalism,
have been projected as promoting more efficient and effective management of
resources and therefore better government for all. Criticisms of the reforms have
emphasised their tendency to reduce assessments of performance to economic
measures to the detriment of the traditional concerns of equity, access and social
equality.
This thesis examines the elements of government financial management and control
in the Islamic Republic of Iran which determine the dimensions of accountability
which the Executive must fulfil and the role of accounting in demonstrating
accountability. The thesis then seeks to determine the extent to which present
reforms in the Australian public sector which have been designed to enhance
accountability and management are relevant to Iran. The study shows that public
sector accounting in Iran has not developed to the extent that it has in the
economically developed countries. It also shows that there is substantial need for
change in accounting systems in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It indicates that the
implementation of the present government accounting techniques and procedures in
the financial management of the Iranian government cannot adequately accomplish
the several goals of the public financial program of the nation.
The study shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran can benefit from adopting the
public sector accounting systems in Australia. It suggests that the use of accrual
accounting by the Iranian Government would enhance publicfinancialaccountability
and provides better information to managers for decision making purposes.

x

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Public sector accounting in the Islamic Republic of Iran has not developed to the
extent that it has in the economically developed countries (Aghvami 1992a, 1992b;
Babajani 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; Islamic Consultative Assembly 1995c;
Rakhshandehrou 1995). The present accounting, budgeting, financial reporting and
auditing practices of the Iranian Government are essentially those established many
years before the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Country's General Law of
Accounts which determines accounting and reporting procedures in the public sector,
is mainly that instituted in 1907. It has been amended four times since its
establishment. The existing law emphasises compliance with legal provisions and

budget allowances, with little or no regard to essential managerial uses of accounti
information.
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The present accounting system of the Iranian Government is cash based. According
to this system, a governmental unit prepares, before the beginning of fiscal year, a
budget or estimate of revenues and expenditure for the coining year. During the
accounting period, cash receipts and expenditures are recorded in the appropriationsbook and receipts and expenditure ledgers. These accounting practices are basically
those of the traditional accountability-oriented, public sector accounting framework
in which the accounting system is designed to satisfy the needs of accountability and
administrative control of appropriated funds. Government officials responsible for
expenditures have had to prepare proper accounts of their stewardship to show that
the funds were expended in accordance with the authority received from the
legislature.

In relation to present-day needs of the Iranian Government, this traditional concept o
accountability is somewhat narrow in its scope since in budgeting and accounting it
relies upon the exclusive use of a combined organisation-object classification in
order to pinpoint control over expenditures (Aghalu 1992). Although these
information needs are still essential today, public sector accounting is also being
recognised increasingly as a tool of management by providing various types of
financial information necessary for efficiency and effectiveness accountability
purposes.

Increased demands on governments, along with pressure from limited resources of
most countries, including Britain, Australia and New Zealand, in recent decades have
resulted in significant reforms in developed countries to the management of public
sector resources and to the mechanisms by which governments are held financially
accountable. Commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation in the public

sector are part of these reforms. Most of the reforms have yet to find their way to the
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Islamic Republic of Iran which has devoted most of its energies since the Islamic
Revolution in 1979 to establishing structures of government.

Seventeen years after the 'victorious' Islamic Revolution in 1979, it would seem
particularly appropriate and timely for a review of Iranian public sector accounting
and budgeting systems and that suggestions for its improvement are made.
Moreover, recently there is an increasing demand for fiscal discipline (Enzabat
Aqtsadi) among the senior officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatollah
Sayyed Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his messages to
the Iranians on the occasion of Iranian new years, or Nowrouz, 21 March, 1995 and
20 March, 1996 (1 Farvardyn 1374 and 1375 according to the solar calendar)1,
requested that all Iranians, including government officials and employees, give
serious attention to fiscal and economic discipline. In his message in 1996, he also
requires all government officials and employees to use public resources efficiently
and effectively (Khamenei 1995, p. 3 and 1996, p. 4).

The Iranian Government will need to improve its accounting system and procedures
in order to serve accountability for efficiency and effectiveness and also help
management more effectively in conducting the affairs of the government.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE THESIS

This thesis will argue that recent accounting reforms by the Australian
Commonwealth Government have the potential to enhance public sector

' The official calendar of the Islamic Republic of Iran takes as its point of departure the migration of
the Prophet of Islam (Mohammad). Both the solar and the lunar Islamic calendars are recognised, but
government offices will base their operations on the solar calendar. According to the solar and the
lunar calendars the current year is 1375 and 1415 respectively.

Chapter 1, Introduction
accountability and management in the general government sector2 of Iran.

4
Of

particular concern to the thesis is the applicability of accrual accounting in the
general government sector. The impact on the relevance of the accounting reforms of
differences in culture and governance between the two countries is a key feature of
this thesis. Where it is appropriate, the thesis will provide recommendations for the
implementation of reforms.

The thesis will argue that existing accounting techniques and procedures used in the
general government sector in Iran cannot meet the goals of the nation as expressed in
government plans and policies3. A better system and supporting set of procedures of
public sector accounting can be devised to serve more efficiently and effectively as
guidelines for the proper utilisation of Iran's public resources. Thus, the overall

objective of this dissertation is to suggest, for application in Iran, various account
techniques and procedures that have proved useful in the general government sector
in more economically developed countries, primarily Australia, and that can be
expected to strengthen the effective financial management and accountability of
government transactions.

Although Australia and other western nations, including New Zealand, Great Britain
and the United States, are moving to consolidated or whole of government reporting
on an accrual basis (see ED 62), this thesis will not examine this as an option

2

To be comparable and consistent, this study uses the definitions of Commonwealth government
reporting entities prepared by the Commonwealth Department of Finance in Australia. According to
the Department of Finance the General Government Sector provides public services which are noncommercial in nature. These services constitute the collective consumption of the community and
involve a transfer or redistribution of income, and are financed mainly through taxes and other
compulsory levies. This sector includes 'budget' entities and 'non-budget' entities. 'Budget' entities
operate on the Commonwealth Public Account whereas 'non-budget' entities have separate ownership
of moneys and other assets (Department of Finance 1996, p. 16).
3
These plans are examined in chapter 5.
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available to Iran at its present stage of development. The use of accrual accounting
in all government agencies is the prerequisite for whole of government accounting on
an accrual accounting basis. Iranian general government sector accounting, however,

is still at a very basic cash accounting level and thus does not provide the informat
for whole of government on an accrual basis. Whole of government accounting,
which is only at a trial stage in Australia (see Department of Finance 1996), is

unlikely to be operational much before the end of this century. In order for Australia
to contemplate whole of government accrual accounting it firstly had to establish
accrual accounting throughout its agencies. Now that this phase is nearing
completion, although recent studies have shown that while management have
generally understood the use of accrual accounting for external financial reporting
most managers have not appreciated its use in management decision making,
planning and control (JCPA 1995; Ernst and Young 1995), the Australian
Government is now sufficiently confident to confront the difficult issues associated
with whole of government reporting using accrual accounting. While whole of
government reporting is accepted as desirable, it is seen as being outside the key
concerns of this thesis.

It is important to note here that this thesis does not attempt to provide a descripti

detailed, technical manual to assist in the implementation of the recommendations for
accounting change in the Iranian General Government Sector. Upon the adoption of
accrual accounting and other measures designed to improve financial management,
the specifics of implementation will be the responsibility of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Finance in co-operation with the Court of Accounts. This
thesis is aimed at a higher systemic level of accounting rather than at a procedural
level. Accordingly, the emphasis is on new structures for accounting and the
benefits/results of accrual accounting for the Iranian nation.
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The Iranian Government differs from the Australian Government in that it is a
unitary system of government with one central bureaucracy. In contrast, Australia is

a Federation that consists of three tiers of government-National, State, and Local. To
enhance comparability, this thesis will be limited to comparing and contrasting the
central government of Australia (Commonwealth) with the central Iranian
government. Also already noted, in section 1.1 above, this is referred to as the
general government sector throughout thesis.

Because of the unique political, social and economic situation of the Islamic

Republic of Iran, as discussed in chapters 2 and 6, this study does not claim that the
recommendations to the Iranian Government for accounting and budgetary reforms
are applicable to other countries. However, there is no reason to believe that the

recommendations cannot be adapted to suit other similar, if not identical, situations.

As an Islamic state any recommendations for accounting reforms in Iran will have to

be consistent with Islamic criteria. Ultimately, discussions about the appropriatenes
of recommendations will have to be left to scholars in Islamic teaching.

1.3 IRANIAN CHALLENGES

Iran is an ancient country. According to Glover (1944) "[t]he Persians created the

greatest Empire of antiquity before the Roman; and they held it for two centuries" (p.
89; see also Haerian Ardakani 1996, p. 22). Iran's history is punctuated with periods
of great upheaval and social dislocation. In the 20th century it has experienced two
revolutions: the Mashruteh Revolution in 1906 and the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
These two revolutions changed the structure of governance in Iranian society through
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n e w constitutions. Both the 1906 Constitution and the 1979 Constitution determined
that, while ultimate sovereignty rests with God, the powers and sovereignty of the

state are derived from the people (Higgins 1986, p. 172). For the first time in Iranian
history the 1906 Revolution established a Parliament while the 1979 Revolution
instituted an Islamic Republic under the supervision of the Valyat-e Faqih4. The
backbone of the present Iranian Constitution is based on the Imam Khomeini's
writings and speeches on the subject of "Islamic Government" pronounced many
years before the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Khomeini 1981; see also Algar 1980;
Bazaei 1993, pp. 38-39, Firouzbakhch, 1994, pp. 139-140).

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, all the civil, penal, financial, economic,
administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be
according to Islamic criteria (Article 4 of Iranian Constitution). The Constitution

requires that the principle of Article 4 is applicable, absolutely and generally, to a

articles of the Iranian Constitution (Article 4 of Iranian Constitution). Article 4 al
adds that the Foqaha of the Guardian Council are responsible for implementing this
criteria. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli (1992) has emphasised that the significant
objectives of an Islamic government are:

a) Leading man towards being God's substitute [Khalifa] on the
earth;
b) Changing the Islamic communities into Utopias by preparing real
bases of genuine civilization and providing for real principles
governing internal and external relations (p. 3).

To be God's substitute, mankind should embody and possess all the traits of God.
Thus, when the Constitution refers to justice and the like as the objectives of an

4

This and other terms uniquely pertaining to Iran are defined in chapter 2.
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Islamic government it in fact refers to the components necessary for perfection, i.e. to
be in the image of God (Javadi Amoli 1992, p. 3; see also Sadeghzadeh 1995, pp.
127 and 130). One of the examples that God provides to the Prophet Mohammad,

the Great Messenger, as His substitute is found at the beginning of the sorah5 call
Abraham, in the Glorious Quran:

Alif. Lam. Ra. This is a Scripture which we have revealed unto thee
( M u h a m m a d ) that thereby thou m a y bring forth mankind from
darkness unto light, by the permission of their Lord unto the path of
the Mighty, the owner of praise (Javadi Amoli 1992, pp. 3-4).

Again, the aim of the establishment of an Islamic system based on revelation and
prophethood is to convert man into God's substitute on earth. Ayaat6 19 and 85 of
the Family of Imran Sorah of the Quran says that "Religion with Allah is Islam" and
those who seek a religion other than Islam will not be accepted by Him. Thus, the
main objectives of the mission of all prophets has been to introduce Islam and to
establish Islamic governments. For example the Quran says:

We verily sent our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with
them the Scripture and the Balance, that man-kind m a y observe right
measure (Sorah Iron; Aya 25 in Javadi Amoli 1992, p. 5).

According to the above Aya, the general aim and objective of all messengers has
been to establish peace and justice (Javadi Amoli 1992, p. 5; see also Sadeghzadeh
1995, p. 132). Javadi Amoli (1992) argues that these objectives of the leaders of
divine governments are intermediate objectives and "not an ultimate of [sic] final

5

Some have used "chapter" as the equivalent of "sorah". However, a sorah does not contain a theme
as is normally found in a chapter. The holy Quran is not organised on the basis of subjects. The
whole Quran consists of 114 lengthy, intermediate and short Sowar (plural of Sorah).
6
Ayaat is plural of Aya. Aya m a y be translated as verse. It literally means "symptom of God's
power". Aya seems richer than verse, hence is preferred. The whole Quran consists of 6,666 Ayaat.

Chapter 1, Introduction

9

one, and as w e said earlier, the main objective for m a n is to change into God's
substitute [Khalifa]" (p. 6).

A consequence of the striving towards these objectives is a nation where all can

enjoy a better standard of living. Therefore, it is important that those entrusted wi
governing do so with fairness, honesty and use resources wisely. This last concern in
the past decade also occupied governments throughout the world as they sought to
improve their management practices.

1.4 MANAGERIALISM IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY

The 1980s witnessed the introduction of a new concept of "management" in the
public sector in most developed countries. The purpose of the "new managerialism"
was to make the public service more efficient and effective in managing public
resources by "letting the managers manage". The aim has been to create a public
sector "able to carry out policies with optimal economic efficiency, and one with
well-designed and targeted policies to carry out" (Emy and Hughes 1988, p. 353). It

is argued that managerialism will give more flexibility to the managers and it is also
a move from the traditional focus on processes of bureaucratic-control to a focus on
results (Helgeby 1990, p. 10). Thus, the major concern in managerialism is with

efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, with the emphasis on outputs rather tha
inputs (this will be discussed in chapter 6). To achieve this, Deegan (1995) argues,

requires increased devolution and delegation to lower organisational
levels, consistent with a philosophy of "letting the managers
manage" while holding them accountable for their performance and
outcomes (p. 11).
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The n e w managerialism, while receiving strong support from most western
governments, has also had its critics (Painter 1988; Sinclair 1989; Yeatman 1987;
Considine 1988). For example, Painter (1988) believes that there is a lack of solid

intellectual or philosophical basis for managerial reforms in Australia. According to
him there are also some dangers for the acceptance of private sector techniques in the

public sector without any critical consideration. Painter argues that middle managers
in the public sector should not just consider economic and technical matters, they
should also pay attention to political, ethical, social and other criteria in their
decision making (p. 2).

Sinclair (1989) echoes Pointer's concerns by arguing that the traditional values of
public administration have been destroyed by the importation of private sector
strategies and structures (p. 382). According to Yeatman (1987) the source of these
problems is the reliance of managerialism on Frederick Taylor's classic scientific
management model, with "its instrumental orientation to people as human resources
and a tendency to reduce the organisational entities involved to calculable and
ultimately financial inputs and outputs" (Yeatman 1987 quoted in Sinclair 1989, p.
389). As a consequence, Bryson and Yeatman are concerned about possible
consequence, of managerialism for the individual bureaucrat and voter. They have
also pointed to the potential for discrimination against women (in Barrett 1990, pp.
3-4). Considine (1988), another opponent of managerialism, also points out
inadequacies in the use of a corporate management framework in the public sector
where the government's aims are far broader, and somewhat more nebulous , than in
the private sector (p. 16).
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Defenders of the n e w managerialism argue that although the emphasis is on

managing for results the traditional values of public administration, such as fairne
and probity, are also preserved (Keating 1989 in Parker and Guthrie 1993).

In response to increasingly loud voices of criticism, in an article called "Towards a
fairer Australia-Social Justice and Program Management: A Guide", the Departments
of Finance and Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1989 have attempted to reassure that

[m]inisters are closely involved with their programs and with their
constituency. Bureaucrats are closely involved with Ministers.
Emphasis is very m u c h on consultation and consensus. Ministers
approve program objectives and strategies. Access and equity are
important planks of the Government's policy approach (in Barrett
1990, p. 5).

In support of the methods and aims of managerialism Barrett (1990) argues that
"there are examples of good management practice in the private sector which are

applicable to the public sector" (p. 20). He refers to the commercialisation process,
accrual accounting techniques, corporate management and planning, strategic
approaches, flatter structures and devolved decision making as applicable to the
public sector. He also commends what he sees as the successful implementation of a
managerialist approach to government in countries such as Britain and New Zealand
to support this argument (Barrett 1990, p. 20).

As one of the prime movers in managerial reforms in NSW and the Commonwealth
Government, Wilenski (1988) affirmed that "the old methods of public
administration were insufficient for the new tasks that the public sector was asked
perform" (p. 216). There was a reluctance among the traditional permanent heads of

departments to plan or set goals on the grounds that he/she could not be responsive t
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short term political change (Wilenski 1988, p. 216). Wilenski (1988) also believes
that one of the elements needed to achieve greater equity is to use the available
resources more efficiently, a core concern of managerialism. Thus, for Wilenski
managerialism justified "the removal of many process-oriented rules and regulations"
(p. 217).

1.5 THE NEED FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN PUBLIC SECTOR
ACCOUNTING AND THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

Many researchers have mentioned the need to study public sector accounting not

only in the national arena but also to compare international public sector accounting
throughout the world (Guthrie 1990b; Chan and Jones 1988; Babajani 1992b, 1992c;
Chang and Khumawala 1994; Guthrie 1994). It is suggested that comparative
research studies will help to find the similarities and differences in public sector
accounting, provide examples of desirable reforms and provide an analysis of the
development of the regulation of accounting in the public sector. Consistent with

these suggestions, this study accepts Guthrie's challenge for a "critical analysis of
experiences with public sector accounting developments from an international
perspective" (Guthrie 1994, p. 143e). There is an urgent need to study accounting,
and chiefly public sector accounting, in the Islamic Republic of Iran at this time.
Babajani (1992b) in his article "Government Accounting in Iran, A Comparative

Survey (in Persian)" (hesabdari dolati dar Iran, yak barasia tadbighi) suggests that:

a board consisting of nominated persons of the Court of Accounts'
experts and representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance be established to study and research public sector
accounting in Iran. They should study and research public sector
accounting systems in developed countries to design a modern
public sector accounting system for Iran. After that if there is a need
to do any amending to the existing L a w and Legislation amendment

Chapter 1, Introduction
suggestions should be given to the authorities in order to give to the
Islamic Republic Council Assembly (p. 89). 7
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Babajani (1992c) again, in 1992, in another article emphasises the necessity of a
comparative study in Iranian public sector accounting with advanced countries (p.
87). He argues that one of the ways to assess and recognise the efficiency of
methods and policies or effectiveness of economic and social institutions is through
comparative studies. He also mentions that if assessing the Iranian public sector
accounting is not difficult, at least it is not easy (Babajani 1992b, p. 32).

Unfortunately his suggestions have not been taken up by the Iranian Government.
Accordingly, the absence of any significant research in public sector accounting in
the Islamic Republic of Iran and a lack of suitable standards for public sector
accounting in Iran highlight the importance of the present study. It is also a
preliminary step toward standards setting in the Iranian public sector and a stimulus
to broaden the notion of public accountability from accountability for legality and
regularity to include accountability for efficiency and effectiveness.

From the public sector accounting techniques and procedures that have been found
useful in practices in Australia, a selection has been made of those that may be
applicable to Iran. This selection was based on the following factors:

1. Information needs to be met by the Iranian general government sector accounting
system.
2. Usefulness of the techniques and procedures under consideration.

7

Translated by author.
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3. Compatibility with the social, cultural and political requirements of a system of
government based upon the teachings of Islam.

The study of the existing accounting system and related financial management
practices of the Iranian Government is based upon a study of the government
accounting literature and upon a systematic investigation of available government
data. Among the government documents that have been consulted are the budgets of
the Iranian Government, the Five-Year Development Plans, the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Consultative Assembly' Reports, the Law of the
Court of Accounts, the Country's General Law of Accounts and other related
financial regulations, Budget Settlements and many other government documents.
Apart from relevant material available in government documents, the neglect of
Iranian public sector accounting amongst researchers is reflected in the dearth of
articles in the literature.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

In chapter 2 the Iranian and Australian systems of government are examined in

detail. The chapter consists of three sections, the first section details the structu
and operation of the Iranian government. It is shown that Iranian government is
composed of the Leader or Leadership Council, the Legislature, the Executive, and
the Judiciary. It will be explained that the system of government in the Islamic
Republic of Iran is unitary under the supervision of the Valayat-e Faqih which is
elected by the Khobragan Assembly. The responsibilities and powers of the
President, the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Khobragan Assembly are
clarified and the process by which they are elected will be also discussed. Section
two details the nature of the Australian Commonwealth government. It refers to the
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Parliament (Senate and House of Representatives), the Executive and the Judiciary in
Australia. Chapter 2 also refers to the three levels of government in Australia; the
Commonwealth, the States, and local government. The processes by which the
Governor-General is appointed, and by which the Prime Minister and members of the
Parliament are elected, along with their responsibilities and powers will be also
highlighted.

The structures of government established in chapter 2 provide the foundations for
chapter 3 which examines concepts of accountability which are followed in theory
and practice in Iran and Australia. The importance of accountability in the public
sector and its role in a changing modern society will be discussed in chapter 3. The
nature of accountability also will be examined, followed by a discussion of how it
functions now in the general government sector of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
Australia. In recent years the dimensions of accountability given prominence in the
public sector have been expanded in Australia, New Zealand and England to include
efficiency and effectiveness rather than just emphasising the traditional dimensions
of accountability, in particular accountability for legality and regularity.

Interpretations of accountability, as found in theories of governance and in practice,
are the primary determinants of the mechanisms used to ensure accountability. This
chapter also will provide a historical overview of accountability as it has been
understood in Australia and in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the consideration of an accounting system as a provider
of useful and adequate information for implementing accountability processes and
enhancing management efficiency and effectiveness in the general government
sector. Government performance is judged with a heavy reliance on financial
information. Thus, accounting mechanisms are very important. Discussion of the
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systems of public sector accounting in chapter 4 includes cash accounting, accrual
accounting and fund accounting. Reference will be made to the benefits of cash
accounting, accrual accounting and their differences. The chapter will also consider
why accounting in the public sector was left untouched by many governments and
little attention has been devoted to standards setting until recent years.

Some of the significant issues currently confronting public sector accounting, in
particular determination of costs, depreciation, valuation and amortisation of fixed
assets and financial reporting in the public sector also will be covered in chapter 4.

Little has been written about accounting, especially public sector accounting, in Iran
by academics and practitioners. There is also no active organisation responsible for
developing public sector accounting in Iran. Chapter 5 is devoted to the examination
and consideration of the characteristics and the weaknesses in implementing
accountability and efficient management of the existing budgeting and accounting
practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

An examination of Australian public sector reforms in recent decades, emphasising
changes in financial management and accountability and focusing on new accounting

technologies as a means to perform accountability practices in the public sector is th
theme of chapter 6. For the purpose of this study, the knowledge of these changes is
needed as a source of reference in order to make suggestions for reform of the
accounting system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in chapter 7. Problems and
deficiencies in the implementation of accrual accounting in the general government
sector are examined in the last part of chapter 6. In chapter 6, the relevancy of the
Australian reforms to help meet these deficiencies and thereby assist in improving
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness will be also considered. Conclusions and
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specific recommendations for reforms applicable to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
based on the discussions in chapters 2, 3,4, 5 and 6, are provided in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 2

SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT: THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND AUSTRALIA

2.1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

Government is the most important national entity. In a democracy, society give
power, authority and legitimacy to the state to direct the use of a country's resources,
either directly or through parties. To make sure that these resources are being used in
the best interests of the electorate, the notion of accountability has been utilised by
the government in its reporting to the people, together with the means to exercise this
accountability. Therefore, responsible public accountability forms the significant
function of government to Parliament and to society at large.

This chapter discusses systems of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran a
Australia in order to provide a framework of public sector accountability in both
countries. For this purpose the chapter is divided into three sections. The first
section details the form of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with particular
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attention directed to the conditions, qualifications, authority and responsibilities of
the Leadership, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Section two deals

with the form of government in Australia, in particular its nature as a Federation, an
its structure of government, including the Houses of Parliament, the role of the
Governor-General and the High Court. The similarities and dissimilarities of these
two systems of government are developed where appropriate throughout the thesis.

A discussion of the systems of governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran and
Australia provides much of the theoretical foundation upon which the substantive

conclusions of the thesis will rest. This discussion is particularly relevant as it fo
the basis for a discussion about accountability in the two systems of government
which will be developed in chapter 3.

2.2 MODERN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRANIAN1
GOVERNMENT
2.2.1 Historical Perspective

Islam, and more specifically Twelver Ja'fari school, has existed since the 7th century
in Iran (Sassani 1963, p. 3). It is deeply rooted in Iranian culture, social and

individual life and has been, therefore, an important factor in Iranian politics. As a

result, a study of the place of Islam in influencing government activities and attitud
is necessary for an understanding of the Iranian government. The office of the head

1

Iran, although it was always called "Iran" by the Iranians, was called Persia by Westerners after the
Greeks w h o called Iran by the name of one of its provinces, Fars or Persia. This tradition continued
until 21 March 1935 when Reza Shah made "Iran" the official name of the country and requested that
all countries follow his usage. In October 1949, his son, the Shah, w h o was deposed in 1979, allowed
both names to be used. Before this change was made, Winston Churchill, in August 1941, had
directed that the British use "Persia" in official correspondence to avoid confusing Iran with Iraq.
Consequently, depending on the nationality of the author, and when he/she is writing, usage varies
(Kuniholm 1980, p. 130).
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of the state and the administrator of religious affairs in Islam politics and religion are
intertwined. This was the case in the Prophet Mohammad's Caliphate.2

Two important Islamic Revolutions have occurred in Iran since the nineteenth

century. The first one was the Mashruteh [Constitutional] Revolution3, in 1906, an

the second one, referred to as the Islamic Revolution, occurred in 1979. The first

Iranian Constitution was drafted by the first National Consultative Assembly [Majl
in 1906 as a consequence of the Mashruteh Revolution (Kuniholm 1980, p. 131).

Before this time Iran had no crucial laws, or even a constitution, to restrict the

power (Ghods 1989, p.2). According to Algar (1980) this first constitution consist
of a preamble and 51 Articles to which 107 Supplementary Articles were added on

October 7, 1907. The Constitution was later amended four times, in accordance with

the dictates of the ruling Pahlavi family, in 1925, 1949, 1957, and 1967. Algar ad
that, theoretically, the Constitution of 1906, with its later supplements and
amendments, remained in force until the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in
February 1979 (p. 7).

The Iranian Constitution asserted that the form of government was a monarchy and
most political power reposed in the Shah. Under this constitutional monarchy the
government consisted of three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. The
legislative branch was vested in a Parliament of two chambers: the National
Consultative Assembly (Majlis Shoray Meli), and the Senate or Upper House

2

For a more detailed discussion of Caliphate in Islam see Bazaei 1993, pp. 41-41.
The author believes that this isfirsttime that the Mashruteh Revolution is referred to as an Islamic
Revolution in Iranian literature. T h e reasons are mainly: the Ulama were the leaders of the
Mashruteh Revolution and had an important role in the victorious outcome of the Revolution; the
Mashruteh Constitution required Islam as the official religion of Iran and established the Twelver
Ja'fari school.
3
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With the Islamic Revolution in 1979 the form of

government changed to an Islamic Republic.

2.2.1.1 Mashruteh Revolution

The Mashruteh Revolution was one of the most momentous Islamic Revolutions in

Iranian modem history. Increasing political dictatorship, a lack of security of l
property, and the increasing influence of European countries in Iran have been

proposed as some of the important reasons which led to the Mashruteh revolution in
1906 (Amjad 1989, p. 37). Apart from the influence of Islamic teaching, another
important source of the Mashruteh Revolution was the Tobacco Movement.

A number of concessions had been granted to foreign economic interests in the
1890s. One of these concessions was the tobacco monopoly (Algar 1969, p. 206). In
1889, the then Shah (Naser al-Din Shah) granted an English Company, led by Major

Talbot, a monopoly over the cultivation, sale, and export of tobacco for fifty yea

return for which he undertook to pay the Shah, or the Iranian Government, an annua

rent of £15,000, in addition to one-quarter of the annual profits, after the paym
all working expenses and a five per cent dividend on the capital4 (Algar 1969, p.
Browne 1966, pp. 31-33; Abrahamian 1982; Moaddel 1986; Hiro 1985, p. 17). This
contract put the Iranian merchants and shopkeepers at the mercy of a foreign

company, ultimately leading them to protest against this Concession, which they f
was against the public interest and a capitulation to foreigners' interests. The

merchants were clearly indignant at selling and buying at prices arbitrarily fixe
foreign company (Algar 1969, p. 208). This feeling was shared by the majority of

4

Abrahamian says that there was also a personal gift of £25,000 to the Shah on die contract (1982, p.
73).
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the people w h o saw this contract as evidence of the corruption of the government and
the government's disregard for national interests (Amjad 1989, p. 37). When the

agents of Talbot's company arrived at Shiraz, the main tobacco-growing region, in
April 1891, they were welcomed with the shutdown of the bazaar which spread into

general strike of the leading bazaars, particularly Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Mas
Qazvin, Yazd, and Kermanshah (Abrahamian 1979; Abrahamian 1982).

The Iranian merchants and shopkeepers turned to the Ulama5 for support. Around
the end of September 1891 the marja' taqlid6, Ayatollah al-Ozma Hajj Mirza Hassan
Shirazi wrote a long letter to the Shah (Naser al-Din Shah) to argue that the

Concession granted by him to foreigners was contrary to the Quran and the spirit o
Islam. When the Shah ignored Ayatollah al-Ozma Hajj Mirza Hassan Shirazi, the
Ayatollah issued a Fatva1 which demanded that no tobacco be consumed because the
consumption of the tobacco was pronounced Haram%. This would stand until the
Concession was repealed. The Fatva was supported by other Mujtaheds9 and Ulama
(Browne 1966, pp. 51-54).

5

The Ulama are those learned in the religious law and its sources.
The practices and pronouncements of the Mujtahed (see footnote N o . 9) furnish a binding example
for those unable to exert/clarify independent judgement in matters relating to the religious law (Algar
1969, p. 263).
7
A Fatva is a legal ruling, an expression of opinion, by one of the Ulama, on a point of religious law
or on a legal case.
8
Everything which is prohibited by the law of Islam.
9
A Mujtahed is one w h o m a y act according to his o w n judgement in matters relating to religious law.
Becoming a mojtahed requires a long process. Those w h o wish to gain this title begin by studying in
the seminaries {Houzeh-e Elmieh or madreseh Elmieh) where the students are called Tullab. A
majority of Tullab leave seminaries after a few years of education and become prayer leaders
(Pishnemaz) or preachers (Rowz-e Khan) (Amjad 1989, p. 35). The remainder, by continuing their
study, will become and get the title of Saqatolislam after some years. Those w h o extend their studies
in the Houzeh-e Elmieh will become and get the title of Hqjjatolislam (Manifestation of Islam).
Hojjatolislams, although capable of interpreting the Quran, are not specialised in any branches of
Islamic Jurisprudence [Fiqh]. After m a n y years of education, a small group of Tullab reach the rank
of mojtaheds. Mojtahes use their independent judgement for the interpretation of Islamic laws
(Sharfa). The rest of the society are called moghalid or imitators. Yet a smaller group will reached
the rank of Ayatollah (sign of the G o d ) (Amjad 1989, p. 35), someone w h o is specialised in Islamic
laws. Ayatollahs often write a book called Resaleh-e Touzihol Massael (Book of Explanation of the
6
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In response to this pressure, on 28 December, a proclamation announcing the

withdrawal of the Concession was published by the Shah (Browne 1966, pp. 51-54).
The capitulation of the Shah in the face of such widespread unrest clearly

demonstrated that "religion played a significant role in mobilizing the people a
a concession granted by the Qajar Shah to a British company" (Moaddel 1992, p.
447-48).

Browne (1966) notes that "the Tobacco Concession was ended, but not its

consequences" which proved to be momentous (p. 31). Most specificantly, the acti

participation of Ulama in this movement had played a crucial role in the abrogat

of the tobacco concession. The victory of the Tobacco Movement brought the Ulama

and the people, notably the merchants, closer together and it showed how they co
work together against tyranny and opened the way for the Mashruteh Revolution
(Browne 1966, p. 37).

The Shah's actions during this period only served to further accentuate the rese
of the people towards an increasingly despotic government, culminating in his
assassination by Mirza Rezay Karmani who was one of Sayyed Jamal al-Din

Asadabadi's10 students and followers, before commencement of the celebration of th

fifty-year's of Naser al-Din Shah's monarchy in 1896. After Naser al-Din Shah wa

Problems) in which answers are provided regarding the application of SharCa to everyday life. The
highest ranking mojtahes are called Ayatollah-e Ozma (Grand Ayatollah) or Marj'a-e Taghlid (Source
of Imitation). A Marj^a-e Taghlid (pi. Maraje-a Taghlid) has m a n y followers and is known for his
piety and knowledge of SharCa.
The choice of a Marj^a-e Taghlid is not based on election or referendum but on the acceptance of
each Marj^a-e Taghlid by the Moghalids. Marjayyat is decentralised, and no Marj^a-e Taghlid has the
right to interference in the rulings of another Marfa-e (Amjad 1989, pp. 35-36).
10
For more about Sayyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi's role in the Mashruteh Revolution see Browne
1966, pp. 1-30.
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killed, his forty-four year old son Muzaffar al-Din Shah ascended to the Peacock
throne, subsequently appointing Ayn ud-Daula as his Sadre-azam (Grand Vazier or
Prime Minister) in 1903 (Algar 1969, p. 240). Since Muzaffar al-Din Shah was

plagued by illness he passed the governance of the country to Ayn ud-Daula who had

not forgotten the insolence of the merchants in 1891. Algar (1969) is of the opini
that

[t]he beating given to some merchants of Tehran on shawal 14,
1323/December 12, 1905, started the chain of events that culminated
in the issue of the decree granting the constitution. Various
circumstances, notably the disruption of the Russian economy by
war with Japan, had caused arisein the price of sugar, and using this
as pretext, A y n ud-Daula decided to punish the merchants of Tehran
for their protests against his policies, and at the same time to
intimidate the ulama allied to them (p. 246).

Ala ud-Daula, governor of Tehran, summoned in his presence and bastinadoed a

number of merchants, not all of whom were concerned with the sale of sugar. As the
news of the bastinadoing became known, the people of Tehran, led by the Ulama,
gathered in the Masjede Shah [Shah mosque] to protest (Abrahamian 1979, p. 405;

Algar 1969, p. 246). While there was no important result of this meeting, the Ulam

decided, at the suggestion of Sayyed [Ayatollah] Tabatabai, to leave Tehran for t
security offered by the shrine of Shah Abdol Azim (Abrahamian 1979, p. 405; Algar
1969, pp. 246-47). There they formulated their demands, in the name of the Ulama,

for the foundation of a "House of justice" (Adalatkhaneh)11 (Algar 1969, p. 247; s
also Abrahamian 1985, p. 123). Muzaffar al-Din Shah when faced with concerted
resentment accepted in principle the demand for an "Adalatkhaneh" on 14 January,
1906 and the Ulama decided to return to Tehran (Algar 1969, p. 248; Amjad, 1989,

11

According to Abrahamian (1979) their main demands were four: "replacement of the governor;
dismissal of Naus [the Belgian customs director]; enforcement of the shari'ah and formation of a
House of Justice" {Adalatkhaneh) (p. 405).
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p. 38). Also at this time Ala ud-Daula was dismissed from the governorship of
Tehran by Ayn ud-Daula. Ayn ud-Daula was prepared to accept the triumph of the
Ulama.

When the Ulama and the people returned to Tehran, the Shah and his Sadre-azam di

not honour their promises. As a result, opposition mounted against them. Matters

were brought to a head on 10 July, 1906 when orders were given for the arrest of
of the Ulama prominent in preaching against the government, Shaykh Mohammad
Va'az (Algar 1969, p. 250; see also Abrahamian 1985, p. 123). Before the Shaykh

could be taken to prison, Tullab12 and others attacked the soldiers escorting h

were able to set him free but not before the commander of the soldiers gave or

fire upon the people. In the confusion which resulted Sayyed Abdol Hamid, a youn
Tallabeh13, was shot and suffered martyrdom (Algar 1969, p. 250; Abrahamian
1982).

The Ulama of the capital gathered in the mosque to express their outraged feeli
They announced that they would not leave until an "Adalatkhaneh" had been
established, demanding the dismissal of Ayn ud-Daula. The Ulama then presented

the government with three choices: either to accept their demands, to remove the

from the mosque by force, or to permit them to leave the city in peace. The last

was accepted, and on 15 July, 1906 about a thousand of the Ulama set out for Qom
(Algar 1969, p. 250; see also Abrahamian 1985, pp. 123-124).

The merchants of Tehran made a similar use of bast (strike) in the grounds of th
British embassy in Tehran. Four days after the beginning of the exodus to Qom.

12
13

Tullab are students at a religion school (madrese).
Singular of Tullab.
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about thirty representatives of the clerical and mercantile classes sought refuge in the

grounds of the British embassy. They asked Grant Duff, British charge d'affaires,

submit their demands to the Shah. The nature of their demands made clear the exten
of cooperation between the Ulama and the merchants. They demanded that the

Ulama be permitted to return to Tehran, that Ayn ud-Daula be dismissed, and that a
Majlis be established (Algar 1969, p. 250-51).

Ayn ud-Daula attempted as before to resist the demands as long as possible, but on

29 July, 1906, he was obliged to resign, and a week later, a decree was issued for
calling of a Majlis (Algar 1969, p. 251). The government sent Abdol Malk to Qom

to invite the Ulama back to Tehran, which they re-entered in triumph on 18 August.
Thus, the grant of a constitution was obtained and the tyrannical government was
changed to a monarchical Mashruteh government. The word "Mashruteh" was
derived from mashruiyat and mashrutiyat, both of which meant government

according to the law of Islam and the incorporation of justice and equality (Algar
1969, p. 253). Algar (1969) says that "the purpose of the 'adalatkhana[h]' was to
secure the application of Islamic law" (p. 253).

Eventually the first Majlis in Iranian history was established and opened on 7
October, 1906 (Abrahamian 1979; Browne 1966), composed of: the Ulama (29.2
percent), government officials/urban notables (22.3 percent), guilds people (18.0

percent), merchants (17.4 percent), and Qajar princesses (5.0 percent) (Foran 1991
805). The Supplementary Fundamental Laws, which were ratified by Mohammad
Ali Shah on 7 October, 1907, amounted to the first Iranian Constitution (Browne
1966).
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The Mashruteh Constitution required Islam as the official religion of Iran and
established the Twelver Ja'fari school (Article 1). A Committee composed of not

less than five Mujtaheds or other devout theologians would be elected to determine
whether proposals passed by the newly formed National Consultative Assembly were

according to Islam (Article 2). The Constitution also provided for the annual Bud
to be fixed and approved by a majority of the National Consultative Assembly
(Article 96) and a Financial Commission, with its members appointed by the
National Consultative Assembly, was made responsible for inspecting and analysing
the accounts of the Department of Finance (Articles 101 and 102) (Browne 1966;
Abrahamian 1979).

According to Abrahamian (1979), the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, which

were passed by the first Iranian National Consultative Assembly, were divided into

two main sections. The first section was a 'bill of rights' which guaranteed "each

citizen equality before the law, protection of 'life, property, and honor,' safeg
from arbitrary arrest, and freedom to organize associations as well as publish
newspapers" (Abrahamian 1979, p. 410). The second section was related to the

separation of powers which "concentrated power in the Legislature at the expense o
the Executive Branch" (Abrahamian 1979, p. 410). The Legislature obtained the
power to appoint, investigate, and dismiss premiers, ministers, and cabinets.
Ministers were responsible to Parliament (Abrahamian 1979, p. 410). The
Mashruteh Revolution established a constitutional monarchy in Iran which was in

force from 1906 to 1979. In this system the executive was headed by the Shah or th
King. Administration of the government was carried out by the King and the

Cabinet, with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister as its head primarily responsibl
the National Consultative Assembly (Sassani 1963, p. 3-4).
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The Mashruteh Revolution was the culmination of a long period of conflict between
the state and the Ulama (Algar 1969) and, as Foran says, even though the
Constitutional Revolution ended in a defeat "it stands out as a revolutionary
movement that attempted to change the balance of power and nature of Iranian
society" (Foran 1991, p. 817). Thus, theoretically, the Constitution of 1906, with

later supplements and amendments, remained in force until the triumph of the Islam
Revolution in February 1979, the subject of the next section.

2.2.1.2 Islamic Revolution

To clarify the importance of Islam in shaping the system of government in the
Islamic Republic of Iran it is necessary to give a brief account of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979. The Islamic Revolution in 1979 was led by the eminent
marja' taqlid, Ayatollah al-Ozma Imam Khomeini. With this Revolution the form of
government dramatically changed. The referendum of March 29 and 30, 1979
(Farvardyn 9 and 10 in the year 1358 of the solar Islamic calendar, corresponding
Jamadi al-Awwal 1 and 2 in the year 1399 of the lunar Islamic calendar), with an

affirmative vote of a majority of 98.2% of eligible voters, held after the victori
Islamic Revolution, confirmed that the people of Iran had endorsed a change to an
Islamic Republic after centuries of monarchy.

The early years of Imam Khomeini's activity in Qom coincided with the

establishment of the Pahlavi state by Reza Khan in 1921 after a coup d'etat. Algar
(1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981) states that Reza Khan transformed the

Iranian monarchy into a dictatorship of the modern, totalitarian kind and made its

chief internal aim the elimination of Islam as a political, social, and cultural f
14). Arjomand (1992) in this regard says "[o]nce he [Reza Khan] had become king
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... the Majles rapidly lost its vigor, was packed with his hand-picked candidates and

became a rubber stamp for his policies. The constitution was manipulated, and its
Islamic provisions were ignored" (p. 57).

In October 1962 Mohammad Reza Shah, Reza Khan's son who was the Shah at that
time, passed a Bill called Layahe' Anjomanhaye Ayalati va Velayati (the Bill of

and Provincial Associations) through the Board of Ministers. This Bill abolished

requirement that candidates for election to local assemblies had to be Muslim and
male. For the first time Imam Khomeini, joined by religious leaders elsewhere in

country, protested vigorously against the measure, leading to its repeal (Arjoma
1992, p. 16; Amjad 1989, p. 40).

In 1963 the Shah, after his trip to America in March 1962, began to pronounce a

series of measures for reshaping the political, social and economic life of Iran

were collectively designated the "White Revolution". The apparent popular approv

of the proposal was obtained by what was alleged to be a fraudulent referendum he

on 26 January, 1963 (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981; Amjad 1989;
see also Firouzbakhch 1994, p. 33). Imam Khomeini moved immediately to

denounce the "revolution" as fraudulent and to expose the motives that underlay i
preaching a series of sermons from Fieziah Madreseh in Qom that had a nationwide
impact (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 16). Imam Khomeini

(1981), in a speech in 1963, warned the Shah that "you have carried out your Whit
Revolution in the midst of all this Black Reaction! What do you mean, a White
Revolution? Why do you try to deceive the people so? Why do you threaten the
people so?" (p. 179). Despite the Shah's attempt to masquerade his reform, the

measures in question were perceived by a large segment of Iranian society as bein
imposed on the country by the United States and designed to bring about
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augmentation of the Shah's power and wealth, as well as intensification of United

States dominance, which had been instituted with the CIA coup d'etat against Prim
Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953 (Algar 1981 in the introduction to

Khomeini 1981, p. 16; see also Bazaei 1993, pp. 200-221; Parsa 1989, pp. 45 and 50;
Pesaranl985,pp. 19-20).

The Shah's regime responded to the mounting opposition to his actions by sending
the army to attack Fieziah Madreseh on 22 March, 1963. A number of students

[Tullab] were killed and the madreseh was ransacked (Algar 1981 in the introducti
to Khomeini 1981; see also Bazaei 1993, pp. 233-235; Amjad 1989). Far from
intimidating Imam Khomeini, this event marked the beginning of a new period of

determined struggle that was directed not only against the errors and excesses of
regime, but against its very existence. The attack on the madreseh had an almost

symbolic value, exemplifying as it did both the hostility of the regime to Islam an

Islamic institutions and the ruthless manner in which it expressed that hostility
1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 16).

Imam Khomeini continued to denounce the Shah's regime throughout the spring of
1963. He delivered several fiery speeches and concentrated his attacks on the

regime's violation of the principles of Islam and the 1906 Constitution, its tyra

nature, its subordination to the United States, and its expanding collaboration wi

Israel (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 17; Bazaei 1993, p. 2
Amjad 1989, p. 40).

The confrontation reached a new peak in June with the onset of Moharram. On the
tenth day of the Moharram, the month in the Muslim calendar when the martyrdom

of Imam Hossein, the third Imam of Shi'a Muslim and the grandson of the Prophet, is
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commemorated, I m a m Khomeini delivered an historic speech in Q o m , repeating his
denunciations of the Shah's regime and warning the Shah not to alienate the people
any further (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981; Bazaei 1993, pp. 23435; Amjad 1989; see also Firouzbakhch 1994, pp. 33-34). H e said "Mr. Shah! Dear
Mr. Shah, I advise you to desist in this policy and acts like this. I don't want the
people to offer up thanks if your masters should decide one day that you must leave.
I don't want you to become like your father" (Khomeini 1981, p. 178). T w o days
later, I m a m Khomeini was arrested at his residence and taken to accouchement in
Tehran (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini

1981; Amjad

1989;

Firouzbakhch 1994).

The arrest of Imam Khomeini brought popular abhorrence with the Shah's regime to
a crisis resulting in a major uprising which shook the throne. In Q o m , Tehran,
Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Kashan and other cities, unarmed demonstrations opposed
the Shah's U.S.-trained and equipped army, which, upon the command to shoot to
kill, slaughtered not less than 15,000 people in the space of a few days. The date on
which this uprising began, in June 1963, Khordad 15 according to the solar calendar
used in Iran, marked a turning point in the modern history of Iran (Algar 1981 in the
introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 17; Bazaei 1993, pp. 235; Amjad 1989, p. 40-41;
see also Hiro 1985, pp. 46-47). Algar in his introduction to I m a m Khomeini (1981),
Islam and the Revolution, says that "in all of these ways, the uprising of Khu[o]rdad
15 foreshadowed the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979" (p. 17). Firouzbakhch
(1994) reinforces Algar's statement that

the most important event in the year 1963 was the June uprising
w h e n [Imam] Khomeini was forced into exile in Iraq which in turn
created a n e w context of Islamic activism leading ultimately, to the
[Islamic] revolution in 1979 (p. 4).
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The uprising was suppressed, but the general public and the religious scholars
refused to tolerate the imprisonment of I m a m Khomeini.

Agitation persisted

throughout the country, and numerous religious leaders converged on Tehran to press
for I m a m Khomeini's release. It finally came on 6 April, 1964, accompanied by a
statement in the government-controlled press that I m a m Khomeini had agreed to
refrain from political activity as a condition for his release. This was immediately
refuted by the Imam, w h o resumed his denunciations of the regime with
undiminished vigour (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, pp. 17-18;
Bazaei 1993, p. 236; see Hiro 1985, pp. 48-49).

In October 1964, the Shah granted legal immunity to American personnel for all
offences committed in Iranian territory. This proved the Shah's tutelage to the U.S.
After learning that the Iranian Majlis had agreed to this measure, I m a m Khomeini on
October 27 furiously denounced this open violation of Iranian sovereignty and
independence (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 18; Bazaei 1993,
pp. 236-37; Amjad 1989, p. 41): "[t]he government has sold our independence,
reduced us to the level of a colony ... They have reduced the Iranian people to a level
lower than that of an American dog" (Khomeini 1981, p. 182). Accordingly, on 4
November, 1964, I m a m Khomeini was arrested again and sent into exile in Turkey,
accompanied by agents of the Shah's secret police (Algar 1981 in the introduction to
Khomeini 1981, p. 18; Bazaei 1993, p. 237; Amjad 1989, p. 41; see also Hiro 1985,
p. 49).

Unceasing pressure was brought on the Shah's regime to allow Imam Khomeini to
leave Turkey for a more favourable place of exile in the holy city of Najaf, one of the
Shi'i shrine cities of Iraq. In October 1965, permission was given, and I m a m
Khomeini proceeded to Najaf, which was to be his h o m e for thirteen years (Algar
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1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 18; Bazaei 1993, p. 238; Amjad 1989,
p. 41; see also Hiro 1985, p. 49). Despite his banishment, I m a m Khomeini continued
to maintain his influence and popularity in Iran. H e issued periodic proclamations
concerning developments in Iran that were copied into the country and clandestinely
circulated at great risk. In addition, his messages addressed to the Muslim world at
large were distributed several times in Mecca during the pilgrimage season of the
year. H e received visits during the long years of his exile in Najaf from a number of
important Iranian and other Muslim personalities (Algar 1981 in the introduction to
Khomeini 1981, p. 18; Bazaei 1993, pp. 238-39; see also Hiro 1985, p. 56). During
this period, the Shah hastened the secularisation and Westernisation of Iranian
society by emphasising the pre-Islamic culture of Iran (in order to provide an
ideological basis for the monarchy), and attempting to control the religious
institutions (Amjad 1989).

On 23 November, 1977, the elder son of Imam Khomeini, Hajj Mostafa achieved
martyrdom w h e n in Najaf he w a s assassinated by the Shah's security police,
SAVAK.

The killing aroused the public in Iran, adding to the already universal

discontent in Iran arising from massive social corruption and economic dislocation as
well as continuing political repression (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini
1981, p. 19; Bazaei 1993, p. 256; see also Hiro 1985, p. 69).

On 8 January, 1978 Attla'at (a government-controlled press) published an article,
supplied by the Ministry of the Court attacking I m a m Khomeini as an agent of
foreign powers, only one week after President Carter had been in Tehran lauding the
Shah as a wise statesman beloved of his people. The public reaction w a s immediate
outrage. The following day in Q o m , demonstrations broke out that were suppressed
with heavy loss of life (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 19;
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Bazaei 1993, p. 256; Abrahamian 1982; see also Hiro 1985, pp. 70-71; Parsa 1989, p.
110). The demonstrators were shouting "we don't want the Yazid government," "we
want our constitution," and "we demand the return of Ayatollah [Imam] Khomeini"
(Abrahamian 1982, p. 505). This was the first of a series of demonstrations that

progressively spread out across the country, until in the end, barely a single re
remained untouched by revolutionary fervour (Algar 1981 in the introduction to
Khomeini 1981, p. 19; Abrahamian 1982).

Throughout the spring and summer of 1978, Imam Khomeini issued a series of

proclamations and directives congratulating the people on their steadfastness and
encouraging them to persist until the attainment of the overthrow of the monarchy

and the institution of an Islamic republic (Algar 1981 in the introduction to Kho
1981, p. 19; Abrahamian 1982).

In September 1978, the Shah's regime requested the Baathist government of Iraq to

expel Imam Khomeini from its territory, in the hope of depriving him of his base o
operations and robbing the Revolution of its leadership (Algar 1981 in the
introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 19; Bazaei 1993, pp. 266; Abrahamian 1982; see
also Hiro 1985, p. 79). After his expulsion from Iraq in early October 1978, Imam
Khomeini went to France to live at the hamlet of Neauphle-le-Chateau near Paris.
Algar (1981) in this regard notes that "the move to France proved beneficial.
Paradoxically, communication with Iran was easier from France than it had been

from Iraq" (Algar in introduction to Khomeini 1981, p. 20; see also Bazaei 1993, p
267-68; Hiro 1985, p. 79-80).

The month of Moharram that coincided with December 1978 witnessed vast and

repeated demonstrations in Tehran and other Iranian cities demanding the abolitio
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of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic Government under the
leadership of Imam Khomeini. Despite all the savagery the Shah had employed,

including the slaughter of thousands of unarmed demonstrators, the torture and ab

of detainees, and massacres of the wounded in their hospital beds, and despite the

unstinting support he had received from the United States and other foreign powers
the rule of the Shah was approaching its end (Algar in introduction to Khomeini

1981, p. 20; see also Hiro 1985, pp. 84-89). On 16 January, 1979, when preparation
had been made for the installation of a surrogate administration under Shahpour
Bakhtiar, the Shah left Iran. The Shah's departure was a consummation of the
prediction which Imam Khomeini had made sixteen years earlier.

When Imam Khomeini returned to Iran, on 1 February, he was met with a tumultuous
welcome. With Imam Khomeini's renewed presence in Iran, the fate of the Bakhtiar
government was sealed. After a final outburst of savagery on February 10 and 11,
the old regime collapsed in disgrace, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born.
With the Islamic Revolution the form of government changed from a monarchy that
had lasted for around 2500 years to an Islamic Republic. The features of the new
system of government are discussed below.

2.3 THE FORM OF ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN
2.3.1 The Nature of Government in the Islamic Republic of Iran

According to the introduction of the Iranian Constitution the main aim of governm
in Islam is:

to foster the growth of m a n in such a w a y that he progresses toward
the establishment of a divine order, in accordance with the Qur'anic
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phrase "and to God is the journeying" (3:28)14, and to create
favorable conditions for the emergence and blossoming of man's
innate capacities so that the theomorphic dimensions of m a n are
manifested. This is in accordance with the injunction of the Prophet,
upon w h o m be peace, "Acquire the divine characteristics" (Algar
1980, p. 20). 15
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The Constitution also notes that the attainment of this goal depends on the broad and

active participation of all segments of society in the process of social developme
(Algar 1980, p. 20).

The Islamic government is based upon the governance of the Faqih.16 Figure 2.1
below shows that in the Islamic Republic of Iran the powers of government are

vested in the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary, three arms of governm
common to most governments, functioning under the supervision of the absolute
Velayat-e Faqih11 and the leadership of the Ummah [Islamic Society], in accordance

with the [Articles of the] Constitution.18 These powers are independent of each oth
(Article 57).

According to the Iranian Constitution the main features of the form of government in
Islam are:

1. Government does not derive from the interests of a certain class;
2. Government does not serve domination by an individual or a group (Introduction
to the Constitution);

14

These numbers refer to chapter 3, verse 28 from the holy Quran.
Emphases in original.
16
A scholar of the Islamic religious sciences, especially jurisprudence. For more see section 2.3.2.
17
For more see section 2.3.2.
18
For a comprehensive discussion of forms of Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih see Bazaei
1993, pp. 54-80.
15
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3. The purposes of Government in Islam are:
a. to aid the process of intellectual and ideological evolution toward the final
goal, i.e., movement toward God.
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b. to establish an ideal and model society on the basis of Islamic criteria.
c. the rejection of all forms of intellectual and social tyranny and economic
monopoly, and aims at entrusting the destinies of the people to the people
themselves in order to break completely with the system of tyranny.19

To achieve these aims the exercise of meticulous and painstaking supervision by just
pious, and committed scholars of Islam ("just Foqaha20") is an absolute necessity
(introduction to the Constitution).

2.3.2 The Leader or the Leadership Council

The most important feature of the Islamic Revolution compared with the Mashruteh
Revolution involves the Leader or Leadership Council. Algar (1980) believes that
the major significant difference between the 1979 Constitution and the 1907
Constitution is the introduction into the 1979 Constitution of the key concept of
Velayat-e Faqih, "the governance of the Faqih". This doctrine, which Imam
Khomeini had outlined at length in his celebrated lectures at Najaf in 1969, is the

keystone of the new political structure, ensuring that the Republic will be Islamic i
substance and daily functioning as well as designation (see Bazaei 1993, pp. 38-39).
Algar (1980) also mentions that it is true that Article Two of the supplementary laws
of 1907 had provided for a committee of five high-ranking scholars to ensure that no
legislation passed by the Majlis would be contrary to Islam, but the Article was never
implemented (Algar 1980, p. 10). According to Article 5 of the Iranian Constitution,
"[d]uring the Occultation of the Valia Asr21, the Valayah and leadership of the

19

This is in accordance with the Qur'anic verse "He removes from them their burdens and the fetter
that had weighed upon them" (Chapter 7, verse 157).
20
Plural of Faqih.
21
The most popular title which is used to call the twelfth and last I m a m of Shi'a, Imam Mahdi.
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U m m a h devolve upon the just [yadel] and pious [muttaqi] Faqih, w h o is fully aware
of the circumstances of his age". He also must be courageous, resourceful, and

possessed of administrative ability, and will assume the responsibilities of this o
in accordance with Article 107.

Article 107 states that after the demise of the eminent marja' taqlid and great lead
of the universal Islamic revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Ayatollah al-Ozma Imam Khomeini, who was recognised and accepted as marja' and

Leader by a decisive majority of the people, the task of appointing the Leader shall
be vested with the Experts elected by the people [The Council of Experts or Majlis'
Khobragan]22. The Experts will review and consult among themselves concerning

all the Foqaha possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In the

event they find one of the Foqaha better versed in Islamic regulations, the subject
the faqih [jurisprudence], or in political and social issues, or possessing general
popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications mentioned in Article
109, they shall elect him as the Leader. Otherwise, in the absence of such

superiority, the Experts shall elect and declare one of the Foqaha as the Leader. Th
Leader thus elected by the Assembly [Council] of Experts shall assume all the
powers of the Valayate-amr and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. The
Leader is equal with the rest of the people of the country in the eyes of the law.

Article 109 indicates three qualifications and conditions for the Leader. The Leader
must be: (a) a scholar to enable him to perform the functions of mufti in different

fields oi faqih; (b) a man of Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of t
Islamic Ummah; and (c) he must have a "right political and social perspicacity,

22

See section 2.3.3.
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prudence, courage, administrative abilities and adequate capability for leadership".
The Constitution adds that in the case of a number of persons fulfilling these
qualifications and conditions, the person possessing the better jurisprudential and
political perspicacity, according to the Experts, will be given preference. The

qualifications and conditions for the Leader before revising the Constitution in 19
(1368) were only (a) and (c) but, as noted above, they increased to three in the
revised version.23

2.3.2.1 Duties and Powers of the Leadership

According to Article 110 of the Constitution the Leader or Leadership has the
following duties and powers: (1) delineation of the general policies of the Islamic
Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council24 and
supervision of the proper execution of the general policies of the system of
government; (2) issuing decrees for national referenda; (3) assuming supreme
command of the armed forces; (4) making declarations of war and peace, and
authorising the mobilisation of the armed forces; (5) appointment, dismissal, and
acceptance of resignation of: the Foqaha on the Guardian Council25; the supreme

judicial authority of the country; the head of the radio and television network of t
Islamic Republic of Iran; the chief of the joint staff; the chief commander of the
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps; the supreme commanders of the armed forces; (6)
resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of
their relations; (7) resolving problems which cannot be solved by conventional

23

There were also minor changes in sections a and c of Article 109. Thus, in section "a" the phrase
'in different fields offaqih' was added and the word imarjaief w a s omitted. In section "c" the word
'prudence' w a s added. These changes made the situation more difficult to elect a person as the
Leader than before.
24
See section 2.3.6.
25
See section 2.3.5.
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methods through the Nation's Exigency Council; (8) signing the decree formalising
the election of the President of the Republic by the people; (9) dismissal of the

President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after t

Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or aft
vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA) testifying to his incompetence on
the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution; and (10) pardoning or reducing the

sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation

[to that effect] from the Head of judicial power. The Leader may delegate part of hi

duties and powers to another person. The suitability of candidates for the Presidenc

of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, m

be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council and, in the case of
the first term [of the Presidency], by the Leadership.

According to Article 111 whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his

constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 an

109, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initiall

he will be dismissed. The authority of determination in this matter is vested with t

Experts specified in Article 108. It adds that in the event of the death, or resigna

or dismissal of the Leader, the Experts shall take steps within the shortest possibl
time for the appointment of a new Leader. Till the appointment of the new Leader, a
council consisting of the President, head of the judiciary, and a Faqih from the
Guardian Council, upon the decision of the Nation's Exigency Council, shall

temporarily take over all the duties of the Leader. In the event, during this period

any one of them is unable to fulfil his duties for whatsoever reason, another person
upon the decision of a majority oi Foqaha in the Nation's Exigency Council shall be
elected in his place. Whenever the Leader becomes temporarily unable to perform
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the duties of leadership owing to illness or any other incident, then during this
the council mentioned in this Article shall assume his duties.

2.3.3 T h e Council of Experts (Majlis' Khobragan)

All members of the Council of Experts should be Faqih. Despite the importance of

the Council of Experts the Constitution has little to say about the qualifications
conditions of its members. Article 108 of the Constitution in this regard notes

[t]he law setting out the number and qualifications of the Experts
[mentioned in the preceding Article], the m o d e of their election, and
the code of procedure regulating the sessions during thefirstterm
must be drawn up by the Foqaha on thefirstGuardian Council,
passed by a majority of votes and then finally approved by the
Leader of the Revolution. The power to m a k e any subsequent
change or a review of this law, or approval of all the provisions
concerning the duties of the experts is vested in themselves.

According to Articles 107 and 111 of the Iranian Constitution, the Council of Experts

will elect and dismiss the Leader and the Experts will be elected by the people (for
more see section 2.3.2). It is worth noting here that the Iranian Constitution has

been written by the first Majlis' Khobragan on the basis of the draft proposed by th

government as well as all the proposals received from different groups of the people
and was approved in a referendum held throughout Iran on December 2-3, 1979.

2.3.4 The Legislature

Article 58 of Iranian Constitution establishes that the functions of the legislatur
exercised through the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Article 62 adds that the

representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly are elected by direct and secr
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ballot of the people. According to this Article "the qualifications of voters and

candidates, as well as the nature of election, will be specified by law"26. The term
membership in the Islamic Consultative Assembly is four years with elections for

each term taking place before the end of the preceding term, so that the country is
never without an Assembly (Article 63). The members of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly are to number two hundred and seventy which may increase by not more

than twenty for each ten-year period from the date of the national referendum in 19
[1368 of the solar Islamic calendar], keeping in view human, political, geographic
and other similar factors. The Zoroastrians and Jews will each elect one
representative; Assyrian and Chaldean Christians will jointly elect one
representative; and Armenian Christians in the north and those in the south of the

country will each elect one representative. The limits of the electoral constituenc
and the number of representatives will be determined by law (Article 64).

The presence of two-thirds of the total number of members of the Islamic

Consultative Assembly is necessary for its sessions to be regarded as legal. Drafts

and bills28 will be approved in accordance with the code of procedure approved by it
except in cases where the Constitution has specified a certain quorum. The consent

of two-thirds of all members present is necessary to approve any changes to the cod
of procedure of the Assembly (Article 65). The code of procedure of the Assembly

will determine the manner of election of the Speaker and the Presiding Board of the

Assembly, the number of committees and their term of office, and matters related to

26

The Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the election of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly (Article 99).
27
A Draft is a proposal which will be given to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA) by at least 10
of its members.
28
A Bill is a proposal which will be given to the ICA by the Executive.
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conducting the discussions and maintaining the discipline of the Assembly (Article
66).

According to Article 67 of the Iranian Constitution the members of the Assembly
must take the following oath at the first session of the Assembly and affix their
signatures to its text:

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. In the
presence of the Glorious Qur'an, I swear by God, the Exalted and
Almighty, and undertake, swearing by m y o w n honor as a human
being, to protect the sanctity of Islam and guard the
accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people and
the foundations of the Islamic Republic; to protect, as a just trustee,
the honor bestowed upon m e by the people, to observe piety in
fulfilling m y duties as people's representative; to remain always
committed to the independence and honor of the country; to fulfil
m y duties towards the nation and the service of the people; to defend
the Constitution; and to bear in mind, both in speech and writing and
in the expression of m y views, the independence of the country, the
freedom of the people, and the security of their interests.

Article 67 adds that members belonging to the religious minorities will swear by their

own sacred books while taking this oath. In addition, members not attending the fi

session will perform the ceremony of taking the oath at the first session they att

In time of war and the military occupation of the country the President of the
Republic may delay the elections in occupied areas or countrywide for a specified

period but the proposal should be approved by three-fourths of the total members of
the Islamic Consultative Assembly, with the endorsement of the Guardian Council.

If a new Assembly is not formed, the previous one will continue to function (Articl
68).
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The deliberations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be open, and full
minutes of them m a d e available to the public by the radio and the official gazette. A
closed session m a y be held in emergency conditions, if it is required for national
security, upon the request of the President, one of the ministers, or ten members of
the Assembly. Legislation passed at a closed session is valid only w h e n approved by
three-fourths of the members in the presence of the Guardian Council.

After

emergency conditions have ceased to exist, the minutes of such closed sessions,
together with any legislation approved in them, must be m a d e available to the public
(Article 69).

The President, his deputies and the ministers have the right to participate in the op
sessions of the Assembly either collectively or individually. They m a y also have
their advisers accompany them. If the members of the Assembly deem it necessary,
the ministers are obliged to attend. Conversely, whenever they request it, their
statements are to be heard (Article 70).

As explained above, the functions of the legislature in the Islamic Republic of Iran
are exercised through the Islamic Consultative Assembly but according to Articles 93
and 94 of the Iranian Constitution the Legislative process in the Islamic Republic of
Iran has two parts. Article 94 says that all legislation passed by the Islamic
Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council
must review it within a m a x i m u m often days from its receipt with a view to ensuring
its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the
legislation incompatible, it will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the
legislation will be deemed enforceable.

Article 93 also states that the Islamic

Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council

Chapter 2, Systems of Government...

47

in existence, except for the purpose of approving the credentials of its members and
the election of the six jurists on the Guardian Council.

Articles 52 and 53 of the Iranian Constitution empower the Islamic Consultative
Assembly to make laws regarding collecting and allocating public money. In article

53 it states that "[a]ll sums collected by the government will be deposited into the

government accounts at the central treasury, and all disbursements, within the limit

of allocations approved, shall be made in accordance with law". Article 52 adds that
"[t]he annual budget of the country will be drawn up by the government, in the
manner specified by law, and submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for
discussion and approval. Any change in the figures contained in the budget will be
in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law". These articles highlight how
the framework of financial management and accountability in government should be
exercised regarding using the public resources.

Some of the other important powers and authorities of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly according to the Iranian Constitution, could be categorised as follows.

Firstly, it has the authority to establish laws on all matters, within the limits of
competence as laid down in the Constitution, and also to interpret all the ordinary

laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some of the specific laws in this category are
the approval of international treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements; the
approval of minor amendments in the boundaries of the country in keeping with the

interests of the country, on condition that they are not unilateral, do not encroach

the independence and territorial integrity of the country and receive the approval o
four-fifths of the total members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly; the approval
of taking and giving loans or grants-in-aid both domestic and foreign; the approval
the employment of foreign experts in cases of necessity; and the approval of
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transferring government buildings and properties (Articles 71, 73, 77, 78, 80, 82 and
83).

Secondly, the Islamic Consultative Assembly has power to investigate and examine
all the affairs of the country. This includes the power to pose a question to the

President and each of the ministers on a subject relating to their duties and also to
interpellate the Board of Ministers or an individual minister. Furthermore, it has

authority to pose a vote of no confidence in the Board of Ministers or the Minister o
pose a vote of no confidence in the President. It has not only the authority to
investigate the work of the Executive Branch but also the authority to investigate
complaints against the work of the Assembly itself and the work of the judicial
power as well.29 The Islamic Consultative Assembly also has authority to give a vote
of confidence in the Board of Ministers after being formed and before all other
business. The President can also seek a vote of confidence from the Islamic
Consultative Assembly on the Board of Ministers on important and controversial
issues during his incumbency (Articles 76, 87, 88, 89 and 90).

The members of Islamic Consultative Assembly are responsible to the entire nation

and are completely free in expressing their views on all internal and external affair

of the country and also can cast their votes in the course of performing their duties
representatives. Furthermore, they cannot be prosecuted or arrested for opinions
expressed in the Assembly or votes cast in the course of performing their duties as
representatives (Articles 84 and 86).

29

Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the Assembly or the executive power, or the
judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly. The Assembly must investigate
complaints and give a satisfactory reply. In cases where the complaint relates to the executive or the
judiciary, the Assembly must demand proper investigation of the matter and an adequate explanation
from the accused, and announce the results within a reasonable time. In cases where the subject of the
complaint is of public interest, the reply must be m a d e public (Article 90).
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The Islamic Consultative Assembly has the authority to elect the six jurists on the

Guardian Council and can delegate the power of legislating certain laws to its own

committees, in accordance with Article 72, whenever it is necessary.30 Finally, the
Islamic Consultative Assembly has power to agree with the government to impose
temporarily certain necessary restrictions in case of war or emergency conditions
akin to war31 (Articles 79, 85, 91 and 93).

There are circumstances in which the Islamic Consultative Assembly does not have
authority to make laws. These include enactment of laws contrary to the usual and

ahkam (commandments) of the official religion of the country or to the Constitutio
(see next section). Members' bills and proposals (see footnotes Nos. 26 and 27) and
amendments to governments bills proposed by members that entail the reduction of
the public income or the increase of public expenditure may be introduced in the
Assembly only if the means for compensating for the decrease in income or for
meeting the new expenditure are also specified.

The Islamic Consultative Assembly does not have authority to grant concessions to
foreigners for the formation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce,

30

In such a case, the laws will be implemented on a tentative basis for a period specified by the
Assembly, and their final approval will rest with the Assembly. Article 85 adds likewise that the
Assembly may, in accordance with Article 72, delegate to the relevant committees the responsibility
for permanent approval of articles of association of organisations, companies, government
institutions, or organisations affiliated with the government and or invest the authority in the
government. In such a case, government approvals must not be inconsistent with the principles and
commandments of the official religion in the country and or the Constitution. A n y inconsistency shall
be determined by the Guardian Council in accordance with what is stated in Article 96. In addition to
this, government approvals shall not be against the laws and other general rules of the country and,
while calling for implementation, the same shall be brought to the knowledge of the Speaker of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly for his study and indication that the approvals in question are not
inconsistent with the aforesaid rules (Article 85).
31
According to article 79, in no case can such restrictions last for more than thirty days. If the need
for them persists beyond this limit the government must obtain n e w authorisation from the Assembly.
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A n d finally the Islamic

Consultative Assembly cannot transfer the right of membership in the Islamic
Consultative Assembly to others and cannot delegate the power of legislation to an
individual or committee (Articles 72, 75, 81 and 85).

2.3.5 The Guardian Council

With a view to safeguarding Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order to
examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly with Islam, a council known as the Guardian Council must be constituted.
It is to be composed of six ""adeP2 Foqaha" conscious of the present needs and the
issues of the day", to be selected by the Leader, and six jurists, specialising in
different areas of law, who in turn are to be elected by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial
Power (Article 91). The term of the members of the Guardian Council is six years,

although during the first term, after three years have passed, half of the members of
each group must be changed by lot and new members elected in their place (Article
92).

As noted in section 2.3.4 above, according to Article 93 of the Iranian Constitution
the Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no
Guardian Council in existence, except for the purpose of approving the credentials
the Islamic Consultative Assembly members and the election of the six jurists on the
Guardian Council. All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must
be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a

Just; T o put every things in its place; T o be moderate in social life; Justice.

Chapter 2, Systems of Government...

51

m a x i m u m of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with

the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible
will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed
enforceable (Article 94). In cases where the Guardian Council deems ten days

inadequate for completing the process of review and delivering a definite opinion, i

can request the Islamic Consultative Assembly to grant an extension of the time limi
not exceeding ten days (Article 95).

The determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic
Consultative Assembly with the laws of Islam rests with the majority vote of the
Foqaha on the Guardian Council; and the determination of its compatibility with the
Constitution rests with the majority of all the members of the Guardian Council
(Article 96). In order to expedite the work, the members of the Guardian Council
may attend the Assembly and listen to its debates when a government bill or the
Islamic Consultative Assembly members' draft is under discussion. When an urgent
government bill or the Islamic Consultative Assembly members' draft is placed on
the agenda of the Assembly, the members of the Guardian Council must attend the
Assembly and make their views known (Article 97).

The Guardian Council has three other important functions: firstly, it is given

authority to interpret the Constitution, which is to be done with the consent of thr

fourths of its members (Article 98). Secondly, it has the responsibility of supervi
the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President of the
Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the recourse to popular opinion
and referenda (Article 99). In the event of a deadlock between the Islamic
Consultative Assembly and the Guardian Council whereby the Guardian Council
judges a proposed bill of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the
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principles of Shariah [the law of Islam] or the Constitution, and the Assembly is
"unable" to meet the expectations of the Guardian Council, then the revised
Constitution of 1989 provides that upon the order of the Leader the Nation's
Exigency Council shall meet. It also adds that all the members of the Nation's
Exigency Council, permanent and changeable, shall be appointed by the Leader.
Finally, the rules for the Council shall be formulated and approved by the Council
members subject to the confirmation by the Leader (Article 112).

2.3.6 The Executive

The President holds the highest office in the country after that of the Leadership. He
is responsible for implementation of the Constitution and acts as the head of the
Executive, except in matters directly concerned with (the office of) the Leadership.

The President is elected for a term of four years by the direct vote of the people and
can be re-elected only once. He should get an absolute majority of votes polled by
the voters and he is responsible to the people, the Leader and the Islamic
Consultative Assembly (Articles 113,114, 117, and 122). According to Article 115
of the Iranian Constitution, the President must be elected from among religious and
political personalities and he should possess the following qualifications: be of
Iranian origin; Iranian citizenship; administrative capacity and resourcefulness; a
good past-record; trustworthiness and piety; a firm belief in the fundamental
principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official school [madhhab, that is
Twelver Ja'fari school] of thought of the country. The President must take the
following oath and affix his signature to it at a session of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly in the presence of the head of the judicial power and the members of the
Guardian Council:
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In the N a m e of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, as
President, swear, in the presence of the Noble Qur'an and the people
of Iran, by God, the Exalted and Almighty, that I will guard the
official religion of the country, the order of the Islamic Republic and
the Constitution of the country; that I will devote all m y capacities
and abilities to the fulfilment of the responsibilities that I have
assumed; that I will dedicate myself to the service of the people, the
honor of the country, the propagation of religion and morality, and
the support of truth and justice, refraining from every kind of
arbitrary behavior; that I will protect the freedom and dignity of all
citizens and therightsthat the Constitution has accorded the people;
that in guarding the frontiers and the political, economic, and
cultural independence of the country I will not shirk any necessary
measure; that, seeking help from G o d and following the Prophet of
Islam and the infallible I m a m s (peace be upon them), I will guard, as
a pious and selfless trustee, the authority vested in m e by the people
as a sacred trust, and transfer it to whomever the people m a y elect
after m e (Article 121).

The President m a y appoint deputies for the performance of some of his constitutional

duties. With the approval of the President, the first deputy of the President shall be

vested with the responsibilities of administering the affairs of the Board of Ministe
and coordination of functions of other deputies (Article 124). If he wishes to resign

his office, the President shall submit his resignation to the Leader and shall contin

performing his duties until his resignation is accepted (Article 130). In the event of
the death, dismissal, resignation, absence of the President or illness lasting longer
than two months or when his term in office has ended and a new President has not
been elected due to some impediments, or similar other circumstances, his first
deputy shall assume, with the approval of the Leader, the powers and functions of the
President. A Council, consisting of the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, the head of the judicial power, and the first deputy of the President, is
obliged to arrange for a new President to be elected within a maximum period of fifty
days. In case of death of the first deputy of the President, or other matters which
prevent him from performing his duties, or when the President does not have a first
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deputy, the Leader shall appoint another person in his place (Article 131). Article
132 of the Constitution adds that during these periods the ministers can neither be
interpellated nor can a vote of no-confidence be passed against them. Also, neither
can any step be undertaken for a review of the Constitution, nor a national
referendum be held.

Ministers, who at present number 23, will be appointed by the President and will be
presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence and they shall continue in office
unless they are dismissed, or given a vote of no-confidence by the Assembly as a

result of their interpellation, or a motion for a vote of no-confidence against them
made (Articles 133 and 135). The President is the head of the Board of Ministers.
He supervises the work of the ministers and takes all necessary measures to
coordinate the decisions of the government. With the cooperation of the ministers,
he determines the programme and policies of the government and implements the
laws. In the case of discrepancies, or interferences in the constitutional duties of
government agencies, the decision of the Board of Ministers at the request of the
President shall be binding provided it does not call for an interpretation or
modification in the laws. The President is responsible to the Assembly for the
actions of the Board of Ministers (Article 134). Under Article 136 of the

Constitution the President can dismiss the ministers and in such a case he must obtai
a vote of confidence for the new minister(s) from the Assembly. In the case where
half of the members of the Board of Ministers are changed after the government has
received its vote of confidence from the Assembly, the government must seek a fresh
vote of confidence from the Assembly. The resignation of the Board of Ministers

either as a group or individually shall be submitted to the President, and the Board
Ministers shall continue to function until such time as the new government is
appointed (this period is at most three months). The President can appoint a
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caretaker for a maximum period of three months for the ministries having no minister
(Article 135). According to Article 126 of the Iranian Constitution the President is
responsible for national planning and budgeting, state employment and may entrust
the administration of these to others. The financial management and accountability
of the government will be discussed in the next chapter.

Ministers are answerable to the President and the Assembly but, in matters approved

by the Board of Ministers as a whole, each of the ministers is also responsible for the
actions of the others (Article 137). Before revising the Constitution in 1989 there
was a provision for a Prime Minister in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Responsibility
for the supervision of the election of the President lies with the Guardian Council
(Article 118).

2.3.7 The Judiciary

Article 156 establishes that the judiciary is an independent power, the protector of t

rights of the individual and society, responsible for the implementation of justice an
supervising the proper enforcement of laws. In the Islamic Republic of Iran the

courts of justice are the official bodies to which all grievances and complaints are to
be referred. The law determines the formation of courts and their jurisdiction
(Article 159). The judiciary is also responsible for: investigating and passing
judgement on grievances, violations of rights, and complaints; the resolving of

litigation; the settling of disputes; the taking of all necessary decisions and measur
in probate matters as the law may determine; restoring public rights and promoting
justice and legitimate freedoms; supervising the proper enforcement of laws;
uncovering crimes; prosecuting, punishing, and chastising criminals and enacting the
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penalties and provisions of the Islamic penal code; taking suitable measures to
prevent the occurrence of crime and to reform criminals.

The head of the judiciary, who is appointed by the Leader for a period of five years,
should be a just Mujtahed w h o is well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing
prudence and administrative abilities. H e is also the highest judicial authority
(Article 157). The head of the judiciary is responsible for the establishment of the
organisational structure necessary for the administration of justice commensurate
with the responsibilities mentioned under Article 156 (noted above) and clrafting the
judiciary bills appropriate for the Islamic Republic. H e is to ensue the employment
of just and worthy judges and to oversee their dismissal, appointment, transfer,
assignment to particular duties, promotions and carrying out similar administrative
duties in accordance with the law (Article 158).

A judge cannot be removed, whether temporarily or permanently, from the post he
occupies except by trial and proof of his guilt, or in consequence of a violation
entailing his dismissal. A judge cannot be transferred or redesignated without his
consent, except in cases w h e n the interest of society necessitates it. In these
circumstances it must be with the approval of the head of the judiciary branch after
consultation with the chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General. The
periodic transfer and rotation of judges will be in accordance with general regulations
to be laid d o w n by law (Article 164).

The Iranian form of government can be described as unitary because it is composed
of one, strong central government. It therefore differs in this regard to Australia
which is a Federation composed of three levels of government. It is to the form of
the Australian government that this thesis n o w turns.
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2.4 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

The Federal form of government in Australia consists of three tiers of government:
Commonwealth, State and Local. Each State has its own Parliament, Cabinet,

Premier and ministers. For the purposes of this study, in the following section the
central government of Australia (Commonwealth) only will be discussed and
explained.

2.4.1 Commonwealth of Australia

The present form of government in Australia was established by the Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act which was passed by the British Parliament in July
1900 and became effective on 1 January 1901 (Public Service Board 1986, p. 2).
Emy and Hughes (1988) argue that the Australian Constitution is unusual because it

derives almost equally from the two very different constitutional traditions of th
United Kingdom and the United States (Emy and Hughes 1988, p. 226), although its
description as a Westminster type of government suggests the stronger British
influence. De Smith (1961) defines the Westminster model as

a constitutional system in which the head of state is not the effective
head of government, in which the effective head of government is a
Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet composed of Ministers over
whose appointment and removal he had at least a substantial
measure of control; in which the effective executive branch of
government is parliamentary inasmuch as Ministers must be
members of the legislature; and in which Ministers are collectively
and individually responsible to a freely elected and representative
legislature (quoted in E m y , 1978, pp. 135-36).

Chapter 2, Systems of Government...

58

In c o m m o n with most major forms of governance, Australian federal governance is
divided among three parts: the Legislature (the Parliament), the Executive and the
Judiciary (Public Service Board 1986, pp. 2-4).

Mascarenhas (1990) argues that "the Westminster model of government works on the
principle of elected ministers who are advised by the permanent civil servants and
responsible for implementing public policy" (Mascarenhas 1990, p. 76). Emy (1978)
is of the opinion that Australia appears to follow orthodox Westminster practice by
giving the lower house power to initiate supply in section 53 of the Australian
Constitution (Emy 1978, p. 207 ). Although the Senate, the upper house, does not
have this power it may deny or approve supply. As an another example of this
orthodox model Emy adds that the model of responsible (or Westminster)
government gives quite a different view of the Governor-General's office to that
apparently provided by the Australian Constitution (Emy 1978, p. 135).

The Australian Constitution does not say much about the purpose of government in

Australia. Instead, Aitkin et al (1989) note that it mainly provides a set of writt

rules determining the shape of the nation's government. Section 51 establishes that
the purpose of Parliament, and therefore government, in Australia is "to make laws
for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth".

2.4.2 The Legislature

The legislative power of the Commonwealth in Australia is vested in a Federal
Parliament which consists of the Queen, a Senate or Upper House, and a House of
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Representatives or Lower House (Constitution, Section l)33. Emy and Hughes
(1988) note that with this definition the monarchical aspect is emphasised and
because the then Queen was to remain in Britain Section 2 of the Constitution states
that the Governor-General34 is appointed by the Queen to be Her Majesty's
representative in the Commonwealth (Emy and Hughes 1988, p. 232).

Two of the most important sections of the Australian Constitution, like most
countries, refer to the collection and spending of money. Section 81 stipulates that
"[a]ll revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive Government of the
Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated Revenue Fund" while Section 83 states
"[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the Commonwealth except under
appropriation made by law" (Commonwealth of Australia 1994, Section 83).

Section 51 of the Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth Parliament the
right to make laws relating to: trade and commerce with other countries, and among
the States; foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within
the limits of the Commonwealth; taxation;35 bounties on the production or export of

goods;36 postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services; insurance, other tha
State insurance, also State insurance extending beyond the limits of the State

concerned; conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industria
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State; and fisheries in Australian
waters beyond territorial limits.

33

See figure 2.2.
See section 2.4.3
35
The taxation laws should not discriminate between States or parts of States.
36
Such bounties shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth.
34
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The Commonwealth government has also been conferred with the ability to make
laws concerning: the borrowing of money on the public credit of the Commonwealth;
currency, coinage, and legal tender; banking, other than State banking, also State
banking extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, the incorporation of
banks, and the issue of paper money; bills of exchange and promissory notes; and
bankruptcy and insolvency (Section 51).

Authority is given to the Commonwealth to make laws concerning family matters

such as marriage; divorce and matrimonial causes, and in relation to parental right
and the custody and guardianship of infants; invalid and old-age pensions; the
provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment,
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental

services, benefits to students and family allowances and the acquisition of proper
on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the
Parliament has power to make laws (Section 51).

Making the laws associated with judicial themes is also one of the authorities of t
Commonwealth Parliament. They include the service and execution throughout the
Commonwealth of civil and criminal processes and the judgements of the courts of

the States; the recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws, public acts an
records, and the judicial proceedings of the States; the influx of criminals; and

matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the
Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth,
or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth
(Section 51).
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The Australian Commonwealth Parliament has been given power to make laws
which are related to external affairs such as the relations of the Commonwealth with
the islands of the Pacific; immigration and emigration; the naval and military defence
of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to
execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth (Section 51).

With one exception, to be discussed below, the Senate and the House of
Representatives are co-equal in powers. In the following section the role of the
Senate as determined by the Constitution will be examined.

2.4.2.1 Senate

The Senate consists of equal numbers of representatives from each of the six States.
The senators shall be directly chosen by the people of each State as one electorate,
otherwise the Parliament provides the form of election (Section 7). Under Section 9
of the Constitution if the Parliament of the Commonwealth makes laws prescribing
the method of choosing senators the method shall be uniform for all the States. The
purpose of the architects of federation in creating the Senate, or Upper House, was to
protect the interests of the States. For this reason, the Constitution provides that each
State should be represented by the same number of senators. The presence of at least
one-third of the whole number of the senators is necessary to constitute a meeting of
the Senate for the exercise of its powers (Section 22). From 1949, each of the six
States had ten senators, this number being increased to twelve in 1983. In 1975, the
Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory were allowed to elect two
senators each, bringing the Senate's total to seventy-six at the present time (Public
Service Board 1986, p. 7). The Senate cannot normally be dissolved during its sixyear term. However, if a deadlock occurs between the Houses, then the Governor-
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General m a y dissolve both Houses simultaneously (Section 28) (Sawer 1975, p. 30).
Apart from safeguarding the interests of the States, one of the main roles of the

Senate is to probe and check the administration of the laws, and to keep itself and t
public informed, and to insist on ministerial accountability for the Government's
administration (Public Service Board 1986, p. 8).

Senators are elected for a six-year term, with the exception of senators from the
Territories whose terms coincide with those of the House of Representatives (Section
7). The election of senators is usually staggered (except following a double

dissolution) by retiring half of the senators on 30th June every third year (Section
to coincide with the general election for the House of Representatives. Senate
elections are usually held at the same time as elections for members of the House of
Representatives. Senators are elected by universal suffrage under a system known as
proportional representation. The Constitution does not declare what the
qualifications of senators should be but in Sections 9 and 16 it says that "the
qualification of a senator shall be the same as those of a member of the House of
Representatives".

Bills may be introduced in either House of the Commonwealth Parliament and both
Houses have the same power to legislate with the exception of money bills (Section
53). Under Section 53, Bills for appropriating revenue or moneys or imposing
taxation must be introduced in the House of Representatives (Public Service Board
1986, pp. 6-8). According to the Australian Constitution, in order for a Bill to

become an Act of the Parliament it is first necessary that it be passed by both House
of Parliament and then receive the Royal assent. As the Senate can reject any
proposed law (including money Bills) passed by the House of Representatives,
deadlocks may arise between the two Houses. In this case, and in these
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circumstances, both Houses m a y be dissolved and an immediate election held
(Section 57).

2.4.2.2 The House of Representatives

The members of the House of Representatives (HR), or Lower House, are chosen

directly by the people, with the number chosen in each State being in proportion to

its population, provided that no original State returns less than five members (The
Northern Territory now returns one member, and the Australian Capital Territory,
two). The Constitution also provides that the House should be approximately twice
the size of the Senate. At present, there are 148 members of the House of
Representatives. Members of Parliament are elected for terms not exceeding three

years and are elected by a preferential voting system (Public Service Board 1986, p
8; Commonwealth of Australia 1989, p. 779). Sawer (1975) points out that the
House of Representatives can be dissolved at any time by the Governor-General
(Sawer 1975, p. 30). The term of the House of Representatives is three years from
the first meeting of the House, and no longer, but may be dissolved sooner by the
Governor-General. To constitute a meeting of the House of Representatives for the

exercise of its powers the presence of at least one-third of the whole number of th
members of the House of Representatives is necessary unless the Parliament
otherwise provides (Section 39).

Under Section 59 of the Constitution the Queen has the authority to disallow any la
within one year from the Governor-General's assent, and such disallowance on being
made known by the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul the law from the day
when the disallowance is made known. When a proposed law is reserved for the

Queen's pleasure it shall not have any force unless and until within two years from
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the day on which it was presented the Governor-General makes known, by speech or
message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, that it has
received the Queen's assent (Sawer 1975, p. 21).

Section 57 further provides that if after a dissolution of Parliament as a result
deadlock between the two Houses the House of Representatives again passes the
proposed law and the Senate again rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-

General may convene a joint sitting of the members of the Senate and of the House o
Representatives (Public Service Board 1986, p. 7).

2.4.3 The Governor-General

The Governor-General is the head of the Executive in the Australian Commonwealth.
He is appointed by the Queen on the Prime Minister's recommendation and is Her
Majesty's representative in the Commonwealth. He has and may exercise the
Queen's powers and functions subject to the Constitution in the Commonwealth
during the Queen's pleasure (Section 2). The Australian Constitution provides
powers for the Governor-General: to represent the Crown in Australia and represent
the executive authority of the Commonwealth; to preside over Federal Executive
Council meetings and sign various government instruments approved by it; to be
Commander-in-Chief of the Australian armed forces; to commission Prime

Ministers; to appoint Ministers of State and administer oaths of office to them; to

appoint and remove all officers of the Executive Government, unless the appointmen
is delegated by the Governor-General in Council or by a law of the Commonwealth
to some other authority; to summon, prorogue, dissolve Parliament; grant a double
dissolution in the event of an inter-House deadlock and summon a joint meeting of
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the Houses if the ensuring election does not result in resolution of the deadlock; to
recommend appropriations to Parliament (that is, the earmarking of government
funds for specific purposes); to assent to Bills; to appoint judges to the High Court
and other federal courts and remove them if asked to do so by both Houses of
Parliament (Public Service Board 1986, p. 19).

2.4.4 The Executive

The Governor-General is responsible for the execution and maintenance of the
Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth (Section 61). Sawer (1975) notes
that this definition the Governor-General's powers includes a share in the legislative
power (Sawer 1975, p. 33). T o fulfil the Governor-General functions regarding
firstly, the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and secondly, the
execution and maintenance of the laws passed (by the Parliament) in accordance with
the Constitution, drafters of the Australian Constitution anticipated that the
Governor-General would need some advisers to assist in implementing his duties.
Hence they m a d e provision for the Federal Executive Council to advise the
Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth. The members of the
Council are chosen and s u m m o n e d by the Governor-General and sworn as Executive
Councillors, and "hold office during his pleasure" (Section 62). The GovernorGeneral m a y appoint any "citizens of merit and ability w h o are considered worthy of
the honour" (Public Service Board 1986, p. 20) without reference to parliamentary
qualifications. Executive Councillors are appointed for life unless their membership
is completed. In the exercise of executive power, therefore, key roles are played by
the Governor-General, the Federal Executive Council, the Ministers of State as the
Cabinet, and their departments (Public Service Board 1986, pp. 19-20).
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Spann (1979) notes that the major instruments of administrative control in Australia
are the Commonwealth and State cabinets. He adds that the cabinet is, in Bagehot's
words, "a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens politics and administration"
(Spann 1979, p. 44). As Aitkin et al (1989) note:

[i]n 1956 Prime Minister Menzies divided his ministry into cabinet,
comprising twelve senior ministers, and a junior ministry which then
numbered ten (more recently, as m a n y as fifteen). Under the
Whitlam Labor government from 1972 to 1975 all ministers were
members of cabinet, but the division into two groups was reintroduced in the Fraser government and maintained by the H a w k e
Labour government, the first Labor administration to adopt this
division (Aitkin et al 1989, p. 105).

In the Westminster system all cabinet members including the Prime Minister come
from and sit in Parliament where they must be prepared, at appropriate times, to
answer the questions of the Parliament. Westminster governance is therefore known
as a 'responsible form of governance'. In countries like Australia in which parties
have a mainstream role in politics, ministers are not merely members of Parliament;
they are members of the political party or coalition of parties which commands a
majority in the House of Representatives. In Australia it is not necessary for all
ministers to be members of the cabinet. Aitkin et al (1989) argue that in the
Westminster system "ministers, and the Prime Minister in particular, wield
considerable power as decision-makers and party leaders, their presence in
parliament has important political effects" (Aitkin et al 1989, p. 107). By

convention, the Prime Minister is the leader of the party which holds the majority i
the House of Representatives (Public Service Board 1986, p. 20) and is a member of
the lower house (Aitkin et al 1989, p. 106). In Australia, Cabinet is composed of
some or all of the Ministries, depending on the decision taken by the Government of
the day. The Ministry is composed of members of Parliament, from the Senate or the
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House of Representatives, w h o have been appointed to be responsible for a
department of State (Public Service Board 1986, p. 20).

In comparison to the Westminster system of government (such as in Australia), there
is at least another different system of government, which is called the Congressional
system. A s noted before, in the Westminster system the executive and legislative
branches of government are not separate. In this system, the executive power is part
of the legislative power and the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the people.
(S)he depends directly upon the support of party colleagues to gain and retain office,
which can leave her or him with political debts. In the Congressional system the
head of executive power, the President, is elected directly by the people and (s)he is
not a m e m b e r of Congress (Parliament). Aitkin et al (1989) show these differences
in figures 2.3 and 2.4 below.

Figure 2.3 The Westminster System
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T h e Congressional System

President
W h o appoints
Voters Elect

Cabinet

Senate
House
of
Representatives
(Source: Aitkin et al 1989, p. 107)

Ministers in the Westminster system are responsible for the administration of their
department and also have certain obligations to the Government. These obligations

are, conventionally, the maintenance of the secrecy of the proceedings of Cabinet an
the responsibility of Ministers for the policy of the Government as a whole (Public
Service Board 1986, p. 21). The most popular definition of "Collective
Responsibility" is that all ministers support a decision once it has been publicly
announced (Emy 1978). Aitkin et al (1989) remark that Ministers should seek
cabinet approval for policy before it is announced. They must publicly support

cabinet decisions, if unable to do so they should resign. They also add that Minister
should not publicly criticise a colleague's actions and they should not express
opinions on policy other than in an official manner; that is, ministers do not have
"private" opinions on such matters (Aitkin et al 1989, p. 118).
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2.4.5 T h e Judiciary

Under Section 71 of Australian Constitution the Judicial power of Commonwealth is
vested in a Federal Supreme Court which is called the High Court of Australia, and
in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it
invests with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and
so m a n y other Justices (not less than two) as the Parliament prescribes.

The

Governor-General in Council appoints a Justice of the High Court and he can only be
removed from his office on the grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity, and
only then by the Governor-General in Council after addresses have been made in
both Houses of Parliament in the same session. The Justice of the High Court and of
any court created by the Parliament must retire at the age 70, and he m a y resign his
office in writing under to the Governor-General (Section 72). According to Section
76 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution the duty of interpreting the
Constitution has been given to the High Court (Public Service Board 1986, pp. 3133).

2.5 CONCLUSION

The systems of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Australia were
discussed in this chapter. These discussions showed that like most countries, both
have three separate branches: the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. It was
explained that the form of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran is unitary and
consists of the Leader or Leadership Council, the President, the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, and the Judiciary. The structure of Federal government in Australia
including the Governor-General, the Houses of Parliament and the High Court also
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has been represented. It has been explained that in the Islamic Republic of Iran the
head of the Executive branch, the President, is directly elected by the people and is
responsible to the Leader, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and people. This
chapter also pointed out that the head of the Executive branch in Australia, the Prime
Minister, c a m e from the party that holds the majority of seats in the Lower House or
House of Representatives and is responsible to the Parliament and through that to the
people. The arguments in this chapter drew together the chain of responsibility and
accountability in a form which will help to give a detailed discussion of
accountability in next chapter. Chapter 3 examines the relationship of accountability
that exists between the Legislature and the Executive in Australia and in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.

CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND IN AUSTRALIA

Even if w e do not think that w e have to give an account of ourselves at the last
judgement, by answering for our conduct or giving an explanation for what w e
have done, w e m a y feel accountable for our daily actions either to others or to
our o w n sense of what is right or appropriate: super-ego can take the place of
super-God. ... [Accountability in the context of social life, it implies that our
actions are open to inspection and can challenge scrutiny.... [Accountability in a
religious or ethical sense, it implies that our actions can be set against a certain
set of rules or expectations about right conduct. ... [Accountability is about
keeping ourfinancialbooks in order... (Day and Klein 1987, p. 4).

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter 2 the structures of government (the Executive, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary) of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Australia were examined in detail. It
was explained that the system of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran is
unitary under the supervision of the Valayat-e Faqih (see section 2.3.2) which is
elected by the Khobragan Assembly. The responsibilities and powers of the
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Assembly have

been clarified and the process by which they are elected has also been discussed.
Chapter 2 also referred to the three levels of government in Australia; the
Commonwealth, the States, and local government. The processes by which the
Governor-General is appointed, and by which the Prime Minister and members of the
Parliament are elected, along with their responsibilities and powers have also been
highlighted.

This chapter draws upon the structures of government established in chapter 2 to
examine concepts of accountability which are followed in theory and practice. The
importance of accountability in the public sector and its role in a changing modern
society will be discussed in this chapter. In recent years the dimensions of
accountability given prominence in the public sector were expanded in Australia,
New Zealand and England to include efficiency and effectiveness rather than just

emphasising the traditional dimensions of accountability, in particular accountabilit

for legality and regularity. Interpretation of accountability, as found in theories o
governance and in practice, are the primary determinations of the mechanisms used
to ensure accountability. This chapter also will provide an historical overview of
accountability as it has been understood in Australia and in the Islamic Republic of

Iran. Finally, the nature of accountability will be examined, followed by a discussion
of how it functions now in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Australia.

3.2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

The concept of accountability in the public sector has changed during recent decades,
chiefly from the 1980s, with the emphasis shifting from a stewardship notion to a
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meaning more related to management principles (Normanton 1966; Johnson 1971;
Cutt 1977; Guthrie 1989; Hood 1990; Goldman and Brashares 1991; Broadbent and
Guthrie 1992; Lourens 1993; Ghartey 1993; Pallot 1995; Sinclair 1995).
Traditionally, the major emphasis in public accountability has revolved around a
proper accounting of the collection of finances or inputs, rather than wise and
effective spending of public funds or outputs (Guthrie 1991a; Broadbent and Guthrie
1992; Lourens 1993). This concept of financial accountability in the public sector
has been common in both Western and Eastern systems of governments for many
centuries (Lourens 1993, p. 180).

The input oriented concept of accountability includes checks on regularity and
probity in using public resources. The aim was to ensure that money which
Parliament permitted the Executive to raise and spend was spent according to the
clauses in the Appropriation Acts and that fraudulent use of public sector revenues

did not occur. This gave accountability a very narrow stewardship interpretation. In
recent years, however, "the boundaries of accounting have been expanded beyond the

traditional stewardship function to embrace the broader socio-economic and political
concerns of society" (Ghartey 1993, p. 170; see also Stewart and Ranson 1988, p.

19). Consequently, the function of 'new accounting' is to create, measure and record

the elements of efficiency, cost saving, productivity and performance (Guthrie 1991a
p. 4; Broadbent and Guthrie 1992, p. 15). Furthermore, according to Staats (1977)
and INCOSAI XII (1987), the emphasis in accountability has moved to examining
the purposes for public expenditures and the accompanying value for money aspects
of such expenditures (in Lourens 1993, p. 41).
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specific time-frame has been given for the beginning of accountability

(particularly public accountability) by researchers. Normanton (1966) is of the
opinion that "the idea of accountability is perhaps as old as organized government"

(p. 3). Taking it further, Normanton (1971) believes that "accountability is a devic

as old as civilised government itself; it is indispensable to regimes of every kind"
312). Normanton (1966) believes that "it [accountability] was highly developed in

classical Athens and was a matter of pride and principle" (p. 3; see also Dewar 1992

p. 5; Sinclair 1995, p. 223). Normanton (1966) also cautions that "accountability is

not the same thing in all ages; it depends upon the nature of the state itself (p. 3
However, the need for governments to be accountable has not changed even though

the state might be a traditional monarchy hierarchy and all accountability is to the
head (Normanton 1966).

Bird (1973) supports Normanton's position on accountability. He reveals that the
idea of public accountability has its roots in the emergence of civilisation (Bird
1973). It is believed that the core of the modern concept of accountability or

stewardship is in the practices and laws of the ancient civilised world and particul
in places such as Egypt, Babylon, India, Athens and Rome (Lourens 1993, p. 47).
When Hammurabi, King of Babylonia, declared his legal code around 2000 BC, it

appeared he had paid a good deal of attention to the accountability of those who wer
entrusted with resources belonging to others (Gray and Jenkins 1993, p. 53). Day

and Klein (1987) discussed two different forms of accountability found in the ancien
governments: political accountability and financial accountability. Political

accountability was concerned with the delegation of responsibility to individuals fo
carrying out tasks on behalf of their fellow citizens. In the Athenian tradition,
accountability was about explaining and justifying conduct. It was this form of
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accountability of officials which w a s the key to responsible government. A n absence
of accountability meant lawlessness. Lack of political accountability caused a
Persian autocrat like Xerxes to be called a despot by the Athenians (p. 6). Day and
Klein (1987) described the Athenian's form of accountability as

direct, continuous, and comprehensive. Ten times a year, the
officials charged with carrying out the administration had to report
on their conduct in office to the Assembly of the citizens. If they
failed to carry a vote of confidence, if their explanation was judged
to be inadequate, they faced a trial by jury of their follow citizens (p.
6).

Financial accountability, refers to explaining performance through financial
accounts. This includes checking "on whether the appropriate funds have come in
and whether the outgoing money has been spent properly" (Day and Klein 1987, p.
6). Financial accountability has been not limited to democratic governments.

Financial accountability has existed in autocratic governments and "even a tyrant li
Xerxes called his servants to account for the way in which they raised the levies for
his armies and how they spent the money" (Day and Klein 1987, p. 8). Lourens
(1993) describes the form of financial accountability in ancient times as having an
emphasis on

the collection and proper custody of state revenues. Any
accountability regarding public revenues revolved around collection
on behalf of the ruler or state, rather than on the manner of
subsequent disposal of such revenues (p. 45; see also Dewar 1992, p.
2).

Day and Klein (1987) have presented five different stages for accountability'.
progressing from Athenian, feudal, transitional, simple modem, and complex modern
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as shown in figure 3.1. In this section discussion of the stages of accountability
makes considerable reference to England because Australia was an English colony
and the principles of public sector management and accountability found in the
Australian 1901 Audit Act were mainly derived from the 1866 British Audit Act
(Funnell 1990, p. 9).
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Figure 3.1: Models of Accountability
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A s part A offigure3.1 shows, the model of accountability in Athens was simple and

direct. In this system the line of political accountability covered the whole body o
citizens as the Assembly to those delegated with the authority to carry out civic

functions. One thousand years later, in medieval England, the notion of financial or
managerial accountability was separated from any idea of political democracy. The

king (see part B of figure 3.1) was only accountable to God for his actions (Day and
Klein 1987, p. 10; see also Hurwitz 1981, p. 10). The conventional principle in the

West, like most other countries with a kingdom state, held that the king was the hea
of a social order whose hierarchy was one reflection of the great 'Chain of Being'
which dominated the universe. The king ruled in accordance with the customary
rights of his subjects and in the light of his responsibility before God for their
being. The only effective sanction upon a king who ruled tyrannically was rebellion
or the disapproval of the Church (Emy 1978, p. 52; Hurwitz 1981, p. 10).

When the division of labour and the specialisation of work or management developed
in the twelfth century along with the emergence of a bureaucratic structure of
government, a primary system of fiscal accountability began to appear (Day and
Klein 1987, p. 10). Day and Klein (1987) highlight the main features and

mechanisms of financial accountability in England between the twelfth and sixteenth
centuries when

[accountability ... had two main characteristics. It represented an
attempt by the king to achieve control over the w a y in which his
estate, that is the realm, was managed. ... Equally accountability in
this context was seen as a form of judicial adjudication.
The treasurer was charged with keeping the accounts of income; the
constable was responsible for keeping the accounts of the king's
household expenditure. Barons, sitting in the Court of the
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Exchequer, in turn held both officials and those w h o owed the king
payments to account in what was, in effect, a judicial trial (p. 10).

Debate about the role of Parliament in usurping God's traditional role by holding the

king or his ministers accountable, was a feature of British constitutional history f
the sixteenth century onwards (see part C of figure 3.1). Having Parliament assert
control over expenditure in terms of spending money appropriately and properly,
without waste and corruption, was an issue contention during this period (Day and
Klein 1987, p. 10).

By the seventeenth century, the growth of centralised administrative systems and the
decline in the authority of the Church increased the monarch's effective power to do
much as he pleased (Emy 1978, p. 52). In Britain and France, monarchs attempted to

legitimise their increased power by appealing to the principle of the Divine Right o
Kings. This principle held that kings were God's agents on earth and gained their
authority to rule directly from God. The appeal to God further implied that subjects
were morally obliged to obey the king in all matters (Emy 1978). Funnell (1994)
notes that "Parliament was not primarily concerned with making the executive
accountable for its financial stewardship" (p. 181) in the 17th century. Lourens
(1993) describes the form of public accountability in a monarchy as:

[t]he ultimate accountability ... due only to the monarch, through
ministers appointed by him, and not to representatives elected by the
people through universal suffrage. Under monarchical systems,
broad issues concerning the merits for expenditures from the public
purse were inconsequential to the major exercise of collections and
disbursements of royal revenues. W h a t was important w a s that the
royal revenues were not defrauded, and emphasis was more on
collecting the revenues and not on h o w they were spent (p. 9).
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These notions of accountability were later developed in the 19th century by John
Stuart Mill to form the modern notion of political accountability, in a representative
democracy (see part D offigure3.1). This resulted in a n e w concept referred to as
'ministerial accountability' which was "seen as the ability of parliament to call the
executive to account for its actions" (Day and Klein 1987, p. 12).

A new era of public accountability to Parliament in Britain began around 1780 with
the passing of an Act of Parliament appointing six Commissioners for Auditing the
Public Accounts. Their powers included making recommendations on improvements
in the system of issuing and accounting for public funds on an annual basis (Lourens
1993, p. 63; for more see Funnell 1994, p. 182; Dewar 1992, p. 10). Referring to
Bird (1973), Lourens (1993) says that "the initial aim of the reforms between 1780
and 1787 was not to introduce n e w and different controls but rather to make the
Exchequer controls effective again" (p. 65).

After 1832, a system was introduced for auditing departmental expenditures whereby
they were compared to appropriation estimates voted by the House of C o m m o n s
(Lourens 1993, p. 66; see also Funnell 1994, pp. 186-187). The n e w era which
started in 1780 was reinforced by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866.
The former duties of the Comptroller General of the Exchequer and those of the
Commissioners of Audit were combined and the n e w Office of Comptroller and
Auditor General was created. T w o main functions were given to the Office of
Comptroller and Auditor General: responsibility for issuing the public funds to
appropriate bodies and certifying the public accounts and reporting on these matters
to Parliament (Lourens 1993, pp. 66-67; see also Funnell 1994, pp. 189-190; Johnson
1971, p. 286; Dewar 1992, p. 15 & pp. 17-19). Aitkin et al (1989) say that
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[w]ith the shift of power from the C r o w n to parliament, and with
ministers assuming greater responsibility, there was a tendency for
attention, support and criticism to focus on a particular person, the
most likely candidate being the minister in the C o m m o n s
responsible forfinance(the Exchequer) (p. 104).

The First World War and the post-war economic crisis provided a strong incentive
for the examination of a n e w concept of accountability and administrative efficiency
within government, and thus broadened the focus of accountability (Normanton
1966). This became necessary as enormous amounts of revenue had been spent by
the A r m y , the Navy, and the Office of Works and Public Buildings during the First
World War. It resulted in an expanded examination of public accounts beyond the
strict financial compliance aspects of the regularity audit by the Office of
Comptroller and Auditor General and encompassed administrative issues such as
economy of expenditure in respect of the amount of resources purchased and their
relevant prices in auditing by that office (Lourens 1993, p. 67). Normanton points
out that the purpose of this examination was not just for efficient performance but
also sought a reduction of public spending (Normanton 1966). It is worth noting
here that the British Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866 was modified and
updated in three aspects in 1921. The major change to the Act of 1866 w a s found in
the 1921 Act which allowed the preparation of income and appropriation accounts on
an accrual basis instead of a cash basis wherever suitable (Lourens 1993, p. 68-69).

It has been suggested that the needs of modern government have changed the roles of
parliament, minister and public service and, therefore, requires a completely n e w
system of accountability (Aitkin et al 1989). For example, the public sector changes
in the U K during the 1980s have been designed to replace traditional forms of
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accounting and accountability (Hopwood 1984, 1990) with "a technical or
managerialist accountability in terms of a dominant financial calculative regime"
(Broadbent and Guthrie 1992, p. 15). The introduction of the new National Audit Act
in 1983 brought new concepts of accountability such as value for money for public
outlays (Lourens 1993, p. 69). To exercise these new concepts of accounting and

accountability consisting of value for money, efficiency, true costs, and performance
accompanying changes in the character of certain public sector institutions and
practices would be required (Broadbent and Guthrie 1992, p. 15).

Jones and Pendlebury (1988b) argue that the system of accountability in the public
sector in modern times entails a synthesis of accounting and auditing procedures,
along with the supporting financial reporting (in Lourens 1993). In recent years the
emphasis in the public sector has changed from the allocation of state revenues to
whether state funds and assets are being, or have been, expended so as to attain the
greatest advantage at the lowest cost (Lourens 1993).

In referring to the public sector reforms in the New Zealand's Telecom, Pallot (1995)
states that "both the ownership and the consumer relationships in the new public
sector framework are now viewed as contractual" (p. 42). She argues that the new
framework has resulted in a shifting of the focus from public accountability
(ministers to parliament and the public at large) to managerial accountability
(departments to ministers) in the case of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Pallot
1995, p. 42). She also says that, while in traditional government accounting the most
important underlying assumption has relied upon the public control over the use of

resources, the managerial shift is in contrast to the traditional one (Pallot 1995, p.
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42).

In other words, according to a managerialist approach the emphasis is on

outputs and outcomes not on inputs.

Definition of accountability and responsibility, to which this chapter is now turning,
will give a better understanding of the importance of accountability in general
(private and public) and particularly in the public sector. This also will help to
establish an accounting system in line with requirements derived from definitions
provided.

3.3 MEANING OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
3.3.1 The Nature of Accountability

A wide variety of meaning has been given to the term "accountability" in the context
of government, and can be defined in m a n y ways. Lourens (1993) has recognised
that "[providing a concise and clearly understood definition of public sector
accountability is not easy" (p. 38). V a n Peursem (1990a) argues that accountability
has different meanings in different contexts (in Lourens 1993) while Churchill
(1992b) suggests "accountability means different things to different people. For
government, accountability
environment" (p. 36).

includes

taking

responsibility

for

people, the

Normanton (1971) is of the opinion that "the word

'accountability' is one of those terms employed in governmental studies which
suffers from frequent use and imprecise or varying meaning" (p. 311). Normanton's
(1966) belief that accountability has been seen mainly as a matter of external control
(p. 25), is followed by two different definitions for accountability with two different
senses. In a limited sense, accountability means "to give a formal statement of
money dealings" (Normanton 1966, p. 1). Later, in 1971. he expanded his definition
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to "in its most general sense, accountability of course means a liability to reveal, to

explain and to justify what one does; how one discharges responsibilities, financial or
other" (Normanton 1971, p. 311). He also points out that the origins of
accountability may be political, constitutional, hierarchical or contractual
(Normanton 1971, p. 311). Normanton's definition of accountability (1971) is very
close to that of Jackson's, who noted how:

[bjasically, accountability involves explaining or justifying what has
been done, what is currently being done and what has been planned.
Accountability arises from a set of established procedures and
relationships of varying formality. Thus, one party is accountable to
another in the sense that one of the parties has therightto call upon
the other to give an account of his activities. Accountability
involves, therefore, the giving of information (Jackson 1982 quoted
in Stewart 1984, p. 14; see also Roberts and Scapens 1985, p. 447).

Contributors to an Australian textbook argue that accountability "involves the
fundamental [sic] of honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and careful, effective
application of resources" (Greiner, 1990, p. 31 quoted in Sinclair 1995, p. 221).
According to Jones and Pendlebury (1985) "accountability" in its widest sense is

used to refer to the responsibility for your actions, which mirrors the recent definiti
of accountability by Gray and Jenkins (1993) as "an obligation to present an account
of and answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those
responsibilities" (p. 55: see also Downey 1986, p. 35). According to Sinclair (1995),
currently

accountability has discipline-specific meanings, for example,
auditors discuss accountability as if it is a financial or numerical
matter, political scientists view accountability as a political
imperative and legal scholars as a constitutional arrangement, while
philosophers treat accountability as a subset of ethics (p. 221).

Chapter 3, Public Sector...

86

Sinclair (1995) also believes that the definition oi accountability is related to the
ideologies, motifs and language of the time. Furthermore, social norms or
aspirations towards order shapes accountability (p. 221).

Cutt (1982) has defined "accountability" in two broad categories: procedural and
consequential accountability. Procedural accountability

reflects the fact that users of resources cannot be assumed to be
completely honest, and requires an examination - which can be
called analysis, evaluation or audit-to attest to the propriety or
integrity which has been demonstrated in discharging the
stewardship of resources. This level of accountability is concerned
to demonstrate that resources have been used, and their use reported,
in the manner specified. It is not concerned with the consequences
of the use of these resources, and is thus concerned exclusively with
inputs, as distinct form outputs or consequences. Consequential
accountability reflects the basic economic fact of unlimited ends and
limited means. This second category of accountability thus relates
to the use of scarce resources, and deals with performance as distinct
from propriety. Performance must relate to both inputs and outputs
(Cutt 1982, pp. 312-313).

The definitions provided for accountability show that public accountability can be
defined in different ways and is much boarder in coverage than private
accountability.

3.3.2 Public Accountability

T w o meanings of 'public' in a public accountability context were given by McCrae
in 1991. First, it may be referred to as the accountability of public sector agents to
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the public at large. Secondly, it m a y be expressed as accountability to the ultimate
source of the public sector resources which have been devoted to a particular activity
(McCrae 1991, p. 9). Public accountability has been defined by Normanton (1966)

consisting in a statutory obligation to provide, for independent and
impartial observers holding the right of reporting their findings at
the highest levels in the state, any available information about
financial administration which they request (p. 2).

V a n Peursem (1990) interpreted public accountability as including an obligation by
"accountors" to report on executions and resource usages:

Public sector accountability is a state of being whereby one party
(the accountor) responsible and subject to sanctions for the resources
or policy implementation of another (the aceountee) should report
and submit to audit information on operations under their charge (p.
7; see also Barrett 1994a, p. 2).

Further, V a n Peursem (1990) goes on and gives the following refined definition:

[p]ublic sector accountability is a state of being whereby one party
(the accountor) responsible for the resources of or the policy
established by another (the stakeholder) should report to the
stakeholder on the economy of acquisition, on the efficiency of
operation and the generation of outputs, on the effectiveness of the
organisational outcomes in meeting its objectives, on the
appropriateness of those objectives in meeting public policy and
social equity requirements, and on the maintenance of organisational
capital. The accountor is subject to sanction from the stakeholder
for past performance under his/her charge and submits to outside
review on the reported information (p. 22).
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Public sector accountability has been seen by Glynn (1985) as an obligation to give
an explanation of actions to an electorate by those who are charged with drafting
and/or carrying out policy (see also Funnell 1990, p. 12; Stewart and Ranson 1988, p.
14). In order to improve accountability mechanisms the Australian Government's
Management Improvement Advisory Committee, in an exposure draft called
"Accountability in the Commonwealth Public Sector" (1991), defined accountability
as existing

where there is a direct authority relationship within which one party
accounts to a person or body for the performance of tasks or
functions conferred, by that person or body. The consequences of
the application of rewards and sanctions are seen as having a logical
connection with the activation of accountability mechanisms (p. ix;
see also Barrett 1994a, p. 1).

Heald (1983) says that the scope of public accountability includes political, legal and
managerial accountability. Heald's definition, in comparison with private
accountability, claims that there are two more elements for public accountability:
political and legal (in Glynn 1985, pp. 143-144). Ghartey (1993) reinforces Heald's
definition of accountability by stating that:

[accountability ensures that the nation's resources are utilized
efficiently and effectively, and provides individuals and the society
as a whole with the means of ensuring compliance with their rights
and responsibilities in the development process (p. 184).

According to Stewart and Ranson (1988)

[p]ublic accountability will not be achieved by reporting of simple
performance measures. ... The main requirement is that those w h o
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work in public service organisations should feel responsible and
accountable to the public for w h o m they work (p. 19).

To some extent, the proper exercise of power depends on the degree of accountability
in a state (Mackenzie 1966; Smith 1971; Stewart 1984; and Pallot 1992a). Pallot
(1992a) is of the view that "greater power is balanced by greater accountability" (p.
60). In a foreword to Normanton, Mackenzie (1966) emphasises that "... without
accountability no control; and if there is no control, where is the seat of power?"
(Normanton, 1966, p. vii). Accountability has been seen as crucial in the case of
governments (Pallot 1992a, p. 60). It is argued that the effective and efficient
utilisation and management of public resources will fall within the domain of
accountability (Ghartey 1993, p. 169). Another view refers to accountability in the
broadest sense as the central objective of democratic government, asking the question
"how can control be exercised over those to w h o m power is delegated [without
accountability]?" (Smith 1971, pp. 26-27). Stewart (1984) in this regard believes
that

[i]n our society the exercise of governmental powers is legitimated
by the requirements of public accountability. Those w h o exercise
the power of government have to be publicly accountable for their
action. It is public accountability that is relied upon to transform
arbitrary action into the legitimate exercise of governmental power
(p. 13).

The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board ( G A S B ) in the U S A consider accountability to be the cornerstone of
public sector accounting (Pallot, 1992a, p. 60). Financial accountability, one of the
most important forms of public accountability, will be referred to now.
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According to Australian Statements of Accounting Concepts N o . 1 ( S A C 1) (1985)

one of the two objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities is "to sati
accountability" (Shand 1990a, p. 145; Carpenter 1990, pp. 166 & 222; Sharpe 1992,
p. 19). The Australian Society of Accountants (ASA) and Institute of Chartered
Accountants (ICA) suggested that "the accountability requirements of government
companies should be more stringent than those of private companies" (Guthrie
1990a, p. 217). Finally, "accountability" has been seen by Ghartey in 1993 as one of
the fundamental prerequisites of the development process for emerging economies.

From the above discussion it is clear that considerable attention has been paid to the
public sector financial accountability in recent years. Regarding the importance of
public sector accountability, Foley (1982a) reported that the Final Report of the
Canadian Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (Lambert
Report) showed the "magnitude, seriousness and pervasive character of the
'accountability problem' in Western democracies" (p. 251). The Lambert Report
concluded that

[a]fter two years of careful study and consideration, we have reached
the deeply held conviction that the serious malaise pervading the
management of government stems fundamentally from a grave
weakening, and in some cases an almost total breakdown, in the
chain of accountability, first within the government, and second in
the accountability of government to parliament and ultimately to the
Canadian people (quoted in Foley 1982a, p. 251).

Financial accountability is just one of the many things that governments are to be
held accountable for. Governments are also accountable for matters such as justice
and equity.
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3.3.3 Social Accountability-Responsibility for Providing A Just/Fair Society

Governments are not just accountable for financial management to the electorate and
to society but also they are mostly accountable for national security, education,
justice and in some countries increasing the social and spiritual well-being of the
people; notable in this regard is Iran. In the Islamic context, the economy is not an
end in itself; it is a means only to contribute to the attainment of the ultimate goal.
According to the introduction to the Iranian Constitution "[i]n strengthening the
foundations of the economy, the fundamental consideration will be satisfying the
material needs of m a n in the course of his overall growth and development" (Algar
1980, p. 21; see also A m i n 1994, pp. 9-10). Therefore, the government is responsible
for furnishing to all citizens equal and suitable opportunities, to provide them with
work, and to satisfy their essential needs (Amin 1994, p. 10; see also Algar 1980, p.
21). Article 2 of the Iranian Constitution also says that the Islamic Republic is a
system which secures equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural
independence, and national solidarity (Amin 1994, pp. 18-19). Thus, this article
requires the Government to be accountable for more than financial matters. The
President in taking his oath, as noted in chapter 2, confirms that he is responsible for
the propagation of religion and morality, and the support of truth and justice (Article
123).

3.3.4 Accountability and Responsibility

It seems that in almost all of the various definitions on accountability given above
that there is a very close relationship between accountability and responsibility.
Indeed, without responsibility there would be no accountability. In the view of the
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Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration ( R C A G A ) (1976, p.
11):

[Responsibility and accountability are related concepts. They are
used in this report to describe two aspects of the relationship
between a person entrusted with a task and towards the authority
which entrusts him with it. Thus a person is responsible for
performing the task to the authority which entrust him with it. If
there is a procedure by which he can be called upon to report and
justify his performance, and can be rewarded or penalised according
to judgement on it, then he is also accountable (emphasis added)
(quoted in Glynn and M c C r a e 1986, p. 94).

The Australian Audit Office (AAO) (1986a) in this regard says that accountability in
its simplest terms means the obligation to answer for a responsibility that has been
awarded (in Lourens 1993, p. 32). The AAO also adds that with accountability the
existence of at least two parties is necessary: one party for allocating the
responsibility and the other one for accepting responsibility and the obligation for
reporting his/her performance (Lourens 1993, pp. 32-33).

While, as shown above, there is no precise and constant meaning for accountability
some researchers have seen responsibility as being a broader and vaguer notion of
accountability (Spann 1979). McCandless (1993) points out that accountability and
responsibility are not the same thing and by seeing 'public accountability' as an
"obligation to answer publicly for the discharge of responsibilities that affect the
public in important ways", argues that "[t]he obligation to act is the responsibility,
and the obligation to report is the accountability" (p. 14). According to Day and
Klein (1987):
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[t]o account is to answer for the discharge of a duty or for conduct.
It is to provide a reckoning. It is to give a satisfactory reason for or
to explain. It is to acknowledge responsibility for one's actions.
Indeed accountability and responsibility are often held to be
synonymous: a reminder that one cannot be accountable to anyone,
unless one also has responsibility for doing something (p. 5; see also
Chowdhury and Chowdhury 1995, p. 2).1

In Spann's view "responsibility is 'to' others 'for' certain activities" (1979, p. 493)
He also argues that the two words responsibility and accountability are often
encountered in discussions of administrative reform and all of us are in favour of
them (Spann 1979, p. 493). A simple meaning of responsibility could be that a
person is accountable to a superior if some result is not achieved, or some procedures
are not followed or if there is a procedure which he/she should have controlled
(Spann 1979, p. 494). Smith (1971) states that "accountability is impossible when

initial responsibility for a decision is blurred; no one can share fully in the making
policy and still have the detachment to act as critic" (p. 49).

In summary, accountability is an obligation to answer for delegated authority and
consequently to give an account and explanation of actions to providers of resources
and powers in terms of some assessable measures for a specific period of time. With
the meaning of accountability determined, it is necessary to define to whom
accountability is directed and for what. These are discussed in the next section.

Emphasis in original.
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3.4 SOURCES AND SUBJECTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In talking about accountability in the public sector there are at least two problems:
firstly, w h o is being held accountable, and secondly, to w h o m are they accountable.
Is accountability limited to the people, to the Parliament, to superiors, or to
subordinates? Mosher (1979) and Stewart (1984) have indicated the difficulties in
ascertaining exactly w h o should be held accountable, and for that which they should
be held accountable (in Lourens 1993, pp. 38-39; see also D o w n e y 1986, p. 35;
Ghartey 1993, pp. 170-171; Russell 1993, p. 1; Chowdhury and Chowdhury 1995, p.
2).

The Management Improvement Advisory Committee ( M I A C ) (1991) in

Australia reinforces Mosher and Stewart's concerns by saying that "[t]he issue [in the
process of public accountability] is the need to clarify w h o is accountable to w h o m ,
for what, and w h e n " (p. 1; see also Lourens 1993). The Committee continues that
"[a]ny response to this issue requires a clear understanding of the basic relationship
between the complementary concepts of authority, responsibility and accountability"
( M I A C 1991, p. 1).

In addition to these aspects of accountability needing

clarification, as noted by M I A C , Mosher adds

• for what and according to what criteria is one accountable?
•

at what stage of a program is one accountable?

•

in what ways and to what extent is one accountable for the actions of
subordinates?

•

what is the recourse against persons w h o have misused their authority or w h o
have failed in their endeavours? (Lourens 1993, p. 87).
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In response to the question 'who is being held accountable?', the straightforward
answer could be that the receiver(s), holder(s), user(s) and expender(s) of public
resources should be held accountable for their decisions and actions with respect to
those resources (Lourens 1993, p. 87; see also Cutt 1977, p. 33; V a n Peursem 1990,
p. 10). Therefore, everybody w h o has any relationship with the public resources
should be held accountable and accordingly he/she is accountable for those public
resources.

In a discussion regarding accountability, Spann (1979) argues that in practice
accountability is not just a requirement imposed by a hierarchical superior, one m a y
also in practice be brought to account by peer groups or 'from below', by customers
or clients. For example, most people say that a permanent head has a responsibility
to 'the government' as well as to his o w n minister (Spann 1979, p. 495).
Governments and public officers as trustees have an obligation to be accountable to
the citizens for the state powers and resources entrusted to them (Ghartey 1993, p.
171). Finally, Smith (1971) states that "[t]he bureaucracy is divided into coherent
parts to accomplish specific tasks, and bureaucrats are accountable not to everybody
but to their administrative superior" (p. 51). Chronological analysis of accountability
in the previous section showed that until the twelfth century in Western Europe
accountabilities were to G o d through monarchs, that is, public servants and officers
were accountable to monarchs and monarchs were accountable to G o d as the agents
of God. This form of accountability w a s replaced in sixteenth century by more
democratic governments which required the king to be accountable to the parliament.
Thus, Lourens (1993) notes:

[i]n democratic systems of government, all public sector
organisations have a c o m m o n feature regarding authority and
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responsibility, namely that their authority and powers are ultimately
derived from the legislature. Therefore, their responsibilities and
accountability are ultimately back to the legislature, despite there
being requirements to provide an accounting to intermediate
authorities, like the executive. In turn, the legislature is held to be
responsible to the citizens and electorate via the mechanisms of free
elections held at determined intervals (pp. 122-123).

It is believed that the public accountability, which is one of the most important forms
of accountability, to Parliament in democratic governments will cover the legality',
the economy, the efficiency and the effectiveness of government spending (Lourens
1993, p. 86).

To operate with force, and therefore to be effective, public accountability needs the
capacity for enforcement (Stewart 1984). Stewart (1984) says that the government's
accountability to parliament includes this capacity (Stewart 1984). That is,
parliament approves the money bills and gives authority over the appropriation to the
government for using public resources. Consequently, parliament has the power to
ask the government for disclosure regarding the delegated authorities on behalf of the
electors and also ultimately, parliament's power (whenever it is necessary) involves
the withdrawal and the renewal of confidence. In this chain, the parliament's
accountability to the electors involves the possibility of non-election as well as reelection (Stewart 1984). Kropp (1989) states that "accountability to Parliament is a
relative [sic] straightforward process, where the operations of Executive Government
...are conducted through an agency established under an Act of Parliament... with a
reporting responsibilities [sic] to the Parliament" (p. 6). Depending on the system of
governance in the state, accountability to parliament could be posed in different ways
and in different forms. The Parliament, the Executive Government and the Auditor
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General are statutory links in the financial accountability chain of the Westminster
System (Kropp 1989). Kropp (1989) points out that

[disclosure and accountability to the Parliament is the cornerstone
of the Westminster System. It brings an added discipline to the
management process of the Executive Government (p. 6).

In this system the heads of departments and agencies are directly accountable to a
Minister who, in turn, is accountable to Parliament (Lourens 1993, p. 123; see also
English and Guthrie 1991, p. 350). Emy (1978) posits that in the Westminster
system of government

[w]hen we say that a minister is 'responsible' we mean (i) that
parliament can call him to account for what he does; (ii) that he is
personally capable of creditable and trustworthy actions. Therefore
he should be a m a n of integrity as well as of intrinsic ability (p.
259). 2

E m y (1978) further states that:

[Responsible government also means checking that those in power
behave reasonably and fairly, i.e. that those w h o have the power to
m a k e society's rules do not abuse or evade the rules to suit
themselves. W h e n w e say a minister is 'responsible' w e m e a n (i)
that he is both answerable and accountable to parliament for actions
done in his name; and (ii) that w e are willing to trust him to m a k e
decisions on our behalf by reason of his personal integrity (p. 250).

The concept of direct ministerial responsibility has changed in recent times (Lourens

1993, p. 139) and the question of that for which a minister or a head of department i

Emphasis in original.
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accountable has also changed ( M I A C 1991, p. 5). The Management Improvement
Advisory Committee (MIAC) says that Ministerial Responsibility implies that
"ministers accept two major responsibilities: first, for the overall management of
their portfolios; and second, for carriage in the Parliament of their accountability
obligations to that institution" (MIAC 1991, p. 2).

This is recognised to be a very narrow view of ministerial responsibility. According
to reforms introduced in Australia in 1983 by the first Hawke Government

[t]he thrust ... was to 'give Australians a public service that is more
efficient, more responsive, more accountable to the elected
representatives of the people, and more in harmony with the diverse
needs of the community it serves' [White Paper on Reforming the
Australian Public Service, 1983] ( M I A C 1991, pp. 5-6).3

This new form of accountability represents a departure from the traditional form of
accountability. Australian public sector reforms over the past decade provide that
ministers and secretaries are not directly accountable for each and every detailed
administrative act within their departments. They are, however, responsible for poor
performance and if this poor performance reflects systemic failure, then the minister
or senior manager is responsible and accountable (MIAC 1991, pp. 2-3).
Furthermore, they are accountable and responsible to the Parliament for using public
resources with which they have been entrusted (Guthrie 1991b, p. 151). In this
system

[t]he Parliament, representing the resource providers, has
responsibility to ensure that the resources are wisely used and

3

Discussion about the nature of Australian Public Sector Reform is one of the subjects of chapter 6.
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safeguarded. T h e parliamentary committees' scrutiny (eg: Public
Accounts Committees) of government activity and stewardship are
one of the means of meeting this responsibility (Guthrie 1991b, pp.
151-152).

Recent reforms in the public sector have been a move towards giving more flexibility
and authority to managers and removing constraints upon them as well as burdening
them with increasing responsibilities and accountability (Keating 1990). The degree
of independence or the extent to which administrators can be given freedom in the
public sector to achieve program goals while remaining accountable to the parliament

and public is a current issue. It has been accepted that there is a relationship betwe
the values of independence and of accountability and that they should not be
considered completely in opposition (Smith 1971). Smith (1971) states that "[in] one
sense to satisfy the need for accountability serves to protect independence" (p. 4).
Hague (1971), however, questions the relationship between accountability and
independence:

[h]ow can the organisation ensure that the job done is the job
required? That is the problem of Accountability. H o w can the
person doing the job be given sufficient discretion to feel that his job
is worth while? That is the problem of independence (p. 356).

It is claimed that the traditional forms of accountability, such as justice, legality
regularity are being lost under the new managerialism. Holmes (1990) believes that
although there are many missing links in accountability based on program
performance, the new standard of accountability which now includes accountability
for performance in terms of outcomes rather than for inputs alone will increase the
accountability of administrators (p. 48). The reforms to public sector administration
in Australia over the recent decade have brought to prominence different elements of
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public sector accountability. It has also pointed to the arrangement of these in
hierarchies of accountability. In the next section the work of Cutt and Stewart on
levels of accountability will form the basis of discussion.

3.5 HIERARCHIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The bases of accountability must be properly defined within any kind of
accountability web (Stewart 1984). The purpose of the account and hence the basis
of accountability can vary and be defined according to the activities for which
accounts have to be given. The bases of accountability have been given by Cutt in
1977 in terms of an increasing sophistication and potentially useful hierarchy for
accountability. He has presented three definitions or bases for accountability in this
regard. First, and at the lowest level of accountability, is fiscal or fiduciary
accountability, which is called Efficiency I by Cutt. This is exclusively concerned
"with the actual expenditure of funds and procedures by which that expenditures is
accounted for" (Cutt 1977, p. 334). This level of accountability relates totally to
inputs and does not deal with the outputs attributable to these inputs. The analysis of
the use of funds will occur after the activity or program has been completed. Cutt
argues that it is difficult to see any concern for efficiency in this first concept of

accountability and that this notion is more related to regularity or financial propriety.
However, he says that perhaps the objective of performance assessment which is
carried on in the context of fiduciary accountability is the determination of Efficiency
I. Efficiency I has been seen synonymous with "compliance audit, regularity audit,
and traditional audit" (Cutt 1977, p. 335).
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In Cutt's approach to accountability the second and more sophisticated form of
accountability is efficiency accountability, which Cutt calls Efficiency II. At this
level accountability will be "determined through efficiency auditing-synonyms and
includes performance auditing, management auditing, and operational auditing"
(1977, p. 335). Efficiency accountability (and thus Efficiency II) has been defined
"in terms of the ratio of some physical measure of output from the activity or
program to the costs of that activity or program" (1977, p. 335). Thus, up to now, the
difference between accountability level one, or fiscal accountability, and the second
level, or efficiency accountability, relates to the consideration of outcomes in the
latter (Cutt 1977, p. 335).

The third and most sophisticated form of financial accountability in the
accountability hierarchy is concerned with effectiveness accountability. Efficiency

III4 as it is referred to by Cutt, will be "determined through effectiveness auditing-the
most frequent synonym for which is program auditing" (Cutt 1977, p. 337). Cutt
concludes that efficiency accountability and effectiveness accountability "are clearly
related to but need not always coincide" (Cutt 1977, p. 337). He also says that
"depending on the measures that are used, efficiency may be either complementary
to, or in conflict with effectiveness" (Cutt 1977, p. 337; see also Van Peursem 1990;
Guthrie 1989, pp. 63-64). He also states that higher levels of accountability subsume
lower levels (Cutt 1977).

The bases of accountability have been classified by Robinson (1971) into three
categories as: fiscal accountability, which is concerned with the regularity of public

4

According to Cutt "Efficiency III requires that the output measure used reflect the at
objectives of the activity or program in question" (Cutt 1977, p. 338).
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expenditures, that is "[fjunds should be spent according to appropriate procedures, in
the manner designated by law and by the terms of the contract or agreement, and
proper accounting standards should be observed" (in Smith 1971, p. 29), program
accountability which is related to whether the government's proposed goals are
achieved or not through its programs, and process accountability which "refers to the
general procedures and method of operation by which a delegated assignment is
carried out" (in Smith 1971, p. 29).

Stewart (1984) also has represented four different bases for accountability. First,
accountability for probity which is concerned with the avoidance of malfeasance.
Second, accountability for legality which is associated with using properly the
powers which are given by the law. Third, accountability for efficiency which is
directed at assuring that there is no waste in the use of resources. And finally,
accountability for good administration which is designed "to ensure that there has
been no maladministration and, in particular, maladministration leading to injustice"
(Stewart 1984, pp. 16-17).

Stewart (1984) combines his bases for accountability with those of Robinson and
then he outlines five alternative bases which, in Stewart's words, constitute "the
ladder of accountability". Stewart's ladder of accountability consists of:

• Accountability for probity and legality
• Process accountability
• Performance Accountability
• Program accountability
• Policy accountability (Stewart 1984, pp. 17-18).
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H e states that this ladder leads accountability from accountability by standards, and
is therefore more objective at this level, to accountability by judgement. Financial
information as a measure of the use of resources, must remain in all bases of
accountability (Stewart 1984, p. 31). Stewart (1984) also argues that "the account"
and "the holding to account" are the significant elements which have been used to
build a framework for the analysis of public accountability (p. 19).

In summary, in Stewart's ladder of accountability, accountability for probity and
legality are concerned with inputs which is in line with Cutt's fiscal or fiduciary
accountability. Process accountability in Stewart's ladder refers to outcomes which
could be the same of Cutt's efficiency accountability. Finally, performance
accountability, program accountability and policy accountability are probably
concerned with the effectiveness accountability of Cutt.

3.6 ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR

The necessity for an accounting system in the public sector stems from two
significant concepts: accountability and control. In fact, accounting systems provide
a mechanism which is vital to the exercise of accountability. Aitkin et al (1989)
argue that to be answerable and accountable "there should be a record of every action
taken and every dollar that is spent, so that the minister can answer to parliament if
necessary" (p. 212). Smith (1971) goes further and says that:

the government must have the assurance that public funds are spent
for the purposes specified and without personal gain to any private
individual beyond fair compensation for his services. Appropriate
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fiscal records must be kept; a 'fair value' must be rendered the [sic]
contracting government agency; some rules-of-thumb to measure
performance are important (pp. 3-4).

Fitzgerald (1968) and Burke (1982) say that there are at least two distinct groups of
purposes of accounting which are discernible over a large sector of government
accounts. These two groups of purposes are: 'accountability or stewardship' and
'management control'. Fitzgerald (1968) brings four functions to accountability
statements, or reports of stewardship. He represents the functions as:

(i) to show compliance with legal requirements;
(ii)
to show receipts and disbursements of m o n e y in relation to
budgets and appropriations;
(iii) to permit determination of the proper custody of moneys and
other assets; and
(iv)
to permit independent audit of all records and of all funds,
securities and other property (Fitzgerald 1968, p. 176; see
also Burke 1982, p. 18).5

To have an efficient and proper system of financial accountability requires an
appropriate structure of financial planning, accounting, banking and auditing
institutions, including a regular routine for all of them (Normanton 1966). Bird
(1973) states that:

[accountability places two obligations upon a steward; he must
render an 'account' of his dealings with the stewardship resources,
and then he must submit to an examination (usually k n o w n as an
'audit') of that account by or on behalf of the person or body to
w h o m he is accountable (p. 2).

Emphasis in original.
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In analysing accountability two elements have to be recognised: the elements of
accounts and of holding to account (Stewart 1984, p. 15). By the element of account,

Stewart refers to the requirement for information that consists of the right to questi
and debate that information as a basis of judgement. The accounts have to be given
in a understandable form and they can be given in different 'languages', depending
on what has to be expressed and for whom the reports are to be produced. The
accountant has an important role in describing the different processes in the
organisation in a common language. By mounting the ladder of accountability,
described in section 3.5, the financial account becomes less adequate by itself. The
language of the accountant is still necessary to prepare accounts but there is a need
for other languages as well. Preparing accounts for financial probity the language of
the accountant is sufficient, but for other bases of accountability, represented by
Stewart, other languages are required. In accounting for performance accountability

output data must be added to financial data; the language of objectives is critical for
program accountability and a range of languages becomes important for policy
accountability. Financial information as a measure of the use of resources must
remain in all bases of accountability (Stewart 1984, p. 31). Stewart goes further and
says that "public accounting is concerned first and foremost with the account element
in public accountability". This element provides the financial information which is
the basis of one form of that account (Stewart 1984, p. 25). This idea supports
Dunsire's argument that the common usage of accountability involves information
(and not merely financial information) (Stewart 1984, p. 14).

According to Stewart, public accounting has been seen as an important, though not
the sole, component in the building up of the account element. It is one component
of the wider universe of information which provides one language for the expression
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of that information (Stewart 1984, pp. 25-26).

Stewart (1984) concludes that

although financial information is of critical importance, it does not constitute the
whole of accountability and the role of information within the wider concept of
accountability depends on h o w to form the raw material (accounting system) for the
account (p. 26). The accountant has a special role in the preparation of the account
within the framework of public accountability.

Stewart says that "the financial

account is a necessary account, but the financial account is only one account, using
but one language" (Stewart 1984, pp. 30-31). Learning more of the language of
politics would be necessary for the accountants in order to express their accounts
more clearly in the political process (Stewart 1984, p. 32).

Financial information is necessary to give an adequate set of reports for financial
accountability purposes in the public sector and since the objectives in the public
sector are largely non-financial there is also a requirement for measurement of
performance in non-financial terms (Pallot 1992a, p. 60; see also V a n Peursem 1990,
p. 9). Pallot (1992a) argues that the belief, expressed by some people, that the
accounting profession should just be concerned with everything measurable in
monetary terms is considerable.

W h o has the responsibility to ensure that the

information provided for accountability purposes is adequate and integrated? Thus,
it seems that the most relevant body for preparing and providing the non-financial is
the accounting system (Pallot 1992a, p. 60).

In this section it was shown that the necessity of an efficient accounting system to
perform the accountability purpose in the public sector is inevitable. W h e n there is a
requirement to report on actions, there should be an effective system to record and
report those actions.
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3.7 PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AUSTRALIA

In the previous sections of this chapter the concern has been to establish meanings
for accountability which are commonly found in practice and in the constitutional

literature. In this section the concept of accountability in Australia is discussed and
examined. Chapter 2 established that the form of government in Australia is
described as a Westminster system. Emy (1978) says that public sector
accountability, which in his words is generally referred to as ministerial
responsibility in the Westminster system (such as Australia), has two propositions:

(i) ministers are individually responsible to parliament for the affairs of
their departments;
(ii) cabinet is collectively responsible to parliament and the electorate
for the conduct of government.
The first implies that parliament can call ministers to account for
mistakes that occur in their department's policy area, i.e. parliament
can question and if necessary censure ministers. The second implies
that either parliament or the people m a y dismiss a government with
w h o m they are dissatisfied (p. 246).

The Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration

(RCAGA)

reported that

[t]he theory of the Westminster system asserts that the minister is
wholly responsible for all actions in matters within his department,
but in fact responsibility lies with officials. It is important that this
be acknowledged, the nature and extent of the responsibility be
clarified as far as possible, and procedures established to assess
performance and to provide that those responsible at all levels will
be accountable for their performances. Unless this is done no-one
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can justly be regarded as responsible and no-one can fairly be called
to account for failure or poor performance (1976, p. 42). 6

These meanings were later reinforced by the Public Service Board (PSB) (1986)
which stressed that

[ministers have responsibility for the administration of their
department and have certain obligations to the Government as well.
These obligations are conventionally the maintenance of the secrecy1
of the proceedings of Cabinet and the responsibility of Ministers for
the policy of the Government as a whole [collective responsibility]
(Public Service Board 1986, p. 21; see also Encel 1974, p. 124).8

The responsibility of Ministers for the policy of the Government as a whole is a
convention which has been developed by the British Parliament. This form of
responsibility, which has been taken from the several unwritten rules, is called
collective responsibility and defined as following:

• Ministers publicly support Cabinet decisions.
•
Ministers resign if unable to give that public support.
•
Ministers seek Cabinet approval for major policy before
it is announced.
•
Ministers do not publicly criticise the actions of a fellow
Minister.
•
Ministers do not express 'private' opinions on policy (Public
Service Board 1986, p. 22; Aitkin et al 1989, p. 118; see also
Marshall 1984, p. 55).

6

Emphases in original.
Two main reasons were given by the PSB for the conventional maintenance of the secrecy of
Cabinet proceedings. Firstly, "Matters relating to defence and finance must be kept secret in the
national interest". And secondly, "Open Cabinet meetings might inhibit candid and unfettered
discussion of the issues by the Ministers" (Public Service Board 1986, p. 22).
8
Emphases in original.
7
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It is argued that the purpose of collective responsibility is ensuring that all ministers
support a decision once it has been publicly announced (Emy 1978). Emy (1978)
adds that this convention requires that

(1) if a minister cannot accept a government decision he must resign;
and (2) if parliament (or the electorate) cannot accept cabinet policy
they m a y dismiss the government.
These two requirements
represent an attempt to enforce standards of democratic
accountability (p. 277).

The chain of public accountability in the Australian context can be presented as:

Parliament is accountable to the public; government is accountable
to Parliament (and thereby, indirectly, to the public) ministers are
accountable to cabinet and to Parliament for the conduct of their
portfolios; the heads of bureaucratic units are accountable to
government through relevant ministers (including those overseeing
co-ordinating departments); members of the bureaucracy are
accountable to the heads of bureaucratic units; the office of AuditorGeneral supports the activities of Parliament in scrutinizing the
activities of the bureaucracy and government in matters of fiscal
propriety, in public view (Birkett 1988, p. 2; see also M c P h e e 1990,
pp. 11-12).

Apart from these forms of politically oriented requirements for ministerial
responsibility and accountability, which mostly involve the maintenance of secrecy
and collective responsibility, there has been a strong concern regarding financial
management and accountability in the Australian public sector among researchers
and public bodies such as the Federal Parliament since the 1950s.

In 1951 the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) was re-established by Act of
Parliament to provide an effective parliamentary body to monitor, inquire into and
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report on the adequacy of the financial administration of Commonwealth
Departments and Authorities (Connolly 1982, p. 94). The Committee is composed of
representatives elected by Government and Opposition, and drawn from both Houses

of the Parliament. The duties of the Committee are wide ranging. It has the power to
investigate all aspects of the accounting systems of Departments9 and the financial
statements of all statutory authorities (Connolly 1982, p. 94).

Throughout Australia the adequacy and consistency of financial reporting as part of
an accountability framework by public sector entities has been increasingly
questioned by government agencies and parliamentary bodies including:

The Commonwealth Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government
Operations
The Commonwealth Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts.
The NSW. Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee
The Victorian Parliamentary Public Bodies Review Committee and
The Victorian Parliamentary Economic and Budget Review Committee (Sutcliffe
1985, p. 1).

In addition to ongoing bodies of review, in 1976 the Royal Commission on
Australian Government Administration Report was established to examine the

federal government administration and issues of accountability in the public sector1
(Sutcliffe 1985).

Now they are all accrual based accounting.
For more see section 6.2.3.

3
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W h e n Premier of N e w South Wales in 1990, the largest state in Australia, Nick
Greiner (1990) made it clear that

[accountability is central to the Coalition government's approach to
managing the State of N e w South Wales. It is part of our approach
to a n e w openness, a n e w era in public accountability. It involves
the fundamental [sic] of honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and
careful, effective application of resources (p. 31).

He added that it was only through knowing the 'facts' that "the community and the
Government can make rational decisions about spending, staffing, investment,
taxation, pricing, borrowing and debt. Improved public accountability is the best
way of ensuring both economic and just as importantly, social sensitivity" (Greiner
1990, p. 33).

These concerns and ad hoc reforms in the Australian public sector since the 1980s
have resulted in increasing demands for a new form of financial accountability by the
public sector to parliament (Guthrie 1991a, p. 1). As noted already, traditionally,

financial accountability was associated with legality and regularity for using public
resources. A new definition of financial accountability brought these traditional
dimensions of accountability under challenge, to broaden the concept to efficiency
and effectiveness. A NSW senior public servant (Dick Humphry) observed that

we need to consider whether we are prepared to compromise on our
existing form of accountability ... w e must be prepared to accept a
different type of accountability. ... The bottom line is that w e pay for
traditional accountability by reducing the efficiency with which
services are delivered (quoted in English 1989, p. 65)
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The recent changes in Australian public sector accountability, as part of Australian
public sector reform11, attempt to remove constraints from managers in the public
sector (Department of Finance 1988; Considine 1990; Helgeby 1990; Keating 1990;
Mascarenhas 1990; Guthrie 1991a; Task Force on Management Improvement 1992;
Parker and Guthrie 1993). A redefinition of public sector accountability, derived
from the recent reforms, affirms that "financial discipline and efficiency are the
central tenants [sic] of a new accountability regime" (Guthrie 1991b, p. 149). This
new interpretation by some writers is seen to be in conflict with one of the other
features of the recent reforms, as providing more flexibility' to the managers (or let
the managers manage). A discussion of the relationship between accountability and
the degree of independence was given in section 3.4. However, greater decision
freedom for public sector managers must be accompanied by increased responsibility
and accountability on the part of those managers (Keating 1990). The AuditorGeneral, John Taylor, noted that

[b]eing realistic and positive one must recognise that the balance
between 'letting the managers manage' and accountability to
parliament is not going to be an easy one to strike in practice (quoted
in Barrett 1990, p. 110).

The RCAGA recommended that a reconciliation between the accountability and the
freedom of public sector servants can be made through performing efficiency
auditing. It suggested that

[i]f, as the Commission proposes, departmental managers are to be
given a clearer responsibility for their managerial functions and
greater freedom and discretion to perform them, it will be the more

1

' Recent reform in Australian public sector will be discussed in chapter 6.
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important that the quality of their performance should be subject to
critical review. The Commission proposes, therefore, that there
should be a regular program of efficiency audits in which
departmental performance will be assessed ( R C A G A 1976, p. 46).

The traditional model of accountability for the public sector in which secretaries an
their staff would be accountable to the Parliament only through their ministers was
reiterated by the Management Improvement Advisory Committee in an exposure
draft on accountability in 1991 (MIAC 1991, p. ix). The draft also recognises

potential barriers to accountability arising from unclear and/or multiple objectives,
poor organisational structure arrangements and the risks associated with too many or
too complex reporting mechanism (MIAC 1991, p. ix).

MIAC suggests that accountability has two roles which are not separate, but are
overlapping and complementary. The first role of accountability, seen by MIAC as a
backdrop and essential foundation to ministerial responsibility, is that ministers
should "see themselves as accountable and responsible and expect the public service,
which assists them, to reflect that" (MIAC 1991, p. 1). The second role of

accountability is referred to as a management tool for ministers and the public servi
itself, which includes accountability arrangements within agencies (MIAC 1991, p.
1).

Public sector accountability in the Australian context, noted above, has changed
recently to include accountability for efficiency and effectiveness. Now the thesis
turns to explain the form public sector accountability in the Iranian context.
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3.8 PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN T H E ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN
3.8.1 Accountability Prior to the Mashruteh Revolution in 1906

In the previous chapter, the Islamic Republic of Iran's form of government was
discussed and the relationship between the three parts of government was
established. In this section, the Islamic Republic of Iran's form of accountability will
be discussed. Before the Mashruteh Revolution in 1906, there was no constitution
and consequently there were no financial laws for controlling and monitoring the
Shah's power and the country's finances. This was possible because the Shahs were
popularly considered to be the representatives or shadows of G o d and were to be
obeyed and respected without question in all their decisions. All the accountability,
if there was any, w a s to G o d and consequently, no one was accountable to the
people, particularly w h e n it came to using the resources of the country and financial
management. This form of accountability was according to model B of Figure 3.1.

There was no separation of powers between the executive and legislature until 1906.
It is worth noting that, in regards to financial management and accountability, there
was a rather weak kind of financial reporting to the Shahs. Public servants were
accountable to their ministers for their actions, and ministers were accountable to the
Shahs. The central government did not handle allfiscalreceipts and disbursements,
allowing instead each province to have its o w n budget, the kitabcheh, which was
prepared by financial officials k n o w n as Mustawfi.

Mustawfis, in their reports,

transferred the balance of a province's revenues and the amounts which were needed
to keep for local expenditure, to the central government (Issawi 1971, p. 337).
Khodadoust Foroughi Tehrani (1975) says that "[n]o serious attempt was m a d e to
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reform the undesirablefinancialsystem before the 1906 [Mashruteh] constitution"
(p. 121).

3.8.2 Accountability Prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979

The Mashruteh Revolution brought about a new system of administration and,
accordingly, a m u c h stronger regime of accountability, particularly in financial
matters, than had previously been the case in Iranian history. The Supplementary
Fundamental L a w s of 7 October, 1907 provided that the powers of the Realm were
derived from the people, and that the Fundamental L a w regulated the employment of
those powers. Government was divided into three categories: the Legislative power;
the Judicial power; and the Executive power. Legislative power was derived from
the King, the National Consultative Assembly, and the Senate. The Executive
powers reposed in the King. Articles 26 and 27 of the Supplementary Fundamental
Laws of 7 October, 1907 provided that the laws and ordinances were carried out by
the Ministers and State officials in the august name of the King in the manner which
the L a w defined (Browne 1966, p. 376).

According to Article 46 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, the appointment
and dismissal of Ministers was effected by virtue of the Royal Decree of the King
(Browne 1966, p. 378). The King had therightto choose the officials w h o headed
the various government departments, whether internal or foreign, subject to the
approval of the responsible Minister, save in those cases which were specially
exempted by the Law. The appointment of other officials did not lie with the King,
save in such cases as were explicitly provided by the L a w (Article 48 of the
Supplementary Fundamental L a w s of 7 October, 1907, Browne 1966, p. 378-379).
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It seems that probably the weakest part of the Supplementary Fundamental L a w s was
that the Shah, with powers and authority as part of the Legislature along with the
authority to appoint and dismiss his ministers, was exempted from any formal
financial responsibility and accountability. However, the Ministers of State were
responsible and accountable to both houses of Parliament in all matters, that is the
Senate and the National Consultative Assembly (Article 44 of the Supplementary
Fundamental Laws of 7 October, 1907, Browne 1966, p. 378). Article 60 of these
Laws reinforced the responsibility and accountability of ministers to the National
Consultative Assembly and the Senate. This article added that ministers must appear
in case their presence was required by either Chamber and also they were required to

observe the limitations of their responsibility in all such matters as were committed
to their charge (Browne 1966, p. 380). Article 61 explained "ministerial collective
responsibility" as "Ministers, besides being individually responsible for the affairs

specially appertaining to their own Ministry, are also collectively responsible to the
two Chambers for one another's actions in affairs of a more general character"
(Browne 1966, p. 380).

According to article 27, of the Fundamental Laws of 30 December, 1906 "[w]herever

the Assembly observes any defect in the laws, or any neglect in giving effect to them,
it shall notify the same to the Minister responsible for that department, who shall
furnish all necessary explanations" (Browne 1966, p. 366). Article 66 of the
Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 7 October, 1907 provided that the Law shall
determine the responsibility of Ministers and the punishments to which they were
liable (Browne 1966, p. 380). The authority of asking the Cabinet or a Minister to
resign was given to the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate. If one of
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those Chambers, by an absolute majority, declared that it was dissatisfied with the
Cabinet, or with one particular Minister, that Cabinet or Minister should resign their
ministerial functions (Article 67 of the Supplementary Fundamental L a w s of 7
October, 1907, Browne 1966, p. 380). Furthermore, according to article 65 of that
L a w the National Consultative Assembly, or the Senate, could call Ministers to
account or bring them to trial (Browne 1966, p. 380).

Article 33 of the

Supplementary Fundamental L a w s also gave the right of investigation and
examination of every affair of state to the Senate and the National Consultative
Assembly (Browne 1966, p. 377).

If the National Consultative Assembly demanded explanations on any matter from
the responsible minister, the minister in question was required to answer. In this case
the minister's answer must not have been postponed unnecessarily or without
plausible reason, apart from secrecy measures, which, for a specified period, was to
the advantage of the State and the People. In such cases, on the lapse of the specified
period the responsible Minister was bound to answer to the Assembly (Article 42 of
the Fundamental L a w s of 30 December, 1906, Browne 1966, p. 369).

With the establishment of the National Consultative Assembly12 (one of the results o
the Mashruteh Revolution in 1906) in Iran and considering the importance of finance
in social, economic, and political affairs of the country and the emergence of
stewardship and auditing of finances, for the first time in the Supplementary
Fundamental L a w s (SFL) of October 7, 1907, 10 articles regarding Finances were
passed by the National Consultative Assembly (Majlis). The most important

2

For more see chapter 2.
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requirement of this L a w (for thefirsttime in Iranian history) was the preparation of
an annual national budget. The Shah, through the Department of Finance, had to
present an annual budget to the Majlis.

According to Article 94 of the

Supplementary Fundamental L a w s "[n]o tax shall be established save in accordance
with the L a w " (Browne 1966, p. 383). Article 96 of this L a w provided that the
annual Budget was to be fixed and approved by a majority of votes of the National
Consultative Assembly. Finally, "[n]o order for the payment of any allowance or
gratuity can be m a d e on the Treasury save in accordance with the L a w " (Browne
1966, p. 383). These two articles of the Iranian Constitution introduced to Iran the
dimensions of accountability, including legality and regularity, which were present in
Westminster countries such as Australia.

According to appropriation article 102, of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, a
financial commission which was to be called the Court of Accounts (Divan
muhasabat) was set up to inspect and analyse the accounts of the Department of
Finance and to prepare a settlement of the accounts of all debtors and creditors of the
Treasury. It was especially deputed to see that no item of expenditure fixed in the
Budget exceeded the amount specified, or was changed or altered, and that each item
was expended in the proper manner. It was to likewise inspect and analyse the
different accounts of all the departments of State, collect the documentary proof of
the expenditure indicated in such accounts, and submit, to the National Consultative
Assembly, a complete statement of the accounts of the Kingdom accompanied by its
o w n observations (Browne 1966, pp. 383-384; Shahbazi 1995). It is worth noting
here that, like most countries at the time, the form of accountability in Iran was
input-orientated.

These concerns of accountability were to ensure that the
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appropriation of the budget was implemented properly. This form of accountability
led to the traditional form of accountability including probity and regularity.

In referring to the requirements of Articles 101, 102, and 103 of the Supplementary
Fundamental Laws for setting up the Law of Accounts, the first Law of Accounts
was passed by the National Consultative Assembly in 1911 (Safar 23, 1329
corresponding to 1290 solar) with 141 Articles (Shahbazi 1995; Babajani 1992b).
The members of the Court of Accounts were to be appointed by the National
Consultative Assembly for a period as may be determined by the Law (Article 101 of
Supplementary Fundamental Laws) while the institution and organisation of the
Court of Accounts was also to be determined by the Law (Article 103 of
Supplementary Fundamental Laws). Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979
this Article had been ignored by the Ministers for Finance who had appointed the
president and the public prosecutor of the Court of Accounts solely with the
signature and approval of the Shah. Thus, the primary purposes of the Court of
Accounts did not come into force and the government did not have any significant

financial responsibility and accountability, even at the basic level of probity and

regularity, to the Majlis and through that to the people. This is because the Minis
of Finance were responsible for implementing the budget and also for appointing the
head and the members of the Court of Accounts for auditing and reporting on
executive expenditures.

The Law of Accounts was amended three times before the Islamic Revolution with
the purpose of decreasing the authority of the National Consultative Assembly and
increasing the power of the Executive or Shah in manipulating finances and the
budget. For example, according to an amendment in 1973 (corresponding to 1352
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solar) to the L a w of the Court of Accounts the president of the Court of Accounts
was appointed on the suggestion of the Ministry of Finance and on the command of
the Shah (Shahbazi 1995). Thus, it can be seen how the Shahs had made the chain of
financial accountability weak and insufficient.

3.8.3 Accountability after the Islamic Revolution in 1979

With the Islamic Revolution in 1979 in Iran, the form of government and
relationships between the three branches changed. In chapter 2 it was shown how the
new Constitution defined the scope of powers and authorities of government sectors.
Under the new system of government the President, the Chief of the Executive, is
responsible and accountable to the People, the Leader, and the Islamic Consultative
Assembly (Article 122). According to Articles 126 and 134 of the Iranian
Constitution the President is responsible for national planning and budget. He may

entrust the administration of this to others. He is also responsible and accountable t
the Islamic Consultative Assembly for the actions of the Board of Ministers. Each of
the ministers is responsible and accountable for his duties to the President and the
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Article 137). It is worth noting that ministers also
have collective responsibility and accountability and are responsible and accountable
for the actions of their fellow Ministers to the People and the Islamic Consultative
Assembly for the matters approved by the Board of Ministers as a whole. Although
the Islamic Revolution changed the relationships between the branches of
government and a stronger form of political accountability came into force, the
dimensions of financial and management accountability did not change. They
continue to be overwhelmingly concerned with accountability for legality and
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regularity. This form of accountability is similar to Cutt's Efficiency I discussed in
section 3.5.

The form and the organisation of the Court of Accounts changed according to
Articles 54 and 55 of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Constitution. Article 54 of the
Constitution explains that the Court of Accounts is to be placed directly under the
supervision of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the organisation and the m o d e
of its operation in Tehran and at the provincial capitals are to be determined by law.

The function of the Court of Accounts, as described by Article 55 of the Constitution
is to inspect and audit, in the manner prescribed by law, all the accounts of
ministries, government institutions and companies as well as other organisations that
draw, in any way, on the general budget of the country.

The purpose of this

inspection and auditing is to ensure that no expenditure exceeds the appropriations
approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and that all sums are spent for the
specified purpose.

The Court of Accounts will collect all relevant accounts,

documents, and records, in accordance with law, and submit to the Islamic
Consultative Assembly a report for the settlement of each year's budget together with
its o w n comments. This Article also adds that the report must be m a d e available to
the public.

The function of the Court of Accounts since the 1979 Constitution is more precise
and broader than that of Supplementary Fundamental L a w s in 1907. A s explained
earlier, the function of the Court of Accounts was mainly limited to inspecting and
analysing the accounts of the Department of Finance. It was not asked to submit a
report for the settlement of each year's budget, together with the Court of Accounts
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comments, to the Majlis and the people. The function of the Court of Accounts,
according to the 1979 Constitution, is to inspect and also audit the public sector
entities.

3.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The meaning of accountability in general, and as it applies in the public sector, and
its importance were discussed in this chapter. Accountability has different meanings
in different contexts and it depends upon the nature of the state. According to one
idea, the definition of accountability is related to the ideologies, motifs and language
of time. The notion of public accountability in some countries such as Australia
Britain, and N e w Zealand has shifted in recent decades from an emphasis on inputs
to outputs and a management concept orientation, which gives greater prominence to
concepts such as value for m o n e y and letting the managers manage. Cutt (1977) is of
the opinion that "to the traditional control-oriented or input-oriented stage in
budgetary evolution ... accountability w a s related to the checking on the use of funds
in the detailed manner prescribed" (p. 335).

Accountability is mainly a matter of external control. Financial Accountability
means a liability to reveal, to explain, to justify and to give information.

To

implement financial accountability there is a requirement of an appropriate structure
offinancialplanning, accounting and auditing institutions. There is an emergence of
different forms of quantitative accountabilities such as efficiency and effectiveness in
recent decades.
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The Executive powers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Australia are
responsible and accountable to the people for their actions; in the Islamic Republic of
Iran through the Islamic Consultative Assembly and in Australia through Parliament.
Before the Mashruteh

Revolution there was a strong lack of accountability and,

particularly,financialaccountability in Iran.

Accounting systems are seen as one of the most important elements in the process of
public accountability which provide a mechanism vital to the exercise of
accountability. A general discussion of the roles and functions of accounting in the
public sector accountability chain will be the theme of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

OBJECTIVES AND ROLE OF ACCOUNTING IN
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

4.1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

In the two previous chapters the structures of government in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and Australia were discussed, and conceptions of accountability were explored.
Discussion included an explanation of the forms of accountability in Australia and
the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This chapter is concerned with the consideration of an efficient and appropriate
accounting system as a provider of useful and adequate information for
implementing accountability processes in the public sector.

Government

performance is judged with a heavy reliance on financial information.

Thus,

accounting mechanisms are very important. Included in this chapter is a discussion
of the systems of government accounting, including cash accounting, accrual
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accounting and fund accounting. Reference will be m a d e to the benefits of cash
accounting, accrual accounting and their differences. It will also consider why calls
for reform in accounting in the public sector have gone unheeded by many
governments and little attention has been devoted to standards setting until recent
years.

This chapter also covers some of the significant issues currently confronting public
sector accounting, in particular determination and allocation of costs, measurement,
depreciation and amortisation of fixed assets, financial reporting and development of
a public sector conceptual framework. It shows accounting to be the most important
mechanism to allow financial accountability to be exercised in the public sector.

Government accounting is an essential element of the financial management and
accountability function of a government. A government accounting system exists to
furnish complete and reliable financial information, in proper form and on a timely
basis, to the several groups of persons responsible for and/or concerned with the
conduct of government activities and operations. The selection of sufficient relevant
information for a comparison of actual performance with the presumed objectives of
government is the most important aspect of monitoring mechanisms in the process of
accountability. According to Sherer and Kent (1983), even though the accountability

of organisations to different participants requires the use of different information,
provision of financial information is the most important part of the accountability
process (p. 7). Sherer and Kent (1983) argue that the process of accountability
includes the two following elements:

• a description of the organization and its participants, and
• the identification of objectives and the provision of relevant information to
monitor those objectives (p. 8).
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Thefirstelements of Sherer and Kent's scheme of accountability, as applied to the
public sector, were the subjects of chapters two and three of this study. Part of their
second element, the provision of sufficient information, will be the theme of this
chapter and chapters 5 and 6.

4.2 THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING

In spite of increases in the size and significance of government activities in the
twentieth century, government accounting was largely ignored throughout the world
until the 1980s (Pallot 1991, p. 229). There was little or no attempt to set accounting
standards for public sector entities. In the U S A the reason for a lack of recognition
of standards setting has been attributed to the right of the individual states to
establish their o w n laws and related practice, including the accounting practices of
state and local governments and the public organisations associated with these
governments (Garner 1991).

It is unlikely that a similar level of neglect will

characterise the future. Apostolou et al (1992) believe that

[t]he next decade will witness changes in the practice of
governmental accounting. Important strides will be m a d e in
updating governmental accounting, and increasingly, it will
resemble business accounting. The full accrual basis will replace the
modified accrual basis. A s a result, governmental fund revenues
will generally be recognized w h e n earned, and most expenses will
be recognized when they are incurred. These changes will result in
governmental financial statements more closely resembling business
financial statements (p. 1144).

The process referred to by Apostolou et al had started in the 1980's. Several reasons
have been suggested for this sudden increase of interest in public sector accounting
in the 1980s.

These include pressure to expand the concept of accountability

(Hopwood 1984, p. 174), the need for improvedfinancialanalysis in order to manage
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cuts in public expenditures and the inadequacies in accounting practices revealed by
the investigations of the financial collapse of New York and other American cities
(Pallot 1991, p. 199). In New Zealand according to Pallot (1991),

[m]uch of the pressure for reform in public sector accounting in the
early 1980s came from a cadre of senior managers and finance
officers concerned about the inadequacies of the traditional
accounting systems in government to measure financial performance
for either management purposes or external reporting purposes (p.
198).

According to Henley et al (1986) the result was that "professional accountancy
institutes, feeling that their members have remarkable skills to improve accounting
and performance information, became interested in public sector practices" (quoted
in Pallot 1991, p. 199). Consequently, as Hopwood (1984) points out, public sector
accounting has become a major issue for both discussion and action (p. 167; see also
Foley 1982a, pp. 31-32). He argues that

[i]n the last few years both the language and the practices of
accounting have entered m u c h more frequently and forcefully into
debates about the efficiency, accountability and even scope of public
sector activities. ... Although there is a long history of investing in
accounting mechanisms for recording, planning, controlling and
making visible public sector activities, within a very short period of
time indeed recent pressures for change have succeeded in
challenging the adequacy of existing public accounts and
management accounting practices. ... The pressures for the
expansion and reform of public sector accounting are numerous,
diverse and even conflicting in nature (Hopwood 1984, pp. 167 and
170).
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M a n y standard setting efforts in public sector accounting were made during the
1980s. In Australia1, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America there
has been an attempt to establish and develop a conceptual framework for public
sector entities (Rutherford 1992, p. 266). In the United States, which has led the
way, changes in government accounting started when in the 1970s New York,

Chicago, Detroit and several other large cities were almost brought to the point of
bankruptcy although their financial statements did not disclose the true state of
positions (Douglas and Anthony 1991, p. 25). As a result of these crises, and in
response to widespread dissatisfaction with the financial accounting practices of
and municipal governments (Douglas and Anthony 1991, p. 25), a new era in
government accounting in the United States commenced in April 1984 with the
creation of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) (Chan 1985;
Douglas and Anthony 1991; Gamer 1991) to succeed the National Council of
Governmental Accounting (NCGA) (Garner 1991, p. 5). Like the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which is the standard-setting body for profitseeking enterprises and the Federal Government (see FASAB News, Special Edition,
June 1995, p.l; FASAB News, Issue No.39, December 1996), GASB is also a

private-sector organisation established to set standards for not-for-profit entitie
difference is that now GASB pronouncements are primarily applicable to local and
state government accounting. Thus, as Chan (1985) has observed, the GASB

standards are intended to be applicable only to the fifty state governments and 80

local governments in the United States (p. 34; see also Jones 1992; Apostolou et al

1992, p. 1144). The Financial Accounting Foundation is the parent of, and the sourc

of funding for, both bodies (see figure 4.1) (Sutcliffe 1985; Chan 1985; Douglas a

1

Discussion about pubic sector accounting and particularly standard setting efforts in Australia will
be part of chapter 6.
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Anthony 1991; Johnson and Langsam 1991; Snodgrass 1993; see also Apostolou et
al 1992, p. 1123).

Since its creation GASB has made numerous improvements in accounting for not-

for-profit entities. One statement of concept, the objectives of financial reporting

been issued by GASB for non-profit entities and it also has issued several statemen
on government accounting practices (Douglas and Anthony 1991, p. 26). While the
spheres of influence of the two standard-setting bodies n o w have been clarified
(Bowsher 1996; Dyer 1996), until only recently there existed considerable ambiguity
both amongst accounting practitioners and within the two standard setting bodies as
to the relative standing of the two bodies at the different levels of government (Patten
and Wambsganss 1991, p.44).

Figure 4.1
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
STANDARDS-SETTING S T R U C T U R E IN T H E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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(Source: Freeman and Shoulders 1993, p. 15)

Pressures for the introduction of new dimensions of public financial accountability
primarily efficiency and effectiveness, as indicated in the previous chapter, are the
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main reasons for the need for change in public sector accounting. Scott and Gorringe
(1989) refer to an information system helping to assess performance as one of the
central features of the public sector reforms in the New Zealand context (p. 81).
Providing the information necessary for assessing and improving performance
requires change from cash accounting to accrual accounting (Shand 1990b, p. 143).
According to Scott and Gorringe (1989), changing the system of financial
accountability to accrual accounting was an essential element in the reform process
of the public sector in New Zealand (p. 82). Financial statements were prepared on
an accrual accounting basis for New Zealand government departments from the year
ended 30 June 1992 (Bourn 1993). In Australia, as one the requirements of the
recent reforms, accrual accounting has been progressively introduced in departments
since 1992.2

The selection of the basis of accounting to be used in public sector accounting is a
controversial issue. The most important suggested bases for government accounting
are: cash accounting, accrual accounting, commitment accounting, budgetary
accounting, fund accounting, partial cash accounting, and partial accrual accounting
(see Jones and Pendlebury 1985, p. 156). Jones and Pendlebury (1985) state that
different types of public sector organisations may adopt different accounting
practices and bases. Depending upon the structure of an organisation and its needs,
they believe that these bases of accounting are not mutually exclusive. For example,
one institution might adopt budgetary accounting, cash accounting, and fund

accounting. It is also possible that all five bases will be simultaneously adopted by
an organisation (p. 156).

For more see chapter 6.
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In recent years, strong pressure has been placed on using accrual accounting in public
sector accounting.

In the sections which follow, firstly cash and then accrual

accounting will be defined and their relative merits will be discussed.

4.3 CASH ACCOUNTING

Cash accounting means that an entity "reports on cash flows during a period and cash
balances at the end of that period" (Sutcliffe et al 1991, p. 41). In other words, the
entity records transactions with each receipt or payment of cash. In this system there
is no record of future receipts or payments and accordingly in most cases no debt or
commitment will be transferred to future accounting records. Cash accounting also
does not attempt to allocate the costs of long lived assets or fixed costs, i.e.
depreciation, to products or services provided. The elements offinancialstatements
under cash accounting are "cash inflows, cash outflows and cash balances" (Sutcliffe
et al 1991, p. 41). According to Churchill (1992a) cash accounting meant: "asset
registers did not exist or were incomplete; debtors could not be properly reconciled
to sales and cash receipts; aggregate creditor balances were unknown; departments
often 'acted differently' in June each year" (p. 19). Until recently, cash accounting
has been the system of recording of government transactions used by most countries,
irrespective of their system of governance.

Cash accounting has been used by Westminster forms of government at least from
the 17th century (Scullion 1993; see also Sutcliffe et al 1991, p. 21). According to
the Commonwealth Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA), Governments
under the Westminster system have:

... historically operated on an annual cash basis because this is
fundamental to democratic constitutional safeguards which have
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199: 1985, pp. 9-10 quoted in Sutcliffe et al 1991, pp. 43).
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Churchill (1992c) states that "the Westminster system of government has effectively
forced the public sector to report on a cash basis to reflect the budgeting process on
cash (or 'funds') basis" (p. 39). Meanwhile, Carpenter (1986a) emphasises that "...
the cash basis has been utilised in most Western democracies which have the
legislature as the primary political institution" (quoted in Sutcliffe et al 1991, p. 21).

In Australia, the basic constitutional safeguard provided by cash accounting is that
moneys shall be collected or spent except in ways and amounts approved by the
Parliament through budget appropriations (sections 81 and 83 of the Constitution).
Thus, the Parliamentary appropriations process incorporates a primarily cash-based
appropriations budget, which also has been, and remains, the major determinant of
departmental accounting and reporting practice in Australia (Sutcliffe et al 1991, p.
ix; see also Parker and Guthrie 1993, p. 70).

A desire to move from a cash system in the public sector can be seen early in this
century. Shand (1987), commenting on the history of using cash accounting in the
public sector, reported that "[t]he reputed failure of the British A r m y Cost
Accounting experiment (1919-25) and the findings of the U K Crick Committee
(1950) are often quoted in favour of the cash system" (Shand 1987, p. 3). The cost
accounting experiment w a s the consequence of criticism of existing accounting
arrangements by the influential Sir Charles Harris, Joint Secretary of the British W a r
Office, with the support of the Comptroller and Auditor-General and some prominent
members of Parliament, including the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee,
w h o submitted formally a m e m o r a n d u m , in October 1917, to a Select Committee on
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National Expenditure appointed by the House of C o m m o n s in 1917. Harris began
his memorandum by pointing out that

[tjhirty years' experience of the actual working of the present system
of external control of W a r Office expenditure, in peace and war, has
convinced m e that it fails to produce real economy (Reports of the
Select Committee on National Expenditure (Sub-Committee on the
Form of Public Accounts), Appendix 2; British Parliamentary
Papers, 1918, Vol. iv, p. 391 quoted in Wright 1956, p. 464).

Harris suggested that administrative control in the army should be exercised thro
cost accounts showing the total cost incurred by each unit. H e asked for "a change
from accounting on a cash basis to accounting on a cost basis" (Wright 1956, p. 466).
At that time a Sub-Committee of the Committee on National Expenditure, called, the
Sub-Committee on the Form of Public Accounts, received a great deal of evidence
favouring such a change. This included Major H. A. Young's article on "Efficiency
and Economy" in The Army

Review in January, 1914, comments by Sir John

Bradbury, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and by M r S. Dannreuther,
Accounting Officer of the Ministry of Munitions. Wright (1956) reported that the
sub-committee asked Harris to prepare a draft showing the manner in which the
Army Estimates and Accounts should be presented to Parliament (p. 466).
"Eventually this draft was appended to the Seventh Report of the Committee on
National Expenditure, in which the Committee recommended the early adoption of a
new form of Estimates and Accounts by the W a r Office" (Wright 1956, p. 466).
After a favourable reception by the government the changes were implemented on
April 1, 1919. The n e w system proposed to show the full cost of every unit and
establishment of the Army. To implement the changes a n e w corps of the A r m y , the
Corps of Military Accountants, was introduced. During its introduction, uncertainty
about the success of the n e w system meant that the old system of cash accounting
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was allowed to carry on, exactly as before. Ultimately, using the two sets of
accounts and two corps of accountants resulted in duplication of effort, high
operating costs, andfriction(Wright 1956, 466).

In 1922 the Secretary of State for War appointed a committee to investigate "the
system of administration of, and accounting for, army expenditure, and to
recommend any changes that might be desirable in the interests of economy and
efficiency" (Wright 1956, pp. 466-467). The Committee report was finally issued in
October 1923 and suggested amalgamation of the two systems. The A r m y Council
accepted the Committee's recommendation and set up a departmental committee to
work out details. B y the time the Committee's report was received Sir Harris, the
champion of the n e w system of cost accounting, had retired. Thus, difficulties in
implementing the n e w system lead the A r m y Council to abandon the cost accounting
system introduced in 1919, and to revert to the old form of Estimate and Account
based on cash accounting (Wright 1956, p. 467). Little was to change in government
accounting for the next 60 years.

4.3.1 Advantages of Cash Accounting

Cash accounting has been said to be an important method for preparing cash budgets.
The function of the cash budget is to summarise the government's fiscal policies
concerned with the macroeconomic management of the economy.

Thus, the

argument is that, irrespective of the form of governance, cash budgets will always be
necessary for central governments (Mackintosh 1992). Scullion (1993) gives three
reasons for the popularity of cash accounting:

•
•

Simplicity
Cheapness
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He says that by a glance at the bank balance the financial position can be understoo
Cash accounting "does not require a complicated accounting system ... therefore
record keeping is relatively cheap" (Scullion 1993, p. 3). Scullion refers to the third
reason as "a simple task to measure expenditure against the authority given by
Parliament, so accountability for stewardship is readily established" (Scullion 1993,
p. 3).

Governments need details of their cash budget receipts and payments and, like profit
seeking enterprises, need cash budget information (Robson 1987). H u m p h r y (1992),
referring to the relevance of cash accounting in the presence of accrual accounting,
says that it "is not to say that cash records need be abandoned. Cash recording is an
integral subset of accrual accounting. W e still need to manage our cash and w e need
to maintain controls over expenditure" (p. 4; J C P A 1995). Information on cash
accounting will be important for management purposes and for economic decisionmaking and will continue to be necessary to demonstrate compliance with the
executive's spending mandate (Sutcliffe et al 1991, p. 45).

4.3.2 Criticisms of Cash Accounting

It has been argued that there are some problems with only using a cash accounting
system in the public sector (Burke 1982; Robson 1987; Shand 1987; Sutcliffe et al
1991; Tisdall 1992, p. 32; Babajani 1992b; Islamia Bid Goli 1992; Scullion 1993).
These problems, which mostly refer to difficulties in measuring asset costs and
liabilities, have been presented as, firstly, the costs of operating programs are
ambiguous and consequently the measurement of performance cannot be fully
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Secondly, there is an emergence of long-term liabilities or

commitments arising from implementing some activities (Shand 1987, p. 3; see also
Robson 1987, p. 9) which, using a cash accounting system, m a y not be adequately
recorded (if at all). Scullion (1993) reinforces Shand's position and believes that cash
accounting will create serious problems of cost control. H e adds that even though
cash accounting will tell the government what has been spent in a year it doesn't
disclose the extent of commitments that the government has entered into; it doesn't
tell the government what other resources have been consumed, especially those
major infrastructure assets which are peculiar to the public sector; and it doesn't
provide the government with information to manage its liabilities (p. 3; see also
Robson 1987, p. 9). Entries in cash accounting are activated only w h e n a cash
movement occurs.

For Scullion, the most important problem with cash accounting is that it simply does
not tell Parliamentarians (or the public) what are the full costs of the services which
the Government is providing and "[t]he resources captured by the traditional cash
approach reflect a mixture of cash operating costs and cash capital costs. There is a
failure properly to distinguish capital and operating costs and an absence of a
measure of the consumption of capital" (Scullion 1993, p. 3). Robson (1987) is of
the opinion that the problem of measuring full costs in cash accounting will result in
the incomplete reporting of activities and transactions and:

• lead to misallocation of resources;
• not adequately disclose the size of assets;
• impose burdens on future taxpayers by deferring the bringing to
account of liabilities such as long service leave and employers'
deferred superannuation contributions and

For a detailed discussion of measuring performance see Wholey 1993.
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• impose burdens on current taxpayers, by charging in full each year,
the cost of assets purchased rather than capitalising such expenditure
and spreading costs over their useful life to bring to account each
year the cost of using the assets employed (p. 9).
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It has been said that the significant problem with cash accounting is that it links
receipts and payments without considering the time in which economic transactions
have happened (Robson 1987). Sutcliffe et al (1991) point out that

[t]he cash basis is simple to apply and avoids the judgements
involved in measuring and reporting m a n y of the transactions and
other events which have an impact on thefinancialcharacteristics of
a department's performance. However, the cash basis will only
report the full costs of providing services during the period where all
costs have a cash-flow consequence during the period. Similarly, it
will not report the assets (other than cash) which the department
controls and which represent a capacity to provide services in the
future, the liabilities which are to be settled by the department and
the changes in those assets and liabilities as a result of operations
during the period (p. 45).

Sutcliffe et al (1991) argue that although information on a cash accounting basis is
important for management purposes, it provides information that is useful for
economic decision-making purposes and also is necessary to demonstrate compliance
with spending mandates, this information is only a subset of the information which is
necessary for accountability purposes and informed economic decision-making by
Parliaments. They add that, for example, the financial reports prepared on the basis
of cash accounting prevent departments from reporting the economy and efficiency
of service delivery and their performance in the management of assets and liabilities
(pp. 45-46).

Thus, in summary there are at least two major problems with using only cash
accounting. First, the impossibility of measuring full costs and in some cases
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misallocation of resources. Second, there is the inadequacy of disclosures of assets
and liabilities for both decision-making and accountability purposes. Using accrual
accounting instead of cash accounting has been advocated as a solution to these
problems.

4.4 ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING

In contrast to cash accounting, "[a]ccrual accounting records the full impact of
transactions and events that have cash consequences ... in the periods in which the
transactions and events take place, rather than in the period in which the cash is
received or paid ..." (Barton 1982, p. 29 quoted in Sutcliffe 1985, p. 28).
Recognition of "thefinancialeffects of transactions and other events in the reporting
period in which they occur, irrespective of whether cash has been received or paid" is
the main feature of accrual accounting (Sutcliffe et al 1991, p. 41; see also Pallot
1991, p. 200; Scott and Gorringe 1989, p. 85). The economic resources (assets) and
obligations (liabilities) of the entity, the cost of services (expenses) and cost
recoveries and other revenues are reported by accrual accounting (Sutcliffe et al
1991, p. 41). Assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, and equity (or net assets) are the
primary elements offinancialstatements in accrual accounting (Sutcliffe et al 1991,
p. 41; see also Parker and Guthrie 1993, p. 70).

Accrual accounting was seen as a superior method of accounting for the economic
resources of any organisation by the National Council on Governmental Accounting
in the U S A several years ago (Robson 1987, p. 11). Robson (1987) states that using
accrual accounting will result "in accounting measurements based on the substance
of transactions and events rather than merely w h e n cash is received and disbursed
and thus enhances their relevance, neutrality, timeliness, completeness and
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The next sections discuss and explore benefits and

limitations of accrual accounting for the public sector.

4.4.1 Benefits of Accrual Accounting

There is general agreement that accrual accounting in the public sector has
considerable advantages over a purely cash system of accounting. Shand (1987)
believes that accrual accounting is fundamental for all government entities.
However, he was not sure about the priority of accrual accounting in respect of the
central accounts of government (p. 7). Harris and Carpenter (1990) went further and
supported accrual accounting for all aspects of government activities including
government as a whole (Harris 1990; Carpenter 1990). Sutcliffe et al (1991) point
out that

[wjhether accrual accounting is appropriate for financial reporting
by departments is dependent on whether information about the
resources controlled (and changes therein) and costs of servicedelivery (and cost recoveries) should be reported for accountability
and economic decision-making purposes (p. 47).

They also state that

[t]o argue that accrual accounting is not appropriate for departments
is to argue that:
(i) the cost of services (and therefore efficiency of operations) is
not relevant to financial report users;
(ii) the identification, control and management of economic
resources is not a matter which is important to Parliaments and
otherfinancialreport users; and,
(iii) the economic characteristics and consequences of particular
transactions, say the acquisition of an item of capital
equipment or the consumption of resources, will differ
dependent on whether or not the reporting entity is a business
entity (Sutcliffe et al 1991, pp. 47-48).
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Mackintosh (1992) states that the benefits of accrual accounting are reflected in the
usefulness of the information it produces (p. 41). The Commonwealth Department of
Finance has listed the following benefits to be gained by moving to accrual
accounting; it would:

facilitate assessment of program performance by showing the
full cost of programs;
facilitate assessment of financial position by showing all
resources and obligations;
enhance the accountability of management for their
performance;
act as a spur to better management performance;
provide a wider range of information needed for day to day
decision making;
enable more effective use to be m a d e of a given level of
resources; and
provide a more effective basis for decisions about such matters
as user charging; identifying savings options to finance high
priority objectives; and workplace bargaining (Department of
Finance 1992b, pp. 2-3; see also Mackintosh 1992, p. 41;
McPhee 1993, pp. 8-9; Robson 1987, pp. 9-10; Humphry 1992,
p. 1; Churchill 1992a, p. 19).4

Thus, the significant advantage or benefit of accrual accounting which is relevant to

this study is that moving from cash accounting to accrual accounting will enable th

'full costs' of operations to be measured which will enhance accountability purpose
in the public sector (Aiken and McCrae 1992, p. 13; Humphry 1992, p. 1; Scott and
Gorringe 1989, p. 85; Robson 1987; Nobes 1988; Shand 1990a; Sutcliffe et al 1991;
Humphry 1992, p. 1; Mackintosh 1992; Scullion 1993; McPhee 1993, p. 2).

Emphasis in original.
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In Australia the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board ( P S A S B ) recognises that
accrual accounting has widespread relevance throughout the public sector and that its
adoption is consistent with the achievement of the objectives offinancialreporting
(Sutcliffe 1985). In referring to S A C 2, Sutcliffe et al (1991) state that disclosure of
information about assets, liabilities, expenses, revenues, and equity are required in
general purpose financial reports. These disclosures are necessary for economic
decision-making purposes and also for accountability purposes of departments using
public resources.

Accrual accounting "is directed at the disclosure of such

information" (Sutcliffe et al 1991, p. 46; see also Barrett 1994b, p. 2). Sutcliffe
notes that the adoption of accrual accounting "enables an entity to prepare fund
statements, operating or performance statements [profit and loss statements for
business enterprises] and balance sheets as well as cash flow statements" (Sutcliffe
1985, p. 28). H e adds that accrual accounting enables most entities to provide a more
comprehensive disclosure of financial position, performance and resource flows than
cash accounting. Sutcliffe also believes that the adoption of these principles will not
have m u c h effect on reporting by those entities which currently prepare financial
statements using cash accounting and which do not "own" assets, incur liabilities or
"accrue" revenues in any material sense (Sutcliffe 1985).

Accrual accounting provides a report of wholly held assets (whether they are being
used for operations or not) and whether they are being used to the greatest advantage
(Robson 1987, p. 12; see also Pallot 1991, p. 200). Harris (1990) also suggested that
accrual accounting "would reduce the ill-informed, single-channelled concentration
on the size of the deficit or the financing requirements as the current definition of the
deficit should be k n o w n " (p. 183).

Redburn (1993) believes that replacing the

federal government's cash basis budgeting approach in the United States with an
accrual budgeting system would improve budgeting for federal insurance programs

Chapter 4, Objectives and Role...

142

(p. 228). He argues that accrual accounting records transactions when they occur
which helps to assess the ongoing costs of various programs (Redburn 1993, p. 228).

The measurement and reporting, by accrual accounting techniques, of assets,
liabilities and the cost of goods or services provided encourages proper
accountability and asset maintenance and also results in the disclosure of the full
extent of assets and liabilities (Robson 1987). In other words, without accrual
accounting it is possible that assets will have no visibility. Robson (1987) strongly
supports using accrual accounting when he suggests that "public sector activities

should be reported to Parliament as far as possible in the same way as a private secto

organisation is accountable to its shareholders" (p. 8). This is because taxpayers are
similar to shareholders in that they provide resources to the organisation. Robson

(1987) considers that financial statements prepared on a cash accounting or a receipts

and payments basis do not always reveal the full cost of all the resources utilised by
the organisation in the accounting period and "the usefulness of departmental

financial accounts - which are not prepared on an accrual basis - is doubtful" (p. 10).

Scullion (1993) supports the change to accrual accounting by outlining specific

benefits identifiable at four levels. First, it provides a financial framework for bett
economic and efficient resource management. The specific areas where accrual
accounting and budgeting are of importance include: asset management and
maintenance; liability management; inventory management; cash management; and
costing of resources. Making effective decisions about the management of assets
regarding the continuing public ownership, disposal and maintenance of those assets
is strongly related to a comprehensive accounting framework. The budget sector is
characterised by central management of the major categories of liabilities, namely
debt and superannuation. Using accrual accounting provides information for
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agencies to manage these and other liabilities such as trade creditors and long service
leave. Accrual accounting helps an agency to identify the stock of goods that it
maintains. It also provides the information for establishing an optimal policy that

minimises the amount of working capital tied up in inventories (Scullion 1993, pp. 56; see also NSW Treasury 1993, pp. 19-20).

Although in the traditional public sector accounting system the prime emphasis is on
cash there is still inadequate information to optimise the use of cash balances and
cash flows. This system does not maintain information on accounts payable and
accounts receivable. Therefore, it is possible for agencies to maintain adherence to
cash budgets whilst building up substantial liabilities through increased creditors.

Conversely, without information on accounts receivable it is possible for agencies t
fail to optimise the flow of cash to the agency. Under accrual accounting a full

resource cost can be identified for inputs including the use of capital but under cas
accounting the only measure of a resource is a cash measure. It is also argued that
the outputs of budget sector agencies can be costed fully by accrual accounting
information. Without such information there is only incomplete material to assess
whether a service should be provided by public service or an alternate service
provider (Scullion 1993, pp. 5-6; see also NSW Treasury 1993, pp. 19-20).

Scullion's second level of benefits refers to accrual accounting's ability to improv

accountability. Scullion (1993) believes that the narrow definition of accountabilit
at present covers the use and application of cash. Accrual accounting and budgeting
are capable of providing a financial framework which is able to assess financial
management performance on a far broader basis. In terms of dimensions of
accountability discussed in chapter 3, accrual accounting can provide information to
assist in measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of management. In addition,
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Robson (1987) argues that without introducing accrual accounting in departments,

the performance indicators based on financial data will result in inaccurate decisions
On a third level, accrual accounting also facilitates improved macro or whole of
budget sector financial policy and performance. ED 62 refers to this as "All of
Government Reporting". Information on cash flows is not enough in itself to enable
effective whole of government financial management. Accrual accounting provides

an additional financial indicator, that of the level and change in the net worth of the
budget sector. At the macro level the adoption of comprehensive accounting
provides better guidance to strategic financial decision making. Scullion's fourth
level refers to the ability of accrual accounting to provide the preconditions for a
more competitive and open approach to the budget sector. Scullion (1993) says that
the first three benefits apply to the traditional model of the budget sector while the
fourth major benefit is relevant to alternative approaches to budget sector service
provision. He concludes that although comprehensive accounting and budgeting is a
necessary condition for the pursuit of increased competition and market creation in
the budget sector, it is not sufficient (Scullion 1993, pp. 7-8; see also NSW Treasury
1993, pp. 19-20). Specifically

• contracting requires the public sector to evaluate private sector
proposals relative to in-house provision or provision from
another public sector agency. This requires an assessment of the
full resource costs and hence is not possible without full
financial reporting.
• application of user charges similarly needs to be based on proper
product costing.
• the creation of internal markets and competition ... also requires
fullfinancialreporting (Scullion 1993, p. 8).
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Ultimately the strong arguments in favour of accrual accounting convinced the
Commonwealth Government to change its accounting system. Thus, as one of the
results of the financial and management reforms introduced since 1983, which will
be discussed in chapter 5, in 1991/92 the Commonwealth Department of Finance

required all the departments to move to accrual reporting by the year ended 30 June
1995 (Department of Finance 1992c, p. 66; Department of Finance 1993, p. 20;
McPhee 1993, p. 11). It is worth noting here that the effective date for the
application of AAS 29, "Financial Reporting by Government Departments", which

requires government departments to prepare their financial statements using accrua

accounting, is from the first reporting period that ends on or after 31 December 1
(AAS 29 para 3). In New South Wales accrual accounting, after commencing in
1990-91, has been phased in for the budget sector (Lambert 1992, p. 9).5
Subsequently in NSW accounts have been produced as full accrual accounting
together with a useful commentary and summary of financial results, comprising:

* operating statements;
* statement of assets and liabilities;
* program statement;
* statement of cashflows; and
* notes (Mackintosh 1992, p. 13).

Reflecting on the experiences primarily of Great Britain, and significantly for a k
aim of this thesis, Nobes (1988) concludes that

Anglo-Saxon commercial accounting involving accruals-based
annual financial statements is necessary for accountability, control
and decision-making relating to government. ... [and] it might serve
as a model for public sector accounting in the rest of the world (p.
198).

For more see chapter 6.
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4.4.2 Limitations of Accrual Accounting

Some problems have been associated with using solely accrual accounting (Jones and
Pendlebury 1985; Robson 1987; Mackintosh 1992). Most importantly, Jones and
Pendlebury (1985) argue that accrual accounting introduces more subjectivity into
the accounts. Subjectivity here refers to the problem of "the recognition and

measurement of assets and liabilities, rather than just cash, [which] requires a grea
deal of judgement .. and there is room for manipulation and interpretation with
accrual accounting" (Mackintosh 1992, p. 25). Secondly, the relevance of accrual

accounting is limited when it is linked with historic costs and during periods of ris
prices. Thirdly, in comparison to cash flow accounting, accrual adjustments require
a higher administrative and accounting cost. For example, Allan (1988) suggests
that, accrual accounting to be implemented requires more sophisticated accounting
skills of which there have been problems of supply in the past. In 1988, Allan, the
Treasurer of NSW, pointed to the result of a report showing that "the demand for
accountants has grown 7% a year in the past decade while the number accounting
graduates has grown at below 5% a year" (p. 3). Finally, there is a problem which is
related to financial control (Jones and Pendlebury 1985, p. 178). Mackintosh (1992)
sees some difficulties which he believes "should not be underestimated" (p. 40) in
preparing accrual accounts for the whole of government, including

• Measuring or putting a value on some government assets raises
difficulties. For instance, what is the value of a national park or
Parliament House?
• There are difficult conceptual questions involved in defining what
are the assets and liabilities of a government. Is the ability to raise
taxes an asset? Is the responsibility to pay aged pensions in the
future a liability?
• W h e n thefiguresare put together, what do they mean?
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• Is there a need to separate budget and non-budget sectors if you are
going to accrual account?
• There is a lack of an existing information base to allow thefiguresto
be put together. N e w systems will need to be implemented to put
together information on the assets and liabilities which are not
currently recorded in cash accounting systems (Mackintosh 1992, p.
40).
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There are also problems of understandability. The public can understand a cash
deficit but what does the corresponding result in accrual accounting mean. This
could have political repercussions. Furthermore, Mackintosh (1992) says

[t]wo sets of difficulties in the public sector cause problems
encountered in applying full accrual accounting systems to
government to be inherently m u c h greater than those normally
encountered in the business sector. Business assets are required to
generate future cash flows which form the basis of their values
whereas most government assets do not do so.... Secondly, m a n y of
the markets in which governments o w n assets are notfreeand active
(p. 69).

Moving governments to accrual accounting is not possible without incurring some
cost and causing some pain (Mackintosh 1992).

Amidst expressions of enthusiasm for the adoption of accrual accounting in the
public sector reservations have also been raised. In particular, less enthusiastic
commentators refer to the significant differences between the pubic sector and the
private sector, where accrual accounting is found in its most sophisticated form. It

said that the roles of these two sectors create inherent differences which have led t
different systems of accounting. The differences are expanded in the following
section.
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4.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING

For some time researchers have been arguing whether public sector accounting and
commercial accounting are different (Anthony 1978; Mautz 1981; Burke 1982;
Hardman 1982; Goode 1984; Lapsley 1988; Douglas 1991; Douglas and Anthony
1991; Wilson 1991; Pallot 1992a). The issue has become increasingly more urgent
recently with greater emphasise on managing in the public sector. The adoption of a
managerial approach has led to the use of a more commercial-oriented accounting in
public sector organisations. Managerialism requires assessment of performance in

terms of some measurable factors and requires a full record of all transactions by t
entity. Lapsley (1988) concludes that

there are differences between the private and public sectors of the
economy and within the public sector of the economy. Such
differences apply to all aspects of the accounting function: the
raising of finance; the decisions to spend (on revenue and capital
expenditure); the basis of recording transactions and related
economic events, and the assessment of thefinancialperformance of
such organisations and the means by which responsible persons are
held accountable for the resources at their disposal (i.e. whether
within organisations, by organisation, or indeed, entire branches of
the public sector). Furthermore, there has been neither systematic
academic investigation of m a n y of these specific accounting issues,
nor the construction of theories of h o w best to account for public
expenditure, from first principles (p. 21). 6

Discussions about differences between government and commercial accounting
systems have highlighted at least three aspects. First, researchers see differences
between the two systems of accounting in terms of differences in practice (Burke
1982). Second, there are those who see differences in the nature of the accounting

Emphases in original.
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systems in profit and non-profit organisations and the purpose of organisations in t
two sectors (Mautz 1981; Goode 1984; Wilson 1991; Douglas 1991). Finally, there
are researchers who argue that there are differences in terms of user needs, which
suggests that different users require different accounting systems.

Mautz (1981) discusses the differences between the two sectors in terms of preparing
a "balance sheet" and an "income statement". He suggests that "many properties
owned by governments and considered by their citizens to be assets would not meet
the concept of asset used in business. On the contrary, they are more properly

viewed as liabilities" (Mautz 1981, pp. 53-54). He argues that in a business when the
probable cash flow of an asset reaches zero, any remaining carrying value is written
off as a loss. In government the case is different. For example, with some valuable
government properties such as a city park and memorials it is expected that
maintenance and operating costs will exceed any anticipated receipts from the
property. Thus, if the government continues to apply its commitments to keep these

facilities operational and open to the public, there are negative cash flows which ar
called liabilities in business accounting, not assets. Further, it is argued that
government properties are not available to government management in the same way

that business assets are available to business management if there are circumstances
which require that some properties be converted into cash to meet business debts.
Mautz also says that the government's taxing power, which is the government's major
resource and which is expected to meet the government's obligations, is not included
in its balance sheet (Mautz 1981, pp. 54-55).

According to Mautz, the income statement in business is referred to as a reflection o
the purpose of profit-seeking in the business enterprise i.e. expenses are incurred
earn revenues. Thus, revenues and expenses are very much related to each other
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(Mautz 1981, p. 56). H e concludes that the purpose of government "is to provide a
wide variety of services as economically as possible to beneficiaries w h o m a y or m a y
not pay for the service and matching revenue with expenses reflects the market's
reaction to a business while matching tax and other revenues with operating costs for
a government represents no such market test" (Mautz 1981, p. 56). Wilson (1991)
reinforces Mautz's idea that the generally recognised goal of companies in the private
sector is the maximisation of Return on Investment (ROI) over the long term. This is
not the same goal as that found in government.

Instead, government exists to

conduct legally mandated programs approved by the legislature in an effective and
efficient manner (Wilson 1991, p. 97). Despite these differences, Robson (1987)
believes that the lack of motivation in making profit in the public sector is not
sufficient to call for different accounting treatments (p. 19).

User needs is another area of differences between cash and accrual accounting
systems which has been referred to by some researchers. Thefirstcomprehensive
study of government accounting and the applicability of private sector practices was
conducted by Anthony in 1978 in order to provide the basis of accounting for
nonbusiness organisations. A s a result of his study he concluded that "there was
nothing

inherently

different in accounting

for business and

nonbusiness

organisations" (Jones 1992, pp. 252-253). F A S B in its fourth statement of financial
accounting concepts adopted the essence of Anthony's study. Consequently, F A S B
concluded that there was no need for an independent conceptual framework for any
one group of entities and that the two sets of objectives that it had identified (for
business and nonbusiness) would become part of an integrated conceptual framework
for all entities (Jones 1992, p. 253). T w o other studies were quickly conducted in
1980 and 1981 after Anthony's study, both commissioned by the N C G A in the
United States. Thefirstone by Holder (1980) concluded that "the commercial model
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is the most appropriate one for governmental units because the user group with the
most intense interest in accounting information and the least command over what is
produced, is investors" (in Jones 1992, p. 254). Douglas and Anthony (1991)
supported the conclusion of Holder's study and suggested that using the business
model is easier for statement users to understand. They also emphasised that the
business model will help the users to evaluate the whole entity instead of just its
separate activities (p. 28). Douglas and Anthony (1991) were of the opinion that if
the way in which fixed assets, and the related debt, are accounted for could be
changed, the government model could be made entirely consistent with the business
model (p. 32). The second study, which is referred to as the Drebin et al study
(1981), offered that government accounting is of necessity quite different from
accounting systems used in business. It was this study which proved most influential
on the deliberations of the NCGA when it developed its conceptual framework for
public sector accounting (in Jones 1992, p. 254). Jones (1992) represented the
reasons that caused the Drebin et al' study to reach a different conclusion from the
Anthony and Holder's studies as:

Anthony's five users become ten [in Drebin et al]; his four user
needs become twenty-two [in Drebin et al]; in Anthony, the
relationship between the organisation and itsfinancialinformation
users is abstract whereas in Drebin et al. a complex flow chart is
needed to show it (Jones 1992, p. 254).

The position taken in Australia with regard to the appropriateness of private sector
accounting is addressed in chapter 5.

Assets, the recording of depreciation and liabilities have presented the most
significant problems in applying accrual accounting to the public sector. These
issues will be referred to in the next section.
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4.6 ISSUES IN PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING
4.6.1 Assets and Depreciation

The definition, evaluation, recording, keeping and depreciation of long-lived or fixed
assets has been a long standing controversial issue in public sector accounting, and
has also been used to emphasise the differences between government and commercial
accounting. Public sector long-lived assets include houses, schools, town halls,
roads, sewers, dams, water-mains and sewage treatment works, hospitals, docks,

aiiports, steel mills, coal mines, and railway lines and rolling stock (Pen-in 1984, p.
61). Prior to the early eighties the concept of assets in the public sector was
discussed little, mainly because government accounting was predominantly cash
based and did not require the recognition of assets (Pallot 1992b). Pallot (1992b) has
presented a number of reasons that have brought assets to the forefront of public
policy discussion in recent years, including as a response to "[dissatisfaction with
cash accounting, a desire to increase managerial awareness of resources in times of

fiscal restraint, concern over the deterioration of infrastructure ... and debate over
sale of governmental assets under 'privatization'" (Pallot 1992b, p. 41).

Assets are defined by the Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) No. 4, Definition
and Recognition of the Elements of Financial Statements, as possessing "service
potential or future economic benefits controlled by the entity as a result of past
transactions or other past events" (SAC 4, para 14).7 And, according to SAC 4
"'[fjuture economic benefits" or service potential is the essence of assets" (SAC 4,
para 18). This definition has been accepted by Australian Accounting Standard AAS

7

For a more detailed discussion of "the definition and recognition of assets", see Miller and Islam
1988.
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27, Financial Reporting by Local Governments, and Australian Accounting Standard
AAS 29, Financial Reporting by Government Departments (AAS 27, para 12; AAS
29, para 8). In addition, the same criteria have been established by AAS 29 and AAS
27 for the recognition of an asset of a government department or local government.

The definition of an asset used in SAC 4 is composed of two elements. Firstly, "it i

probable that the service potential or future economic benefits embodied in the ass
will eventuate". Secondly "the asset possesses a cost or other value that can be
measured reliably" (AAS 29, para 53; AAS 27, para 33). Consistent with the
definitions in AAS 27 and AAS 29 the New South Wales (NSW) Treasury also
classifies an item as an asset of a department if:

(a) it has service potential or future economic benefits
(b) the department controls the service potential or future economic
benefits, and
(c) the transaction or other event giving rise to the department's
control over the service potential or future economic benefits has
occurred ( N S W Treasury 1991, p. 36; see also N S W Treasury
1989).

The definitions of assets included in Australian accounting pronouncements reflect
the earlier work of the FASB in America. Assets are defined for profit-seeking
enterprises by the FASB as "probable future economic benefits obtained or

controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or events" (FASB
3, December 1980, p. 19). The need for past exchanges created concerns about using
this concept for non-profit organisations.

It is argued that the conceptions of control and the entity's ability to restrict a
the service potential or economic benefits derived from the asset provided in the
definition of public sector assets are often different from those provided in the

private sector. In a business enterprise, control over the service potential derive
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from an asset is constantly obtained by restricting access to end products to those
willing to pay for them. In the public sector, non-commercial public sector reporting

entities are often unable to restrict individual access to the use of the service pot
derived from an asset, eg roads, railroads, hospitals and other government buildings
(NSW Treasury 1990, pp. 6-7).

Patten and W a m b s g a n s s (1991) have been critical of the FASB's reliance upon

private sector conceptions of assets to define public sector assets. They believe tha

FASB "with its roots in the traditional business world, apparently does not recognize
that fixed assets in the nonprofit arena differ from those of profit-driven
organizations" (Patten and Wambsganss 1991, p. 46). They support Mautz's notion
(1989) that

[t]he fundamental difference ... is that whereas fixed assets for
profit-oriented businesses exist to help produce cash inflows
(revenues), fixed assets for nonprofits exist to allow the
organizations to provide services. Nonprofit fixed assets are not, as
a general rule, revenue producing, but in contrast are cash drains
(Patten and W a m b s g a n s s 1991, p. 46).

They also believe that

the objectives of financial reporting for nonprofit organizations
support the use of some measure of accounting that identifies the
productive status of the fixed assets belonging to the organization.
Second, depreciation is not the appropriate measure (Patten and
Wambsganss 1991, p. 46).

Patten and Wambsganss (1991) suggest that not-for-profit organisations should be
reporting deferred capital maintenance instead of depreciation of assets. They argue
that
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Deferred capital maintenance represents the estimated charge for
maintenance and rehabilitation costs needed to keep fixed assets
operational that are put off or deferred to a future period. Similar to
accumulated depreciation, it should be reported with the fixed assets
as a contra account. However, w e also believe that w h e n costs that
had been previously deferred are incurred, the deferred capital
maintenance account should be correspondingly decreased. Because
w e believe the deferred capital maintenance amount should be
reported with the fixed assets, the logical place to account for it
would be in the General Fixed Asset Account Group (Patten and
Wambsganss 1991, p. 46).

Assets in the public sector have been categorised as: infrastructure assets such as
roads, bridges, railroads, sewerage systems; operatory assets such as computers,
scientific and office equipment; and heritage assets such as museums and
monuments. A similar classification of public sector fixed assets has been provided
by McBride and Peirson in the Australian CPA's Communique No. 66 where they
identify infrastructure assets, such as roads and railway systems; heritage assets,
as historical buildings and monuments; and community assets, such as parks and
recreation reserves (McBride and Peirson 1996; see also Pallot 1990).

In Australia, the depreciation of government department assets is recognised by
Accounting Standard AAS 4 which requires the disclosure of information in relation
to the depreciation of non-current assets in general purpose financial reports.
According to this standard "[t]he depreciable amount of a depreciable asset shall be

progressively recognised in the profit and loss or other operating statement by means
of depreciation expenses" (AAS 4, para 13). AAS 4 is applicable to "each private
sector reporting entity; each public sector reporting entity employing any accrual
basis of accounting; and each other public sector reporting entity, to the extent
practicable" (AAS 4, para 3). This standard is not applicable to the non-current
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assets that are: "forests, livestock or similar regenerative natural resources; or
investment properties" ( A A S 4, para 3). This is because, according to para 6 of that
standard, these assets are not depreciable assets ( A A S 4, para 6).

Douglas and Anthony (1991) say that "[although GASB currently does not plan to
include depreciation as an operating expense, government units will be allowed to
show accumulated depreciation as a deduction from capital assets in whatever
fund/account group configuration is adopted" (Douglas and Anthony 1991, pp. 3132).

They add that in the G A S B model "depreciation" is not recorded "'as an

operating expense. It records the payment of debt service principal as a reduction of
a liability with no net effect on the organisation's equity as reflected in the total of its
fund balances. Consequently, the cost of the asset is n o w recognized as an expense,
and hence as a decrease in equity (i.e., "fund balance")" (Douglas and Anthony 1991,
p. 32).

In the United States, FASB Statement No. 93 establishes standards of financial
accounting and reporting for not-for-profit entities. This Statement requires all notfor-profit organisations to recognise the cost of using up long-lived tangible assets as
depreciation in general purpose external financial statements and to disclose:

a. Depreciation expense for the period
b. Balances of major classes of depreciable assets, by nature or
function, at the balance sheet date
c. Accumulated depreciation, either by major classes of depreciable
assets or in total, at the balance sheet date
d. A general description of the method or methods used in computing
depreciation for major classes of depreciable assets ( F A S B N o . 93,
paras 2 and 5, 1987).

Paragraph 6 of the same statement says that there is no need for depreciation
recognition "on individual works of art or historical treasures whose economic
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benefit or service potential is used up so slowly that their estimated useful lives are
extraordinarily long" ( F A S B N o . 93,1987). It continues that

[a] work of art or historical treasure shall be deemed to have that
characteristic only if verifiable evidence exists demonstrating that
(a) the asset individually has cultural, aesthetic, or historical value
that is worth preserving perpetually and (b) the holder has the
technological andfinancialability to protect and preserve essentially
undiminished the service potential of the asset and is doing that
( F A S B N o . 93, para 6, 1987; see also Pallot 1990).

Recording and valuation of heritage assets is one of the most controversial issues i
dealing with public sector assets. Heritage assets have been defined by the N S W
Treasury as "those non-current assets that a government intends to preserve
idenfinitelv because of their unique historical, cultural or environmental attributes"
( N S W Treasury 1989, p. 6). According to the Treasury's "Accounting Guidelines for
Reporting Physical Assets in the Budget Sector", a c o m m o n feature of heritage assets
is that they cannot be replaced ( N S W Treasury 1989, p. 6). The Commonwealth
Department of Finance guidelines for "Financial Statements of Departments" and
guidelines for "Financial Statements of C o m m o n w e a l t h Authorities" require heritage
assets to be valued at "current replacement cost of the service potential utilised by the
entity if the service potential would otherwise be acquired by the entity" (Department
of Finance 1995b, p. 49; Department of Finance 1995c, p. 59). The guidelines
suggest that where service potential would not be replaced if the entity was deprived
of the asset the greater of N P V and current market value (selling price) should be
used for valuation of heritage assets (Department of Finance 1995b, p. 49;
Department of Finance 1995c, p. 59). In contrast, according to the N S W Treasury
"[hleritage assets are to be shown, for identification purposes, at nominal value of $1
on [sic] balance sheet of the reporting entity, with appropriate notes to the financial
statements" ( N S W Treasury 1989, p. 1). The reasons which has been given by the
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N S W Treasury for this valuation are: the absence of a realistic market for the
heritage assets; ambiguity in recognising which valuation principles should be
applied for evaluating heritage assets; inability of non-commercial public sector

reporting entities to put a restriction on individual access to the use of the service
potential derived from the heritage assets; the problem of assigning meaningful
values to the heritage assets; and finally the problem of seeing those assets as the
Government's representation to the people of the State and at the same time putting
these assets on the balance sheet of a particular entity at replacement cost (NSW
Treasury 1989, p. 9). The NSW Treasury suggests four methods of valuation for
assets other than heritage assets and those with mixed attributes (heritage and nonheritage): market valuation (including expert appraisal), written down reproduction
cost, written down replacement cost and net realisable value/net cash inflow (NSW
Treasury 1989, pp. 10-11).

Apart from problems of measurement, there is also a concern about the applicability

to heritage assets of the definition of assets expressed in SAC 4. Burritt et al (1994
recommend the use of alternative dimensions in the definition which would be more
appropriate to heritage assets. They suggest the following dimensions:

-preservation
-protection, through non-degradation. - an 'existence' value
-a multi-generational view of asset lifespan
-a custodial view of ownership rather than 'service potential' based
on exploitation
-a non-market based evaluation of 'service potential'. - the 'service'
is a consequence of cultural, aesthetic, and personal factors
-a multi-faceted asset which cannot be defined in a 'general' sense
eg. mining potential, real estate potential, aesthetic potential, cultural
potential (Burritt et al 1994, pp. 12-13; see also Burritt et al 1996,
pp. 26-27; Rowles 1991).
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In light of recognition and measurement difficulties for some categories of public

sector assets, Rowles (1991) warns that "[b]ecause infrastructure and heritage asse
consume large amounts of any community's scarce resources ... the consequences of
incorrect accounting practices may be significant" (p. 48).

4.6.2 Liabilities and Commitments

Liabilities, particularly their measurement and reporting, have always been a major
concern of government accounting systems. Like long-lived assets, another problem
in public sector accounting lies in the recording and reporting of liabilities and
commitments. SAC 4 defines liabilities as "the future sacrifices of economic

benefits that the entity is presently obliged to make to other entities as a result

transactions or other past events" (SAC 4, para 48). This definition is based on th
research of Kerr, "The Definition and Recognition of Liabilities", who defined

liabilities as "the future sacrifice of economic benefits that an entity may be req

to make in satisfaction of a present obligation to transfer assets or provide servi

other entities as a result of past transactions or events." (Kerr 1984, p. 25). A s
definition of liabilities is found in FASB Statement of Financial Accounting

Concepts No. 3, "Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises" (para 28
quoted in Kerr 1984, p. 14).

Almost the same definition, as provided by SAC 4, has been accepted by Australian
Accounting Standard AAS 27, Financial Reporting by Local Governments, and
Australian Accounting Standard AAS 29, Financial Reporting by Government
Departments (AAS 27, para 46; AAS 29, para 72). In addition two criteria have been

established by AAS 29 and AAS 27 for the recognition of a liability of a government

department or a local government. Firstly, "it is probable that the future sacrific
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Secondly "the

amount of the liability can be measured reliably" (AAS 29, para 72; AAS 27, para
46). The Guidelines on Financial Statements of Departments require
Commonwealth Departments to prepare and include "a Statement of Assets and
Liabilities" as part of their annual reports for the reporting period ended 30 June
1995 (Department of Finance 1995b).

Most governments' commitment for paying the retirement of current and former
employees is a major long term liability of governments. This commitment normally
appeared under the current year's budget and no recognition was made for the future
or long term commitments that would have to be made (Leonard 1985, p. 125). It
was argued that this treatment was required because there is a degree of uncertainty

about the ability of current officials to commit future generations to pay for servi
enjoyed now.

The difference between financial commitments of public sector entities and private

sector organisations is that the former entities, typically, have been given a guara
by governments (Sutcliffe 1985, p. 44). According to Sutcliffe (1985)

[t]he ability of a public sector entity to meet its debts as they fall due
therefore depends on the government's ability to raise revenues from
taxes, user charges or other sources. In such circumstances, the
disclosure of information on the liquidity and solvency of a public
sector entity will be required by creditors and other users for such
purposes as: predicting the likely timing of payments; the funds
required to continue the provision of services; and, the impact such
funding will have on taxes, rates, interest rates or user charges (pp.
44-45).

Mautz (1981) argues that
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[liabilities are typically incurred to obtain assets that will then be
used productively in the operations of the enterprise. Through such
operations the assets are intended to produce positive cash flows
which, over time, permit repayment of the liabilities. In one sense,
then, the liabilities in a going business enterprise are incurred on a
self-liquidating basis. N o t so in government. Liabilities are incurred
to acquire properties that in turn add to the unit's obligations to m a k e
cash payments in the future. There is little that is self-liquidating in
the flotation of a bond issue to build a bridge or a n e w courthouse (p.
55).

161

At the close of thefinancialyear recording decisions about assets and liabilities will
be reflected in the financial reports of government agencies which are meant to
contribute to their accountability, primarily to Parliament. The next section
addresses the purpose and importance of financial reporting in the public sector.

4.7 FINANCIAL REPORTING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Financial reporting in the public sector has been seen as a significant feature and a
key element in the accountability process of public sector organisations (Sherer and
Kent 1983, p. 184; Henley et al 1992, p. 10). So important is financial reporting in
the public sector that Egol (1988) believes that "[wjithout sound financial reporting
by nation-states, it is highly questionable whether a sound global economy can ever
be achieved" (p. 183). Two objectives for financial reporting by public sector
entities in Australian Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC 1), "Objectives of
Financial Reporting by Public Sector Entities", are: firstly, to disclose useful
information for making economic decisions (including those relating public policy

matters) and secondly, to satisfy accountability (Sutcliffe 1985, p. 40; Walker 1990a,
p. 252). This reflects the Governmental Accounting Standards Board's Concepts
Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting, which establishes objectives of
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external financial reporting by state and local governmental entities in the United
States of America. This statement sees financial reporting as

a means of communicating financial information to users. It
encompasses all reports that containfinancialinformation based on
data generally found in financial statements. Financial reports and
financial statements are end products of the reporting process.
Certain information is better provided byfinancialstatements: other
information is better provided, or can only be provided, by financial
reporting outside the financial statements. But financial reporting is
not the only source of financial information about government
entities. In m a n y cases, users of financial reports also need to
consult other sources to completely satisfy their information needs
( G A S B N o . 1, para 4, 1987; see also Patton 1992).

The G A S B also seesfinancialstatements as the core offinancialreporting and as the
principle means of communicating financial information to external users (GASB
No. 1, para 6, 1987). According to paragraph 10 of GASB No. 1, Governmental
activities have traditionally been divided into two categories—governmental-type
activities and business-type activities. The first category is performed by general

purpose governmental entities such as states, cities, counties, towns, and villages, as
well as certain special purpose governmental entities. For the second it says that
"Governmental entities perform business-type activities both through departments of
general purpose governmental entities and through special purpose governmental
entities created to perform these activities" (GASB No. 1, para 10, 1987). The
GASB Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting, is applicable to
government activities which are included in both categories of activities (GASB No.
1, para 11, 1987).

The G A S B in Concepts Statement N o . 1 argues thatfinancialreporting is intended to
provide information useful for many purposes. It says that financial reporting helps:
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(1) government to fulfil it's duty to be publicly accountable; and (2) to satisfy the
needs of users. In terms of users' needs the purpose of financial reporting is to help
people who have limited authority, ability, or resources to obtain information and
who therefore rely on the reports as an important source of information (GASB No.
1, para 1 and 3, 1987; see also Patton 1992).

According to FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 117, Financial
Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations8, "[t]he primary purpose of financial
statements is to provide relevant information to meet the common interests of donors,
members, creditors, and others who provide resources to not-for-profit organizations"
(FASB No. 117, para 4, 1993). This FASB standard also establishes that the purpose
of financial statements, including accompanying notes, is to provide information
about:

a. The amount and nature of an organization's assets, liabilities, and net
assets
b. The effects of transactions and other events and circumstances that
change the amount and nature of net assets
c. The amount and kinds of inflows and outflows of economic
resources during a period and the relation between the inflows and
outflows
d. H o w an organization obtains and spends cash, its borrowing and
repayment of borrowing, and other factors that m a y affect its
liquidity
e. The service efforts of an organization ( F A S B N o . 117, para 5,
1993).

This information, noted above, can only be disclosed through using accrual
accounting. FASB has recognised that the following statements with accompanying

"This Statement shall be effective for annualfinancialstatements issued forfiscalyears beginning
after December 15, 1994, except for organizations with less than $5 million in total assets and less
than $1 million in annual reporting. For those organizations, the effective date shall be forfiscalyear
beginning after December 15,1995" (FASB No. 117, para 31, 1993).
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notes to financial statements are necessary to provide a complete set of financial
statements for a not-for-profit organisation:

• a statement of financial position as of the end of the reporting
period;
• a statement of activities;
• a statement of cash flows for the reporting period ( F A S B N o . 117,
para 6,1993).

In Australia, one of the results of Sutcliffe's study in 1985 called "Financial
Reporting in the Public Sector-A Framework for Analysis and Identification of
Issues", was the Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 2 "Objectives of General
Purpose Financial Reporting".9 The purpose of Sutcliffe's study was to:

(i) identify a general framework within which Statements of
Accounting Standards for the public sector can be developed in
a logical and consistent manner; and,
(ii) highlight issues of relevance to public sectorfinancialreporting
that should be resolved within the context of that framework
(Sutcliffe 1985, p. vii).

Sutcliffe (1985) reported that although the financial reports of public sector entities
may be used by management, government departments, central agencies and other
interested parties, these reports are prepared primarily for parliament as the
custodians of community interest. According to him, the public sector entities'
general purpose financial reports should disclose information needs for the following
groups:

(i) recipients of services (or benefits) or their representatives
(including consumers, taxpayers, rate-payers and
representatives);

This will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

their
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(ii) providers of resources, or their representatives (including
creditors, investors, customers, taxpayers, rate-payers,
parliament, local government councils, central agencies, review
bodies, donors and their representatives); and,
(iii) other parties performing a review service of relevance to all, or
particular, sections of the community (including analysts,
media, special interest community groups and their
representatives) (Sutcliffe 1985, p. 15).

Each of these is reflected in the clauses of SAC 2 (paras 12-19). Sutcliffe (1985)

argues that the objectives of general purpose financial reporting in the public secto
are to disclose financial information which is:

(i) useful in making economic decisions (including those relating
to matters of public policy); and,
(ii) for accountability purposes (p. 47).

SAC 2, noted above as one of the results of Sutcliffe's study, covers general purpose
financial reporting by business and non-business entities in the public and private
sectors (SAC 2, para 9). SAC 2 requires entities to include in their general purpose
financial reports the disclosure of information relevant to the assessment of
performance, financial position, and financing and investing and information about
compliance (SAC 2, para 45).

To meet these requirements, Australian Department of Finance issued Guidelines for
Commonwealth Departments and Statutory Authorities which will be discussed in
detail in chapter 6.

FASB Statement No. 117 also affirms that the focus of the statement of financial
position shall be on the organisation as a whole and shall report the amounts of its
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total assets, liabilities, and net assets ( F A S B N o . 117, para 10, 1993). The F A S B
Statement establishes further that

[t]he primary purpose of a statement of activities is to provide
relevant information about (a) the effects of transactions and other
events and circumstances that change the amount and nature of net
assets, (b) the relationships of those transactions and other events
and circumstances to each other, and (c) h o w the organization's
resources are used in providing various programs or services. The
information provided in a statement of activities, used with related
disclosures and information in the other financial statements, helps
donors, creditors, and others to (1) evaluate the organization's
performance during a period, (2) assess an organization's service
efforts and its ability to continue to provide services, and (3) assess
h o w an organization's managers have discharged their stewardship
responsibilities and other aspects of their performance ( F A S B N o .
117, para 17, 1993).

Jones (1992) argues that Trueblood in Chapter 11 of Objectives of Financial

Statements, offers twelve objectives of which objective 11 relates specifically to notfor-profit business entities:

[a]n objective of financial statements for governmental and not-forprofit organisations is to provide information useful for evaluating
the effectiveness of the management of resources in achieving the
organisation's goals. Performance measures should be quantified in
terms of identified goals (p. 251).

To the majority of Western democracies the merits of accrual accounting have been
very persuasive in bringing about accounting reforms. The process of the
introduction of accrual accounting in Australia will be discussed in chapter 6.
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4.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter explored the importance of accounting systems as one of the means of

implementing the concepts of accountability and responsibility in the public sector.

It discussed the application of a different basis of accounting in the public sector
more emphasis on accrual accounting. The benefits and limitations of the two
popular bases, accrual and cash, were also discussed. It was shown that some
researchers preferred using the cash and accrual basis of accounting simultaneously
(Robson 1987; Shand 1987; Carpenter 1990; Mackintosh 1992; see also JCPA 1995),
seeing them as parts of a comprehensive accounting information system (Mackintosh
1992). For example, Mackintosh (1992) says that cash flow reports must be seen as
a subset of the financial reports which can be produced under a full accrual
accounting system (Mackintosh 1992). Shand (1987) is of the opinion that

[b]oth cash based and accrual information are required, but for
different purposes: one to tell us something about accountability to
parliament for funds received, and the other to tell us something
about performance andfinancialposition, and perhaps cost recovery
for economic decision making. This m o v e to accrual accounting
was designed to enhance the external accountability of these
organisations (p. 2; see also M c P h e e 1993, p. 2). 10

Churchill (1992c) agrees that, "[i]n a perfect world, public sector organisations
would be able to generate financial statements prepared on both a cash and an
accruals basis to aid budgetary comparisons and to facilitate asset valuation and
project evaluation" (p. 42).

Emphases in original.

168

Chapter 4, Objectives andRole...

Efforts m a d e to develop standard setting in public sector accounting have until
recently been unheeded by governments and professional bodies. S o m e work has
been done in standards setting but it needs the participation of most national
governments. Since the 1980s some countries such as Australia, Britain, and N e w
Zealand have been involved in public sector reforms and have introduced n e w
management and financial techniques for accountability and reporting purposes.

As a consequence of these reforms, the new concept of "managerialism" or "let the
managers manage" has been introduced to the public sector during the 1980s.
Obviously, using the managerialism concept requires performance assessment for
accountability purposes in terms of some measurable factors and needs the full
recording of all transactions performed by the entity. Reforms in public sector
financial management during the past decade in Australia, and other Western nations,
have required the introduction of accrual accounting at all levels, whether
departments, statutory authorities or companies. Without accrual accounting, moves
to make the public sector more efficient and accountable for its performance would
not have been possible. With the successful implementation of accrual accounting in
developed nations, attention can n o w be turned to reforming public sector accounting
in developing nations.

A description of the form of financial control and management in the Islamic
Republic of Iran is the subject of the next chapter.

This will complete the

examination of the structure of control in Iran c o m m e n c e d in chapter 2. It will also
demonstrate the interrelationship which has developed in practice between the
structure of financial control, entrenched interpretations of accountability and
accounting practices. This will provide the basis on which to adjudicate on the
relevance to Iran of recent public sector reforms in the Australian Commonwealth
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Government, with the emphasis on accounting reforms and to make a list of
recommendations for improving the accounting systems in Iran in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 5

THE FINANCIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING
SYSTEM OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

5.1 INTRODUCTION

To understand the existing budgeting and accounting systems and practices of the
Iranian Government and to identify the users and the kinds of financial information
they need, the structure of the Iranian Government was explained in chapter 2 while
chapter 3 examined the notion of accountability and the role of accounting in
ensuring financial accountability. Chapter 4 provided a discussion of different
systems of government accounting, including cash and accrual accounting. This
chapter will be devoted to the explanation and consideration of the characteristics
and the weaknesses of the existing budgeting and accounting practices of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. This will lead to a consideration of the relevancy of Australian
accounting reforms to help meet these deficiencies and thereby assist in improving
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.
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In the public sector fiscal administration refers to the financial management and
accountability of a government and normally includes the preparation of the budget,
the collection of various revenues, the custody of public funds, the disbursement of
government funds, keeping of accounts, rendering offinancialreports, auditing and
scrutinising of financial reports, and preparing the annual settlement in some cases.
Every activity of the government in rendering services to the public has financial
consequences. Therefore, finance and government are inseparable. The scope of
activities and operations of a government is often limited by its ability to raise funds
to finance a country's activities and operations. With the growth of activities, and
accordingly the increase of expenditures of any m o d e m government, effective
financial management and accountability in the conduct of government affairs are
assuming increasing importance.

Within a government, especially in developing countries, revenues are frequently
limited and often smaller than expenditure demands. Therefore, careful budgetary
planning and control are essential to the efficient utilisation of the available resources
in providing required public services. In this environment, the accounting system
must support the entire cycle of government financial management and operations,
from the earliest planning stages through programming, budgeting, implementing,
reporting, and controlling. It must meet both the management needs for program
information and the executive and legislative needs for information with which to
review and approve programs. In addition, it must also provide the accounting
control of expenditures to ensure compliance with legal provisions and budget
restrictions.
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5.2 BUDGETING SYSTEM IN T H E ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN1
5.2.1 Government Budgeting — Its Rationale and Significance

One of the essential features of any government is the task that it performs in the
generation and expenditure of public funds. A government must annually expend to
provide necessary public services, such as national security, education, health,
transportation, and communication (some governments). T o finance these activities,
the government must generate funds by taxation or by s o m e other means. It is on the
basis of a "budget system" that the government forecasts, allocates, and controls its
revenues and expenditures.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, after the Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural
Development Plan, the country's annual budget is the basic planning document of
public finance. The country's annual budget reflects the government's policy, and
determines the direction and scope of its activities. The Budget Bill is designed to
assist both the executive and the legislative branches in determining the best set of
programs to be adopted, and the method of achieving the optimum level of efficiency
in government operations.

According to Article 52 of the Iranian Constitution, the country's annual budget is
drawn up by the government, in the manner specified by law 2 , and then submitted to
the Islamic Consultative Assembly for discussion and approval. This Article also

1

The term "general government sector" that was introduced in chapter 1, in the Iranian context for
the purpose of this study refers to government departments and ministries which will be categorised in
section 5.2.3.1 as local government institutions and national institutions.
2
This law normally refers to the Country's General Law of Accounts, the Country's Law of Plan and
Budget, the Government's Circulars, etc.
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provides that any change in the figures contained in the budget should be in
accordance with the procedures prescribed by law (Article 52).

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the significance of the government's annual budget
has recently been accentuated by the government's effort to accelerate economic
development in order to build the economy's infrastructures and to improve the
standard of living of the Iranian people. Since 1988, after the Islamic Revolution in
1979, the Government has used m e d i u m term plans in preparing its budget by
introducing a series of Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Plans.3 The First Five Year Development Plan, w a s prepared by the Prime Minister,
Mir Hossein Mussavi, and approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in
January 1990, covering the fiscal years 1989/1990 to 1993/1994.

This Plan

represented a significant development program for the whole economy, but
especially for the government sector. The program was to be implemented in
successive annual development budgets. Thus, before proceeding to a consideration
of the budgetary process of the Iranian Government in the rest of this chapter, it is
appropriate to discuss in the next section the relationship between the Development
Plan and the annual budget.

5.2.2 Relationship Between the Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural
Development Plans and the Annual Budget

The end of the war imposed by Iraq on Iran in 1988 signalled the beginning of a new
era in the development of the Iranian economy.

The First Plan introduced the

Government's purposes for the reconstruction of the economy and provided an

3

Iran had Five-Year Plans also before the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
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important framework within which the government's reform and liberalisation
policies could be implemented for thefiscalyears covered by the plan. The First
Plan was implemented on behalf of the newly elected government in 1989 by
President Rafsanjani.

The primary aims of the First Plan were: to regenerate the economy; the
reconstruction of war-damaged regions; to advance public culture and education; to
increase economic growth in order to decrease dependence on other countries, with
priority given to agricultural products; controlling inflation; efforts to achieve Islamic
social justice and reform of the structure and the management of the executive and
legislature.

Liberalisation of the economy and, accordingly, privatisation have been emphasised
throughout the First Plan in its different sections. It has included almost all sectors
of the Iranian economy.

Before explaining these changes and their impacts on

sections of the economy a brief account of the structure of the Iranian economic
sectors is referred to here. According to Article 43 of the Iranian Constitution the
economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the objectives of achieving national
economic independence, uprooting poverty and deprivation, and fulfilling the needs
of individuals in their process of growth and advancement, while at same time
preserving their liberty. Therefore, the economy is to be operated on the following
criteria:

a. the provision of basic necessities to all citizens: accommodation,
food, clothing, health care, medicine, education, and the
necessary facilities for the establishment of a family;
b. assuring conditions and opportunities of employment for
everyone, with a view to attaining full employment; placing the
means of labor at the disposal of everyone w h o is able to work
but lacks the means, in the form of cooperatives, through
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granting interest-free loans or recourse to any other legitimate
means that neither results in the concentration of wealth in the
hands of a few individuals or its circulation a m o n g them nor
turns the government into a major absolute employer. These
steps must be taken with due regard for the necessities
determining public planning of the national economy at each
stage of its growth;
c. the drawing up of the economic plan for country in such a
manner that the form, content, and hours of work of every
individual will leave him, in addition to his labor, sufficient
opportunity and strength to engage in intellectual, political, and
social self-development, active participation in the leadership of
the country, and the improvement of his skills and sense of
initiative;
d. respect for the right to choose freely one's job; refraining from
compelling anyone to engage in a particular job; and preventing
the exploitation of another's labor;
e. forbidding the infliction of harm ... upon others, monopoly,
hoarding, usury, and other evil and forbidden practices;
f. the prohibition of extravagance and wastefulness in all matters
related to the economy, including consumption, investment,
production, distribution, and services;
g. the utilization of science and technology, and the training of
skilled individuals in accordance with ... [the needs of] ...
development and progress of the country's economy;
h. prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's
economy;
i. emphasis on the increase of agricultural, livestock, and industrial
production in order to satisfy public needs and to m a k e the
country self-sufficient and independence [sic] (Article 43,
translated by Algar 1980, pp. 43-44).
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To implement these objectives, Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution establishes that
the economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran consists of three sectors: state,

cooperative, and private. According to this article, the state sector includes all larg
scale and 'mother' industries4, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance,
power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television,

Mother industries refers to industries such as iron, steel and car industries.
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post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the
like. All of these are publicly owned and administered by the State (Article 44).

The cooperative sector includes cooperative companies and enterprises concerned
with production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in accordance with Islamic
criteria. The private sector consists of those activities concerned with agriculture,
animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the economic
activities of the state and cooperative sectors. The laws of the Islamic Republic
protect ownership in each of these three sectors, in so far as this ownership is in
conformity with the other articles of chapter 4 of the Iranian Constitution, "Economy
and Financial Affairs", does not go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, contributes to
economic growth and progress of the country and does not harm society. Article 44
adds that laws shall specify the [precise] scope of each of these sectors, as well as the
regulations and conditions governing their operation (Article 44). Architects of the
First Plan claimed that they attempted to establish a plan according to these
requirements of the Constitution. The First Plan provided m a n y changes for different
sections of the Iranian society. S o m e of these changes relevant to this study are
discussed below.

The significant changes introduced in the First Plan were part of section 4-37 and
sections 8-1 to 8-3 of the strategies of the First Plan which give the State authority to
privatise government industries which were nationalised during the Revolution in
1979. Accordingly, the Board of Ministers in their meetings on 24/4/1991 and
5/5/1991 approved the privatisation of some government business entities and
companies and nationalised companies. They approved the privatisation of 391
government business entities and companies in the first stage of privatisation. The
government also established a committee to consider suggestions for privatisation of

Chapter 5, The Accounting...

Ill

other government business entities, which might be m a d e by government institutions
to the committee, and asked the committee to consider those suggestions and report
to the Board of Ministers for the final decision. Section 8-2 also introduces a
suggestion for the centralisation of the structure of government.

In section 3 of the First Plan, "Budget and the State Finance Situation", which
provides a macroeconomic perspective of the Plan, the general purposes of the First
Plan are stated as:

1. Rationalisation of the structure of government in accordance
with its regulatory duties andfiscalresources.
2. Establishing balance between receipts and payments of the
general government budget.
3. Increasing government revenues by using existing capacities and
facilities more efficiently.
4. Encouraging the people to contribute to the financing of public
service expenditure.
5. Improving the taxation system in order to distribute revenue and
wealth more equitably.
6. Reducing government expenditures by transferring some of the
existing government functions to the non-government sector
(The First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan Act
1990, p. 499). 5

The government's fundamental policies in the Budget and the State Finance Situation
of the First Plan consist of a reduction in the level of the government expenditure in
education, reducing subsidies to loss making government business entities and
institutions, reducing the expenses of profit making government institutions, the
progressive decrease in the number of employees of the public sector and revision in
the price of public service activities and products (The First Economic, Social and
Cultural Development Plan Act 1990, p. 499). Unfortunately, in the First Plan little

5

Translated by the author.
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attention was given to changing the form of public sectorfinancialaccountability and
accounting procedures. After the completion of the First Plan there was a one year
delay before the Second Five-Year Plan covering the period 1994/1995-1998/99 was
approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in December 1994. It was started in
March 1995. One of the reasons for the break between the two plans was the
incompleteness of the programs of the First Plan. Some people, such as the Speaker
of Islamic Consultative Assembly, said that there was a need for a one year delay to
complete the First Plan6.

The second Five-Year Plan 1994/1995 had a number of qualitative aims, including:

1. Implementing social justice.
2. Promoting peoples' commitment to the merits (virtues or
excellencies) of Islamic ethics and increasing the quality and
quantity of society's general culture.
3. Guiding of the youth and teenagers towards the religious faith,
indigenous culture, creativity, science, art, physical education,
h u m a n relations, family and social matters, and encouraging
them to participate in cultural, social, political and economic
affairs of the country.
4. Increasing the productivity and efficiency of the country's
economy.
5. Training the required h u m a n resources.
6. Increasing and developing economic stability by giving priority
to the agricultural sector.
7. Improving the structure of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of the government, wherever it is necessary, in order to
implement the purposes of the Plan.
8. Strengthening and encouraging all people to participate in the
implementation of the Plan and establishing the necessary
policies for appropriate and consistent control over the execution
of the Plan.

6

The real reason for the delay, according to Astaneh (1994), a m e m b e r of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, is that according to Article 36 of The First Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Plan Act 1990 the government should have submitted the Second Plan to the Islamic Consultative
Assembly in the middle of 1993 (solar calendar 1371) but it was handed down 15 months later
(Astaneh 1994, p. 24).
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9. Attempting to decrease the country's dependence upon oil
revenues and increasing non-oil exports.
10. Sustaining the natural environment and optimising on the usage
of the country's natural resources.
11. Strengthening the country's defence power in accordance with
the framework of policies and discretions of the Commander- inChief.
12. Keeping in mind and protecting the country's principles of
honour, wisdom and interests in foreign affairs politics.
13. Attempting to implement the L a w s and maintaining security of
the people in all aspects and encouraging them to respect the
law, social order and to work conscientiously.
14. Systematisation of research and using it as a means for solving
problems to enhance the development of the country.
15. Establishing equilibrium in different sectors of the economy
(cooperative, private and state).
16. Strengthening of the values of the Islamic Revolution and giving
priority to these values w h e n the State's financial resources and
facilities are provided (Plan and Budget Organisation 1996, The
Second Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan Act, p.
13).7
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A s noted above, government plans as embodied in the Economic, Social and Cultural
Development Plans are exercised through the annual budgets. The study now turns
to explain the budgeting process in the Iranian government.

5.2.3 Budgetary Process in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Government budgeting is one of the major processes by which the use of public
resources is planned and controlled. The plan embodied in the budget is such a
controlling factor in government operations that the term "budgetary process" has
been used to describe the complete cycle of financial activities of a government. The
budgetary process involves four different operations or stages: (1) preparation and
submission of the budget by the executive, (2) consideration and enactment of the

Translated by the author.
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budget by the legislature, (3) execution of the budget by the executive, and (4)
auditing and scrutiny of the accounts by both the executive and legislature (Aghvami
and Babajani 1988, pp. 118-121).

Before the Iranian Government budgetary process can be examined in detail, it is
necessary to explain h o w the budget is organised and h o w thefiguresare put together
to prepare the annual budget. A s described in section 5.2.2, the budgetary system is
to be in accordance with the Five-Year Plans. Iran has used a form of program
budgeting for a long time which is a combination of the traditional object based
budgeting and program budgeting with the emphasis increasingly on program
budgeting. Thus, Iranian budgeting incorporates some of the negative aspects of
traditional budgeting and the benefits of m o d e m approaches (see also Islamic
Consultative Assembly 1995c, p. 53).

The government budget is divided into Current Appropriations and Development
Appropriations. Each of these two appropriations consists of four areas: General
Affairs, National Defence Affairs, Social Affairs and Economic Affairs. Each of
these in turn, have their o w n sub-sections.

For example, the sub-sections of

Economic Affairs for the Current Budget of the 1996/1997 budget are:

• Agriculture and Natural Resources
•

Water Resources

•

Electricity

•

Industrial

•

Petroleum

•

Gas

•

Mines
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•

Commerce

•

Transportation

•

Telecommunication and Post

•

Tourism (Plan and Budget Organisation 1995).

181

Routine expenditures are classified by organisational units and by object of
expenditures, whereas the development expenditures are grouped by a classification
system based on programs in the Five-Year Development Plan. Four Chapters and
twenty Codes have been introduced for the classification of expenses in the Iranian
budgeting and accounting system (Tabatabai 1983; Aghvami and Babajani 1988).

Like many other annual budgets which seldom start from scratch, the Iranian annual
(current) budgetary process commences with the previous year's level of
expenditures as the base for consideration. Thefirststage in the budgetary process is
the budget preparation which will be described next.

5.2.3.1 Phase I-Preparation of the Budget

Sound financial planning requires that preparation of the budget be started soon
enough to be adopted before the beginning of the fiscal year to which it applies. T o
insure that adequate time will be allowed, a modern government usually prepares a
"budget calendar". The schedule is prepared by listing each step in the budgetary
procedure and the time allowed for its completion. It should provide sufficient time
for planning, for preparation of budget estimates, for review and analysis of the
estimates, and for further review and approval of the budget. The budget steps and
calendar for preparing the 1996/97 budget bill of the Iranian Government is shown in

Figure 5.1.
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The preparation of the country's annual budget is the responsibility of the Plan and
Budget Organisation. The head of this organisation is one of the President's deputies.
The budgetary process begins when the Plan and Budget Organisation prepares a
draft of the Budget Circular. This draft, after consideration and confirmation by the
Economics Council8, is sent to the President to give notice to the ministries9,
government institutions10, government business entities11 and non-government public
institutions and authorities12. For the preparation of the budget for the fiscal year
1996/1997, the head of the Plan and Budget Organisation transmitted a "budget
circular" to ministries and government institutions at the beginning of August 1995
(the letter of the head of the Plan and Budget Organisation of 29 August, 1995) and
asked the latter to submit their appropriation requests for the budget. Meanwhile, the
Plan and Budget Organisation prepares the guidelines and enclosures of the Budget
and sends these to the ministries, government institutions, government business
entities, and non-government public institutions and authorities. There follows a
lengthy process in finalising the budget after this stage.

The Budget divides into five categories. Thefirstcategory is related to the process
of preparation and regulation of the budget of local government institutions13. Local
government institutions prepare and regulate their own institutions budgets and give

8

The Economics Council is responsible for conducting and organising the country's economic affairs.
A Ministry is an organisational unit which is recognised or will be recognised by a law under this
title (Article 2 of the Country's General L a w of Accounts).
10
A Government Institution is an organisational unit which is established by a law and is managed
under the office of one of the three branches of the State (Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) and
does not have a Ministry title (Article 3 of the Country's General L a w of Accounts).
1
' A Government Business Entity is an organisational unit which is established as an entity according
to a law and or ordered to nationalise by a court and/or requisitioned by a law. The government owns
more than 5 0 % of their shares (Article 4 of the Country's General L a w of Accounts).
12
Non-government Public Institutions and Authorities are those organisational units which have been
or are established by a law to perform activities or provide services which are considered public. A
list of these institutions and authorities should be prepared by the government and approved by the
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Article 5 of the Country's General L a w of Accounts).
13
Government's Institutions which are located in a city are called local government institutions.
9
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a report to the Province's Plan and Budget Organisation.14 The Province's Plan and
Budget Organisation considers and consolidates these reports and prepares the
Province's Budget. This budget includes both current and capital expenditures of a
province. The Province's Capital Budget is approved by the Planning Boards of each
province and a report is given to the Plan and Budget Organisation. Simultaneously,
the Province's Current Budget is aggregated in terms of different sections of the
State's budget by the Provinces' Plan and Budget Organisations and a report is given
to the Management of the Sections of the Plan and Budget Organisation, the
Province's Plan and Budget Organisation and the Deputy for Regional Affairs of the
Plan and Budget Organisation. The latter three consider the Province's Current
Budgets. Turning to the Capital Budget of the Province, this budget is aggregated by
the Plan and Budget Organisation and a report is given to the Management of the
Sections of the Plan and Budget Organisation, the Province's Plan and Budget
Organisation and the Deputy for Regional Affairs of the Plan and Budget
Organisation which then consider these budgets.

The second category of the budget preparation process is associated with the
preparation and regulation of the budget of government business entities. As noted
already, these entities are owned and managed by the government. The government
business entities prepare and regulate their own budgets. The government business
entities' budgets should be considered and approved at their general meeting. After
receiving these budgets they are scrutinised by the Plan and Budget Organisation.
These budgets are aggregated finally and consolidated by the Plan and Budget
Organisation for preparing the Country's Annual Budget.

14

The Plan and Budget Organisation has an office in each of the 25 provinces of the country. Those
offices are called the Province's Plan and Budget Organisation.
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The third category of the budget preparation process is related to the preparation and
regulation of the nominal Notes (Clauses) of the budget by the National
Institutions15. This is followed by consideration of the national budgets by the
Management of Sections of the Plan and Budget Organisation. Explanations are
presented in a Financial Note which contains information concerning thefiscaland
monetary policies as bases of the proposed budget. It also contains the analysis of
the budget itself, and the predicted condition of the nation's economy during the
fiscal year under consideration.

The forth category is concerned with the estimation of oil and taxation revenues. The
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the Ministry of Oil suggest the
taxation and oil revenues. The revenues are aggregated by the Economic Affairs
Deputy of the Plan and Budget Organisation. Finally, The Plan and Budget Board
considers and approves these revenues.

The final category is related to the consideration of the Notes of the previous year's
budget by the Board of Notes of the Plan and Budget Organisation. They also
consider the n e w Notes for the next year's budget. These n e w Notes are considered
and approved by the Plan and Budget Board.

A report of the results of all these five above categories will be given to the
President.

At this stage the Deputies of the Sections of the Plan and Budget

Organisation consider the budget of Sections of the Plan and Budget Organisation.
The Economic Affairs' Deputy of the Plan and Budget Organisation aggregates the

15

National Institutions refer to the ministries and government institutions activities and operations
which are not related to a specific city or town. In fact, these activities of the ministries and
departments will affect the whole country and not a particular city or town.
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annual budget. This budget is considered and approved by the Plan and Budget
Board. Meantime, the budgets of important, key government companies are
considered by the Plan and Budget Board. A report of these considerations is given
to the President and the Board of Ministers. The Board of Ministers considers and
approves this report. After this approval, the final consolidation is done and the
Budget Bill will be printed by the Plan and Budget Organisation. This bill will be
presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by the President. The 1996/1997
Budget Bill was submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly on 26 November,
1995.16

The Budget Bill, as prescribed in the Country's General L a w of Accounts, is to
consist of the following three parts:

1. The Government General Budget which includes:
a. the estimates of the Government's receipts and fiscal
resources that directly or indirectly are collected by the
institutions in the budget fiscal year through the Treasury
Accounts.
b. the estimates of payments that the authorities can carry out
from the general revenues and or from the special revenues
for the current, capital and special appropriations in the
budgetfiscalyear.
2. The Budget of government business entities and banks, including
the estimated revenues and the otherfiscalresources.
3. The Budget of the institutions which will be put in the annual
budget with a n a m e other than the aforesaid names (the
Country's General L a w of Accounts, 1987, p. 31). 17

16

This bill was presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly four days earlier than the scheduled
time provided in Figure 5.1.
17
Translated by the author.

Chapter 5, The Accounting...

188

5.2.3.2 Phase II—Authorisation of the Budget

Discussion of the Budget Bill in the Islamic Consultative Assembly is generally held

in four stages. The first stage is the presentation of the Bill in open plenary sessio
in which the President gives a speech explaining the general policies and the
essentials of the budget under consideration. For example, the Budget Bill for the
fiscal year 1996/1997 was submitted by President Hashemi Rafsanjani in the open
plenary session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly held in Tehran on Sunday 26
November, 1995. In this meeting the President told the Islamic Consultative
Assembly that he proposed expenditures in the budget to be equivalent to

138,113.4bn rials (US$78.8billion at the official exchange rate of 1, 750 rials to the
American dollar), which includes 60,742.3bn rials for the government's general
budget. In pointing out the main features of the Iranian Budget for the fiscal year
1996/1997, the President noted:

• the increase in tax incomes for 1996/97 is mainly owing to a
rise in taxes levied on non-governmental companies, on jobs
and on imports which would be materialised through the
improvement in the country's economic situation and
expansion of trade and manufacturing activities inside the
country.
•
[a] l,260bn rials credit has been allotted to promotion of
cultural activities and encouraging [the] non-governmental
sector to contribute to this goal.
•
the government has paid special attention to the vulnerable
strata of society, by increasing the budgets of organisations
responsible for supporting this group of people.
•
the government is to support and save job opportunities by
removing obstacles in the w a y of production units, increasing
output, classifying jobs and reducing the risk of labour
accidents.
•
the government would help set up 3,600 cooperatives with a
membership of 319,600 to bring 850 projects into operation,
thereby creating 45,460 jobs with an investment of 3,356bn
rials, which in turn would enable the building of 70,000
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residential houses ( I R N A news agency, Tehran, in English
1116 gmt 26 November 1995).
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The second stage involves giving suggestions, if there are any, to the Expert
Committees (komeitehye takhasosei)ls of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Each
member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly can give his/her suggestion(s) to the
Expert Committees within 10 days after the Budget Bill is presented and distributed
among the representatives by the government (Islamic Consultative Assembly 1995b,
P-19).

The third stage in the budget authorisation is when it is reported to the Main
Committee (komeitahe aslei) by the Expert Committees. The Expert Committees are
charged to give their reports no later than 10 days after the respite granted to the
representatives in the previous stage. The Main Committee consists of the members
of the Committee of the Plan and Budget and one m e m b e r of each of the other
Committees of the Majles to be elected by those Committees except the Committees
of the Internal Rules, Investigation and Laws before the Revolution (Islamic
Consultative Assembly 1995b, p. 19).

The fourth stage in the budget authorisation is related to the duties of the Main
Committee. This Committee should consider the reports of the Expert Committees
within 15 days and prepare its final report which it will then give to an open plenary
session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly at the end of this period (Islamic
Consultative Assembly 1995b, p. 19).

18

These Committees, of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, are established in accordance with
different functions of the government such as Culture and Higher Education Committee, Defence
Committee, Plan and Budget Committee, etc.
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The fifth stage in the budget authorisation is discussion in the open plenary session of
the Islamic Consultative Assembly to make a final decision on the Budget Bill. The
discussion is begun with a statement by the Main Committee in the Islamic
Consultative Assembly on the proposed Budget Bill. This is followed by the
speeches given by the opponents and proponents of the Budget Bill. Then the

government is given an opportunity to reply on issues raised by the representatives o
the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Islamic Consultative Assembly 1995b, p. 19).
This type of discussion for the 1996/1997 budget was held on 26 January, 1996 and
the reply was given by the head of the Plan and Budget Organisation on behalf of the
Government on that day. After that the Islamic Consultative Assembly votes on the
entire Budget Bill.

In the sixth stage, which is the final one, the discussion on suggestions related to
revenues and other fiscal resources of the government general budget is started and

ceilings for expenditure are approved. After this approval a session on the discussio

of the Notes and Clauses is started. When this session is finished, the Budget Bill i
sent to the Guardian Council for confirmation. If the Guardian Council confirms and
returns the Budget Bill without asking for any amendment, the Budget Bill becomes
the Budget Law and is in force and sent to the President for implementation. If there
is a need for any change to the Budget Bill the Islamic Consultative Assembly should
consider the amendments of the Guardian Council by discussion and take a new vote
for amendments to satisfy the Guardian Council. The financial year of the Iranian
Government is from 21 of March (1 Farvardyn, according to solar calendar) to 20 of
March (29 or 30 Esfand, according to solar calendar) of the following year.
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5.2.3.3 Phase III—Execution of the Budget

After the budget has been enacted, the Executive branch is authorised to incur
obligations and to liquidate them by payments within the limitations of the
appropriation resolutions.

The Islamic Consultative Assembly generally extends budget authorisation directly
to the spending ministries and government institutions, not to the President. The
Iranian Government budget is divided into 4 chapters and twenty objects. The
appropriations are executed either under both the supervision of a specific Minister
as head of a ministry and the Treasury Officer19 (Zeehasab) or under the supervision
of a specific head of a non-ministerial institution such as the Islamic Propaganda
Organisation. Since each ministry or government institution is not allowed to spend
money for each budget item beyond its budget allowance, there is a need for keeping
accounting records in order to maintain necessary control over appropriations and
allotments. The Treasury Officer is responsible for keeping these records. There is
no provision for a Treasury Officer in government business entities and nongovernment public institutions and authorities (for more see footnote 11).

19

A Treasury Officer is a person w h o is appointed by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance
among the qualified employees of a ministry or a government institution in order to control and
arrange the government financial laws, rules and regulations in a government ministry, government
institution and a government business entity. He/she also holds the following functions:
1. Controlling the fiscal affairs and the accounts, keeping and arranging the accounts
according to related laws, rules and regulations and also control over using them properly
and accurately.
2. Controlling documents andfinancialbooks.
3. Keeping, delivering and transferring cash and deposits and security papers.
4. Keeping the government properties and controlling them (Translated by the author).

This article also says that the Treasury Officer functions under the office of the head of the ministr
the government institution (the Country's General L a w of Accounts, article 31).
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5.2.3.3.1 The Allotments Procedures

The ministries' appropriations when voted are immediately available, but no payment
can be made other than those for which the necessary allotments have been made.
The allotments are issued by a committee consisting of the representatives of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the Plan and Budget Organisation.
Before giving such an approval, the Committee must determine:

(a) Whether the proposed expenditures are provided in the budget;
(b) Whether they are within the limits of the budgetary appropriations; and
(c) Whether the proposed report20 has been given for the requested amounts
(Aghvami and Babajani 1988, p. 121).

On the basis of the above considerations, the Committee can withhold approval of
the allotments proposed. As a general rule, the allotments are issued on a quarterly
basis.

5.2.3.3.2 The Disbursement Procedures

There is a uniform system for the spending of money approved in the budget. For
those expenditures for which the allotments are issued on a quarterly basis, payments
are made by the Treasury Officers of the ministries or government institutions.
According to Articles 52 and 53 of the Country's General Law of Accounts the

20

In the case of development appropriations the Committee may ask the ministry or government
institution to provide a progress report to the Committee.
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payments of expenses has two stages. The first stage which includes recognition21,
obligation22, confirmation23, and warrant24 is the responsibility of the minister or the
head of the institution. The second stage, which consists of financing and checking
the conformity of payment with the rules and regulations, is the responsibility of the
Treasury Officer.

In order to make easy payments of the expenses of the ministries, government
institutions and their subsidiary units, in the capital, cities and abroad, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Finance provides some funds as an imprest fund to the
Treasury Officers and Treasury's representatives in the provinces (Article 54 of the
Country's General Law of Accounts).

All the current and capital appropriations can be obligated and are payable until the
end of the financial year, the 20 of March. The balance of the appropriations should
be returned to the Treasury no later than 20 of April (the end of Farvardyn).

21

Recognition is defined as the choosing and determination of goods and services, including the other
payments, which are necessary to implement the government institutions' programs (Article 17 of the
Country's General Law of Accounts).
22
Obligation stems from: 1) receiving goods or service(s); 2) completing a contract(s) in accordance
with the regulations; 3) orders given by the legal and competent referees; and 4) joining international
conventions and membership in international organisations and societies with the permission of law
(Article 19 of the Country's General Law of Accounts).
23
Confirmation is referred to as determination of the amount of payable debt by the government
institution according to its documents (Article 20 of the Country's General Law of Accounts).
24
Warrant is a written permission which is issued by the authorised employee(s) of the ministry,
government institution, government business entity, government local institution, non-government
public institution and other executive institutions to pay their obligations and debts from the
appropriations on the Treasury Officer (Article 21 of the Country's General Law of Accounts).
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5.2.3.3.3 The Receipts Procedures

All government receipts-from oil, taxation, customs duties, and other revenue
sources, including government companies except the banks and credit institutions
and insurance companies, are deposited to the General Treasury Accounts in the
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Article 39 of the Country's General
L a w of Accounts).

All revenues collected by individual ministries and institutions of the Government
belong to the State.

The ministries and government institutions collecting the

revenues are not allowed to use directly the money they collected to finance their
operations.

The revenues, therefore, should be fully deposited in the General

Treasury Accounts in the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

5.2.3.4 Phase IV-The Closing and Audit of the Accounts

According to Article 90 of the Country's General Law of Accounts, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Finance is responsible for the financial control of the
ministries, government institutions and government business entities. This article
adds that the operative control and evaluation of the activities and capital projects
that are included in the Budget L a w are the responsibility of the Plan and Budget
Organisation.

According to Rakhshandehrou (1995), the head of the Court of

Accounts, this responsibility has not been carried out properly by the Plan and
Budget Organisation in the past (Rakhshandehrou 1995, p. 12). A s noted in section
5.2.3.3 above, in each ministry or government institution there is a representative of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance called a Treasury Officer w h o controls
the payments of expenditures of the ministry or the government institution. This
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officer examines all evidences of expenditures and makes records of the transactions
in the books of the agency.

At the end of the fiscal year, all Treasury Officers are required by the Country's
General Law of Accounts (Article 95) to prepare a detailed statement of receipts and
payments of each month along with the documents, broken down by budget item, by
the end of next month and for the final account of the year no later than 21 of June
the next year (this means three months after the last fiscal year according to the
Iranian fiscal year). These statements are then reported to the Court of Accounts.
Article 95 also stipulates that a second copy of these statements, excluding the
enclosed documents, be handed to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.
The auditing or scrutiny procedure for these statements and documents by the Court
of Accounts will be determined by the executive rules of the Law of the Court of
Accounts.

According to article 96 of the Country's General Law of Accounts, the government

institutions should give a report of their operations during the past year, accordin
proposed objectives in the Budget Law, to the Court of Accounts, the Budget and
Plan Organisation and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance no later than
six months after the end of the fiscal year. Government companies are required by
the Country's General Law of Accounts (Article 98) to prepare and report their
balance sheets and statements of income immediately after being approved by their

general meetings to be included in the performance statement of the country's annual
budget to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.
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The Country's General L a w of Accounts also requires all the government public
institutions and non-government public institutions and authorities25, which have
been established by the law to carry out functions and perform services that are
considered public, to give a statement of their receipts and payments according to the
procedures provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance to be included
in the performance statement of the country's annual budget to the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Finance (Article 100). The law provides that these reports of
ministers and institutions be consolidated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance into an over-all report of budget execution for each budget. This over-all
report represents a comparative statement of budgeted and actual revenues and
expenditures. The report, which also represents the financial accountability of the
executive to the legislature for each year's budget, should be submitted to the Board
of Ministers for their approval. This report then should be given to the Court of
Accounts to prepare the Budget Settlement.

The accounting records and the accounts of the ministries and government
institutions, including government companies and public institutions, are examined
by auditors of the Court of Accounts. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance
should give the performance statement of the country's annual budget, noted above,
to the Court of Accounts no later than 21 December of the coming year (30 Azar
according to solar calendar) (Article 103 of the Country's General Law of Accounts).
Thus, the auditing stage is normally started after receiving this statement. This audit
is generally exercised in accordance with provisions of Article 55 of the Iranian
Constitution and Article 104 of the Country's General Law of Accounts, which aim
to ascertain:

As noted in section 5.2.3.3, the difference between these institutions and local and national
institutions is that there is no place for a Treasury Officer in the former institutions.
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(a) That expenditures have not exceeded the amount of budget appropriations,
(b) That expenditures for the purposes specified in the budget have been charged
against the proper budget item,
(c) That no mixtures have been m a d e a m o n g the appropriations available for
different fiscal years or different chapters of each budget, and
(d) That expenditure documents have met the requirements established in the
regulations governing the accountability of the Treasury Officers.

These objectives of audit indicate that the budgeting and accounting systems in Iran
provide the information necessary for a very traditional system of accountability
meeting the requirements of legality and regularity.

The Court of Accounts prepares a report of the Budget Law of the previous year,
including its audit report, and gives this to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for
consideration and approval. This report is not normally up-to-date. For example, the
settlement report for the fiscal year 1991/1992 was submitted to the Islamic
Consultative Assembly in December 1994 (Court of Accounts 1994, p. 24) and for
the fiscal year 1992/1993 in December 1995 (Court of Accounts 1995, p. 18). The
major reason for this delay is because the Court of Accounts normally receives the
ministries' and government institutions' reports late or incomplete and in some cases
it never receives a ministry or government institution's report (Islamic Consultative
Assembly 1995a, p. 22). 26

See also section 5.5.2.2.
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5.3 THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM AND PRACTICES OF THE IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT
5.3.1 Purposes T o B e Served B y A G o v e r n m e n t Accounting System

Chapter 4 has shown that a sound accounting system is essential for effective
financial management and accountability in the public sector.

Within the

government financial management cycle, the accounts are the official source of
financial data used from the earliest planning stage of government operations through
programming, budgeting, funding, record keeping, reporting, and controlling. Such
data must be classified and recorded in the accounts in a form that will support
budget requests and provide for adequate control of budget execution and
government financial accountability.

T o do this in a systematic manner, the

programming, budgeting, accounting, and reporting should be integrated through the
use of c o m m o n classifications; that is, the primary classification used for preparing
and presenting the budget should be identified in the accounting system and in the
related reports. The use of such an integrated classification system will provide best
thefinancialdata needed for managerial decision making and for ensuring regularity
and legality in expenditure.

Traditionally, accounting in government has been developed primarily to meet the
information needs for accountability and control of public funds.

Government

officials responsible for expenditures have had to render proper accounts of their
stewardship and show that the funds have been spent in accordance with the
authorisations provided by the legislative body. In this conventional system, the
government officials' accountability for appropriated funds was generally satisfied
through the use offinancialinformation classified in terms of the source of funds, the
responsible organisation unit and the object of expenditures.
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Within the context of today's management requirements in governmental operations,
the traditional concept of accountability described above is somewhat narrow in its
scope, since, in budgeting and accounting, it relies upon the almost exclusive use of

classification by organisation unit and object of expenditures. While the need for thi
type of information is still relevant today, it was established in chapter 4 that
accounting in government is being recognised increasingly as one of the most
essential tools of management. As such, a government accounting system must be
developed, not only to fulfil the traditional accountability requirements of legality
and regularity, but also to provide various financial information needed for the new
dimensions of accountability, such as the efficient and effective management of
government operations. In addition, a government accounting system should provide
financial information necessary for purposes of planning economic development and
stabilisation policies, and evaluating their effects.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran today, as shown in section 5.2.3.3 above, the
government accounting system and practices are essentially those of the traditional,
narrow accountability-oriented government accounting framework, in which
accounting is viewed as a means of assuring financial accountability of the executive

officials, in accordance with legal provisions and budgetary restrictions. In addition,
the Iranian government's accounting system is very complicated. As noted in section
5.2.3.1, according to the system, a government unit prepares, before the beginning of
each fiscal year (or accounting period), a budget or estimate of revenues and
expenditures for the coming year. During the accounting period, cash receipts and
expenditures are recorded in the books and in revenue and expenditures ledgers (see
also Islamic Consultative Assembly 1995c, p. 54). Financial data recorded in the
accounts are classified by organisation unit, source of revenues, and object of
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expenditures. At the end of the accounting period, a statement comparing budgeted
and actual amounts of each item of revenues and expenditures is prepared in order to
evaluate the execution of the budget.

5.3.2 Provisions Concerning the Accounting System of the Iranian Government

The Iranian General Law of Accounts contains a large number of provisions
concerning the accounting system of the Government. Detailed requirements within
which the accounting system of the Government must be operated are outlined in the
manual of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance which should be ratified by
the Court of Accounts.

A complete set of instructions on the maintenance and operation of the accounting
systems in the Ministries and Government Institutions was published in the manual
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance in accordance with article 93 of the
197027 (1349) Country's General Law of Accounts with the approval of the Court of
Accounts. The manual is oriented to practice, emphasising how to record financial
transactions by ministries and government institutions. The primary purpose of the
publication of this regulation was to achieve uniformity among the budgetary
accounting systems in the Ministries and Government Institutions. In addition, it
was also intended to attain simplicity in their operation of accounting systems.

The manual for the accounting system in the ministries and government institutions
is divided into two sections: a manual for the accounting of current appropriations;

27

According to Article 140 of the Country's General Law of Accounts, the practical regulations of the
1970 Country's General Law of Accounts were to be applicable until the preparation of the practical
regulations for the 1987 Country's General Law of Accounts which would overwrite the 1970
Country's General Law of Accounts.
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and a manual for the accounting of capital or development appropriations. The

accounting system for the current appropriations consists of 54 accounts. In the case
of capital or development appropriations these are 32 (Aghvami and Babajani 1988).

5.3.3 The Financial Management and Accounting System Within A Ministry or
A Government Institution

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the execution of a Ministry or a Government

Institution's budget is the responsibility of the Minister for that Ministry or the H
of a Government Institution or the Head of a non-Ministry Agency. The financial
management within a ministry or government institution, however, is performed by
officials designated for that purpose by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance. These officials are known, as noted before, as Treasury Officers and are
accountable to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance for their performance.
Therefore, all the financial management in the ministries is with the Treasury
Officer.

As noted earlier, the accounting systems in the Ministries/Government Institutions

are generally operated in accordance with the instructions prescribed in the Country'
General Law of Accounts and the manual of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance.

In the ministries and government institutions two different groups of accounts are
kept for recording ministry or government institution financial transactions:
Governmental Funds and Trust Funds. Governmental Funds consist of a Current
Fund, a Capital Projects Fund and a Special Revenue Fund. The Current Fund is
used to record the financial transactions related to a ministry or a government

Chapter 5, The Accounting...

202

institution's current activities. In this account revenues are recorded on the basis of
cash accounting while expenses are recorded using a modified form of cash
accounting. The Capital Projects Fund is used to record the revenues and expenses
which are associated with establishing or building a new fixed asset (long lived asset)
by a ministry or a government institution. It is worth noting here that fixed assets
will not be recorded in a ministry or a government institution accounting system
when they are completed. This fund, therefore, is also kept on cash accounting
principles. The Special Revenue Fund Account is kept to record the receipts and
payments of funds from special sources which are allowed by a law.

Trust Funds, which include the Deposit Fund and Superannuation Fund, are devoted
to recording the receipts and payments of funds which should be kept, according to a
law or a regulation, by the Government for a specific time. A ministry or a
government institution cannot use Trust Funds and they are payable to their owners
after implementation of the required conditions.

5.3.3.1 Accounting for Appropriations and Allotments

Since each ministry or government institution is not allowed to spend money for each
budget item beyond its budget allowance, there is a need for keeping accounting
records in order to maintain necessary control over appropriations and allotments.
This is performed in each Ministry/Government Institution by using an
Appropriation Ledger where each page of this ledger represents an account for an
appropriation of each budget item. Each page shows the fiscal year, the code number
and explanation of the budget item, the amount originally appropriated, additional
appropriation, the amount allocated as permanent charge, the amount allotted as
provisional charge, unallotted balance, and other related information.
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5.3.4 T h e Financial M a n a g e m e n t and Accounting System of the Treasury of
Iran

The Treasury in Iran is responsible for recording the State receipts and payments of
money during the fiscal year. The system of accounting in the Iranian Treasury is
cash accounting which uses fund accounting for recording its financial transactions.
Like accounting systems in the ministries and government institutions, the Treasury
also uses Governmental Funds and Trust Funds in its accounting system.
Governmental Funds consist of a General Fund and a Special Revenue Fund. All
General Government Revenues such as tax, oil, sales and services should be
deposited in the General Fund and all General Government Expenses should be paid
from this account. Thus, the General Fund Account is used to record those financial

transactions which are related to the current and capital appropriations provided in
the Government General Budget section of the country's annual budget. The Special
Revenue Fund is kept by the Treasury to record the receipts and payments of funds
from special sources which are allowed by a law. Similar conditions to Trust Funds
of Ministries (see section 5.3.3) govern the nature and operation of the Treasury's
Trust Funds.

5.3.5 Accounting for Fixed Assets and Supplies

Government assets are divided into movable (operating assets) and immovable
(capital or fixed assets) properties. According to articles 106 and 114 of the
Country's General Law of Accounts, the responsibility for protection, guarding,
keeping of and recording payments for a ministry's or a government institution's
movable and immovable properties is with the ministry or the institution that uses
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those properties and assets. Article 106 also adds that the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Finance is responsible for controlling and centralising the State's
movable properties and assets. In addition, the sub-article 4 of the Article 31 of the
Country's General L a w of Accounts says that the Treasury Officer is responsible for
recording the n u m b e r of a ministry or a government institution's properties and also
controlling them. Note 1 of Article 31 adds that a Treasury Officer performs his/her
duties under the office of a minister or a head of a government institution. It can be
concluded that the Treasury Officers are not only responsible for control of financial
management within ministries or government institutions, but also for ministries or
government institutions' properties. There is no provision for recording depreciation
of fixed assets in the Iranian government accounting system (see also Islamic
Consultative Assembly 1995c, p. 84).

The function of the Court of Accounts in connection with the ministries or
government institutions properties is to check the inventory of properties and assets
of the ministries and government institutions (Article 4 of the Country's L a w of
Court of Accounts). A s to records of fixed assets, the Properties Trustee 28 within
each ministry and government institution, at the end of each six months, prepares a
list of furniture and equipment of the institution under its supervision and submits the
list to the State Properties Section. This list for the first six months should be
provided by 21 of October and for the second six months by 20 of April next year
(Article 11 of the State's Properties Regulations).

28

A Properties Trustee is a person who is appointed with the agreement of the Treasury Officer and
by order of the Ministry or Government Institution from those employees of a Ministry or a
Government Institution who are considered to be qualified for the position and also considered
trustworthy. He/she is responsible for protecting and transferring ministry or government institution
properties and arranging the accounts of those properties (Article 34 of the Country's General Law of
Accounts).
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consolidated number of the properties of the ministries and government

institutions is not available in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The head of the Court o
Accounts, Rakhshandehrou (1995) says that "there is no precise information about
the volume of government properties"29 (p. 13). He adds that there are no ownership
documents for most government properties. According to him, in one of the
country's provinces 90% of the government's immovable properties do not have
ownership documents (Rakhshandehrou 1995, p. 13).

Ministries and government institutions can sell their movable properties that they do
not need or when they are no longer serviceable and other ministries and government
institutions do not need them. These sales should be in accordance with the
regulations for government transactions and also they need to be made with the

permission of the relevant minister or the head of the government institution. Article
112 of the Country's General Law of Accounts requires that the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Finance should be also informed in advance. Ministries and
government institutions are prohibited by law from selling some immovable and
movable properties (Article 112 of the Country's General Law of Accounts). These
include:

1. Immovable properties which are considered to be national treasures.
2. Military plants and fortifications, weapons and missile factories.
3. Ancient and historical buildings.
4. Immovable properties which are of unique interest and provide national benefits.

Translated by the author.
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In the case of non-government public institutions, the sale of their immovable
properties is dependent upon the suggestion of the head of the non-government
public institution. For the government business entities, the sale of their immovable
properties is dependent upon approval at their general meeting (Article 114 of the
Country's General Law of Accounts).

5.3.6 Financial Reporting

The Iranian General Law of Accounts provides that each Ministry/Government
Institution must submit a detailed annual report of its receipts and expenditures by
budget item to the Court of Accounts, the Plan and Budget Organisation and the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (Article 96). The accounting records
mentioned above are the source of the data needed to prepare this report.

As noted in section 5.2.3.4, these ministerial reports are consolidated by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Finance into an overall report of receipts and expenditures
for each budget. This report is submitted to the Court of Accounts for examination.
The Court of Accounts, then, audits this report and prepares the "Budget Settlement",
which is required by Article 55 of Iranian Constitution, and submits to the Islamic
Consultative Assembly for ratification. The Budget Settlement bill is the Executive's
presentation to the Legislative body to show the implementation of its duty regarding
financial accountability and responsibility (Articles 103 and 104 of Country's
General Law of Accounts). It is a comprehensive statement comparing budgeted and
actual amounts of revenues and expenditures for each budget.

For management use within each ministry or government institution, such an annual
report only is, of course, not sufficient. Various operating statements are needed for
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use by management at different levels. Besides, more frequent reports on the status
of appropriations, financial condition and results of operations of each ministry and
government institution are needed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance
in performing its responsibilities for state financial reporting.

5.3.7 The Country's General Law of Accounts

The Iranian General Law of Accounts and its practical regulations governing
financial management and accountability purposes of the Iranian Government are
essentially those established in 1911 which have been amended four times. The L a w
emphasises both the accountability for budget execution at the end of the fiscal year
and compliance with legal provisions and budget restrictions, with little or no regard
to essential managerial use of accounting information. For example, the only reports
required by the L a w are the Statement of Annual Performance and the "Budget
Settlement", which should be prepared at the close of the fiscal year as the
Executive's accountability of the execution of the budget each year. In addition, the
L a w requires the classification of budget expenditures by object. While such a
classification provides control over the limits on the amounts the Government
operating units m a y expend on specified items, it cannot furnish the ministerial
management officials and the executive and legislative policy makers with essential
information on Government programs and activities.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The existing accounting system and practices of the Iranian Government are basically
those established m a n y years before the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (see also Islamic
Consultative Assembly 1995c, p. 53).

This system and related practices are
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essentially those in a legally-oriented, traditional government accounting framework,
where accounting is viewed as a means of assuring accountability and compliance
with legal provisions and budgetary restrictions. Therefore, the current budgetary
system of Iran, in the context of the pressures of the move to a modem, advanced
country, needs to be changed. Rakhshandehrou (1995), the head of the Court of
Accounts, has warned that if the financial management of the Iranian Government
does not change the Iranian's economy will continue to suffer (Rakhshandehrou
1995, p. 12). It means that the information provided by the current system of
financial management is not sufficient for accountability and planning purposes.
According to the current budgeting and accounting system in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, it is impossible to control and evaluate government programs. This study
confirms Rakhshandehrou's (1995) conclusion that the information which is provided
by the Iranian's fiscal system is primary, inadequate and cannot be analysed for the
purposes of achieving efficiency and effectiveness (Rakhshandehrou 1995, pp. 1213; see also Islamic Consultative Assembly 1995c, p. 84-85).

As mentioned in early sections of this chapter, no specific objective has been given
for accounting systems in the ministries and government institutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Reference to the Court of Accounts Law and the Country's General
Law of Accounts, however, indicates that the objectives of the accounting systems in
the ministries and government institutions could be twofold: (1) provision of
information on revenues and expenditures made by individual ministries and
government institutions so that the executive branch can prepare an overall "Budget
Settlement" to be presented to the legislative body at the end of fiscal year as the

executive's accountability for their yearly financial management, and (2) control over
expenditures and revenues. These objectives are too narrow especially in view of the
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aims of the two five year plans; they give little or no concern for essential manager
uses of accounting information.

Overwhelmingly the accounting system of central government departments
(Treasury, Plan and Budget Organisation) and ministries i.e. the general government
sector, are cash based and designed to complement the categories of approved
expenditure in the budgeting system. It has been demonstrated that the accounts are
used for the purposes of establishing the legality and regularity of expenditures.
These features of traditional public sector accounting, it has also been noted, are

inadequate to meet the needs of governments in times of fiscal restraint. For Iran th

weaknesses are all the more significant as it seeks to meet the objectives of its Fiv
Year Plans and thus raise the living standards of its people.

Recent Australian public sector reform, with the emphasis given to introduction of
the new public sector accounting mechanisms and techniques, will be the theme of
the next chapter. This will be followed by an examination of the relevance of the
accounting and financial management reforms enacted in Australia for giving Iran an
accounting system which will provide the necessary management tools and
accountability mechanisms to achieve government goals as expanded in the Five
Year Plans.

CHAPTER 6

RECENT REFORMS IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC
SECTOR MANAGEMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW
REGIMES OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCOUNTING

6.1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

In previous chapters systems of government in Australia and the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the notion of accountability and the role of accounting in ensuring financial
accountability were discussed. Chapter 4 provided a discussion of different systems
of government accounting, including cash and accrual accounting.

A detailed

description of the accounting and budgeting systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran
was given subsequently in the previous chapter. It was shown that the accounting
system of central government departments (Treasury, Plan and Budget Organisation)
and ministries i.e. the general government sector, are cash based and designed to
complement the categories of approved expenditure in the budgeting system. It has
also been discussed that the accounts are used for the purposes of establishing the
legality and regularity of expenditures. These features of traditional public sector
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accounting, it has also been noted, are inadequate to meet the needs of governments
in times of fiscal restraint. For Iran the weaknesses are all the more significant as it
seeks to meet the objectives of its Five-Year Plans and thus raise the living standards
of its people.

A redefinition of the concept of accountability to encompass the recent changes in
the public sector in Westminster countries, including the n e w dimensions of
accountability such as efficiency and effectiveness, reflects the level of attention that
has been given to managerialism. Managerialism refers to the principle of "letting
the managers manage". Eventually it involves allowing public sector managers
greater freedom in their decision making and resource allocations.

The 1970s have been described as a decade of administrative reform inquiries in
Australia, and the 1980s as a decade of Public Service reform (Task Force on
Management Improvement 1992; see also Wanna, O'Faircheallaigh and Weller 1992,
p. 99; H o o d 1989, p. 349). Majorfinancialmanagement changes took place in the
Australian Commonwealth Government during 1980s (Emy and Hughes 1988, p.
353; see also Halligan 1987, p. 40). Enhancing financial accountability in the public
sector continues to be the significant reason for the reforms.

Recent reforms in the Australian Public Service have been grouped by the Task
Force on Management Improvement (1992) into six areas: structural, industrial,
human resource management,financialmanagement, commercial, and planning and
reporting reforms (p. 7; see also Sedgwick 1993, p. 25; Crompton 1994, p. 2). This
chapter is concerned with changes in financial management and accountability,
focusing on n e w accounting technologies as a means to perform accountability
practices in the public sector. For the purpose of this study, the knowledge of these
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changes is needed as a source of reference in order to m a k e suggestions for the
improvement of the accounting system of the general government sector of Iran. To
provide a balanced assessment of the accounting reforms, an essential requirement
for any discussion of the relevance of the reforms for Iran, problems experienced in
the implementation of reforms in Australia are also examined.

6.2 REFORM OF THE COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SECTOR
6.2.1 Pressures for Reforms

Public sector reform has a long history in many countries. Change in the public
sector is not n e w with all public organisations undergoing change all the time. The
1980s witnessed a renewed emphasis on reforming the public sector in most
developed countries. The election of conservative regimes led by Margaret Thatcher
(1979) in Britain and Ronald Reagan (1980) in the United States is generally
regarded as providing the impetus which led to the neoliberalism or conservatism of
the 1980s (Mascarenhas 1993, p. 319; Gunn 1988, p. 21; Boston 1987; Broadbent
and Guthrie 1992; H o o d 1989; Gray and Jenkins 1986; Schick 1990). The World
Bank, for example, reported a significant equity re-arrangement of at least 1,343
government enterprises in 83 countries in the 1980s (Guthrie 1993, p. 101). Reform
in the public sector refers to changes in task design, structure, accountability, and
objectives of political institutions and administrative agencies. These reforms reflect
the changing values of societies like Australia, Britain and N e w Zealand where a
range of public sector reforms, largely based on economic theories of organisation,
were introduced in the last decade (Mascarenhas 1993; see also H o p w o o d 1984, p.
170; Goldman and Brashares 1991). It has been stated that

[occasionally ... a number of individually unexceptional changes
occur simultaneously and in a manner capable of precipitating
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system-wide transformation. Such a process of generalized change
is always externally driven and always creates n e w constraints and
opportunities for policy-making (Considine 1990, p. 171).
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The recent changes introduced in the Australian and New Zealand public sectors are
examples of such a transformation (Considine 1990, p. 171). It is argued that some
global factors have influenced recent changes in the public sector of most countries.
S o m e of these widespread factors have been recognised and represented by
Mascarenhas (1993) as follows. A s a product of the post-Keynesian welfare state,
public bureaucracies grew

significantly and

became

increasingly complex.

Consequently, governments have failed to deliver the goods which in turn led to
public disenchantment. Taxation, which was seen as a substitute for private sector
resources to fund expenditure on public services, was accused of crowding out the
private sector. These factors contributed to pressure for reform of the public sector
through the introduction of n e w management practices which are referred to by some
as 'the n e w public management' (Mascarenhas 1993, p. 319; G u n n 1988, p. 21;
Boston 1987; Broadbent and Guthrie 1992; H o o d 1989; Gray and Jenkins 1986;
Schick 1990). Mascarenhas (1993) states that

the globalization and internationalization of internal economies and
the transformation following the oil shocks led to a chain of events
that resulted in reform of the economy in most O E C D countries, and
were initiated in Australia and N e w Zealand by officials in the
economic ministries w h o were influenced by the "new right" (p.
320).

As an example of recent reforms in the public sector, Guthrie (1991a) refers to
Britain and Metcalfe and Richard's (1988) examinations of the process of
management reform in British central government (since Thatcher's election victory
in 1979) (p. 5).

A

series of related changes in N e w Zealand included a

comprehensive program of commercialisation, corporatisation and liberalisation and
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the introduction of a n e w system offinancialmanagement (Boston 1989, pp. 103125 in Guthrie 1991a, p. 6; see also Goldman and Brashares 1991). However, it has
been said that "Australia pioneered the world in the 1980s with public management
and ownership" (Guthrie 1993, p. 103). According to a Department of Finance

report "[t]he reforms have affected all levels of financial management and the role
of the Parliament, Ministers and managers of Commonwealth agencies" (Department
of Finance 1992a, p. vii).

The oil crises of the early 1970s precipitated an economic recession in the mid-197
which was followed by widespread severe external account problems in the 1980s

(Considine 1990, p. 174; see also Department of Finance 1992a, p. 6). This resulted
in slow economic growth and reductions in the growth of public expenditure which
affected the quality and quantity of public services provided (Wilenski 1986, pp.
257-258; see also Department of Finance 1992a, p. 6). In response to the seemingly
intractable problems facing government in Australia, solutions were offered by the

major political parties (Labor and Liberal) while there was also increased pressure
from other organised groups previously excluded from public policy-making
(Wilenski 1986, pp. 257-258; Considine 1990, p. 174). Suggestions for cutting
deficits and deregulating the economy by embracing civil service reform became
increasingly popular. These were taken up with unprecedented enthusiasm by the
Labor Party upon assuming power in 1983 (Considine 1990, p. 174). Coincident
with the reforming zeal of the Labor Party there were increased demands for public
sector accountability to parliament and government, and increased pressures for
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in financial and human resource management
(Guthrie 1991a, p. 1; see also Department of Finance 1992a, p. 6; Task Force on
Management Improvement 1992, p. 113; Broadbent and Guthrie 1992, p. 3; Glynn
andMcCrae 1986, p. 101; Stevenson 1994, p. 1).
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Wilenski (1986) believed that five factors appeared to be important in Australian
public sector reform. First, pressure for reform came from the legal profession which
pursued reform from a different perspective and a power base different from political
and bureaucratic activists. Second, as a very effective method of change, all the
suggested reforms were embodied in legislation.1 Third, a number of the reformers
were placed in key positions to continue the reform process after the various
committees had reported. Fourth, the establishment of the Administrative Review
Council in 1976 along with the O m b u d s m a n and the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal have acted as continuing agencies promoting and supervising reform.
Finally, the legislation which w a s longest in gestation and most modified in the
process, the Freedom of Information Act, was passed (p. 268).

According to Considine (1990), there were two critical factors in Australian public
service reform. Thefirstrefers to the leadership of the Labor Party. H e believes that
this was generally the case within the Australian states because "the most energetic
public sector reformers have been those governments controlled by the Australian
Labor Party" (p. 179). The second source of change emanated from the functional
problems of bureaucracy itself. In this sense he believes that "[a]t an organizational
level the need for reform w a s created by problems of overload, cost, demands for
greater bureaucratic responsiveness to government policy and increasing pressure for
the provision of n e w services" (Considine 1990, p. 180).

Parker and Guthrie (1993) argue that public sector reforms during the 1980s were
dominated by two philosophies, 'economic rationalism' and 'managerialism'. In

For more see Wilenski 1986, pp. 264-265.
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their opinion changes in the character of organisation, management, accounting,

auditing, and accountability in the public sector have been profoundly influenced b
these philosophies (p. 62; see also Broadbent and Guthrie 1992).

6.2.2 Objectives of Recent Public Sector Reforms in Australia

The purpose of many specific changes that have been introduced in Australian
Commonwealth Government administration has been to improve management in the
Australian Public Sector (Task Force on Management Improvement 1992, p. 52).
The objectives of the Government's proposals in its White Paper, Reforming the
Australian Public Service in 1983, were to develop an administration that would:

• be more responsive and accountable to Ministers and the
Parliament
• be more efficient and effective
• give all Australian citizens an opportunity to compete on merit to
join and advance within it, and to provide greater opportunities
for disadvantaged groups, and
• have a more streamlined and independent system for protecting
the rights of staff (Commonwealth Government, White Paper
1983, p. 1; Mascarenhas 1990, p. 82; see also Dawkins 1985;
E m y and Hughes 1988, p. 353; Helgeby 1990, p. 1; Guthrie
1991a; English and Guthrie 1991; Weller 1991, p. 10; Parker and
Guthrie 1993; Mascarenhas 1993, p. 326; Halligan 1987, p. 40).

As noted earlier, the objectives of reforms were ultimately to give departmental
heads greater autonomy and responsibility for managing departments and holding
them accountable for performance (Dawkins 1985; Guthrie 1991a; Parker and
Guthrie 1993; Mascarenhas 1993, p. 326; see also Humphry and Waters 1986, p. 49;
Bartos 1994b, p. 9), including the pursuit of value-for-money (Parker and Guthrie
1990; Guthrie 1991a; English and Guthrie 1991; Parker and Guthrie 1993; see also
MIAC 1991, p. 6; McPhee 1993). After nearly five years in power, in September
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1987 the Australian Prime Minister reaffirmed that the objectives of reforms in the

Public Service were twofold. Firstly, to enhance ministerial control over the public
service and secondly, to give departmental managers more responsibility over dayto-day management (Emy and Hughes 1988, p. 353).

Implementation of the purposes of the reforms, indicated above, required a

decentralisation of responsibility. "[L]ower level operatives [were to be] made awar

of and accountable for the costs of their operations" (Gray and Jenkins 1986, p. 171;
see also Guthrie 1991a, p. 3). There was also a requirement to sub-divide public
sector organisations into commercial businesses and non-commercial organisations.
The public also had to be defined as 'customers' (Gray and Jenkins 1986; see also
Guthrie 1991a, p. 3; Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 114; Weller 1991, p. 11).

Simplification of statutory provisions and related guidelines, elimination of variou
steps in the administrative process, and devolution of responsibility for decisions
managers at the appropriate level were other measures of the reforms (Mascarenhas
1993, p. 324).

Similar objectives of reforms pertained in NSW:

• optimal resource allocation
• efficient and economic use of resources
• better, more responsive and effective provision of services
• improved accountability ( N S W Treasury 1993, p. 5).

In budgeting, the Government's 1984 Budget Reform Paper focused on the need to

• develop better means of identifying and setting budgetary
priorities, in order to ensure that the best overall result is
achieved in terms of meeting the Government's objectives with
the resources which can be m a d e available;
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• focus attention more clearly on the goals and objectives of
particular programs, in relation to the resources they use;
• develop and apply to the management of Commonwealth
programs specific techniques aimed at improved performance
and more efficient resource use; and
• set up machinery to ensure that the effectiveness and efficiency
of programs are reviewed regularly, and that the results of such
reviews are taken into account in the ongoing evaluation of
budgetary priorities (Commonwealth of Australia, Budget
Reform 1984, pp. 1-2; see also Stevenson 1994, p. 1)
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6.2.3 Early Reforms of the Hawke Government

Reforms of the Australian public sector by the Hawke Government drew heavily
upon the earlier work of the Royal Commission on Australian Government
Administration (RCAGA). The RCAGA which had been established in June 1974
by the Labor Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, under the chairmanship of Dr. H. C.
Coombs, reported to the Fraser government in 1976. The duty of the Commission
was to examine federal government administration (Weller and Smith 1977;
Humphry and Waters 1986; Wilenski 1986; Weller 1991), and particularly issues of
accountability and financial control within the Commonwealth public service (Glynn
and McCrae 1986). The commission inspired the Reid Report (Review of
Commonwealth Administration 1983), the report of the Parliamentary Joint
Committee of Public Accounts on the selection and development of senior managers
(the Connolly Report, 1982), and then Dawkins' policy paper on Budget Reform
(1984) (Task Force on Management Improvement 1992, p. 52; see also Dawkins
1985, pp. 63-65; Weller 1991, p. 10; Barrett 1994a, p. 10).

The RCAGA report consisted of 337 recommendations in one volume of report and
four volumes of appendices. According to Weller and Smith (1977) the RCAGA
examination "was the first wide-ranging inquiry for over fifty years and its items
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reference required it to look into most aspects of the public service and other
agencies of administration" (in Wilenski 1986, p. 5). As noted earlier, the most
significant reason for this reassessment of the role of the public sector and its
management was Australia's (like many other countries') poor economic
performance during the 1970s (Department of Finance 1992a). The RCAGA found,
in 1976, that the Commonwealth administration "needed significant adaptation to

deal responsibly, effectively and efficiently with the tasks that confront it" (Task
Force on Management Improvement 1992, p. 52). Parker and Guthrie (1990) argue
that "[f]ollowing Fulton2, the RCAGA (1976) report recommended a 'system of
accountable management' to promote management efficiency and to achieve
management accountability" (Self 1978 in Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 116; see also
Glynn and McCrae 1986, p. 93). They also added that,

the commission recommended that the government's objectives and
priorities needed to be established to enable implementation of
coherent work plans for individual ministers, departments and
agencies, and therefore for subordinate levels of managerial
responsibility ( R C A G A 1976). This scheme would involve the
establishment of a 'patterning' of institutional arrangements,
organisational forms, management processes and various accounting
and other technologies ( E m y 1976).
The commission also
recommended that department heads be responsible for the
management of programs, for efficiency and economic
administration, and, as accounting officers for exercising their
primary role in financial management ( R C A G A 1976: R 3 , R14,
R47, R48, R234-40) (Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 116).

These recent reforms of the Australian public service were implemented in two broad

stages. The first stage related to the reform of the public service following the 19
election (Mascarenhas 1990; Task Force on Management Improvement 1992, p. 2).
The second stage occurred with a restructuring of the machinery of government

2

The Fulton Committee (The Civil Service Committee) was established in England in 1
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following the 1987 election (Task Force on Management Improvement 1992, p. 79;
see also Wettenhall 1989, pp. 98-99). Parker and Guthrie (1993) believe that

[a] major change to the machinery of federal government was
introduced in July 1987 (the Administrative Arrangements Act
1987), when the number of departments was reduced from 28 to 18.
These were organized into 16 Cabinet portfolios. This followed the
Block (1987) efficiency scrutiny. This was a move to a 'portfolio
approach' to management in the public sector (pp. 61-62; see also
McPhee 1990, p. 3).

Therefore, the practical changes began to be put into effect with the arrival of B
Hawke's Labor government in March 1983. The new Labor government instituted a
platform of changes to the machinery of government, the Public Service and other
sectors of Commonwealth administration (Commonwealth Government, White Paper
1983, p. 1; Parker and Guthrie 1993; see also Halligan 1987, p. 40). This platform
was set out in the document "Labor and Quality of Government", released by the
then Leader of the Opposition and the then shadow Attorney-General on February 9,
1983 (Commonwealth Government, White Paper 1983, p. 1). The White Paper of

1983, Reforming the Australian Public Service, set out the government's policy goa
which in 1984 "were developed in a series of papers on the budget process and
statutory authorities" (Task Force on Management Improvement 1992, p. 2; Parker
and Guthrie 1993; Mascarenhas 1993). A summary of major reforms in Australian
public sector has been given in figure 6.1.

According to Dawkins (1985), the desired outcomes of Australian public sector
reform were to:
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(a) help ministers to be closely involved in the management of
their departments and provide greater opportunities for them to
take into account strategic issues with the help of ministerial
consultants;
(b) provide a more open, competitive and flexible senior
management with a service-wide orientation;
(c) improve processes of resource allocation by involving
ministers and by a greater degree of co-ordination of financial
and staffing decisions coupled with better opportunities for
review of programmes and administration (Dawkins 1985
quoted in Mascarenhas 1990, pp. 82-83).

The R C A G A
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and the Review of Commonwealth Admimstration both paid

considerable attention to a productive and responsive relationship between
Governments and the Public Service in the formulation, implementation and
administration of policies and programs. This was reinforced by the attention that
the 202nd Report in 1982 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts
paid to the selection and development of senior managers. A key element for the
reform of the Australian Public Service centred upon Department Heads and their
senior managers (Commonwealth Government, White Paper 1983, p. 9; see also
Guthrie 1994).

At the heart of the public sector reforms in the 1980's was a determination to enhance
management performance. The Government's reform proposals suggested that
management capacity could be improved by:

• providing it with improved opportunities for considering
term goals
• streamlining the central system for organising
financial resources to accommodate greater
involvement and management flexibility
• requiring Department Heads to develop
improvement plans, and

longer
h u m a n and
ministerial
management
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• introducing a mechanism to ensure that programs are reviewed
regularly in the most appropriate w a y (Commonwealth
Government, White Paper 1983, p. 27).
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The Government's 1983 White Paper established that there should be a much closer
involvement of Ministers in decisions about the level, mix and distribution of
resources. It was envisaged that this would include a greater degree of integration of
decisions onfinancialand personnel resources and maintaining a reasonable level of
central control and oversight of resources along with increasing the flexibility.
responsibility and accountability

of departmental managers

(Commonwealth

Government, White Paper 1983, p. 28; see also Task Force on Management
Improvement 1992, p. 113; Crompton 1994, p. 2; Bartos 1994b, p. 1). Therefore, the
White Paper suggested more flexibility for departments in the use of their staff
resources. At the same time this would have to be accompanied by an increase in
responsibility and accountability. Action also was taken to develop the Review of
Commonwealth Administration recommendation for the creation of a financial
management improvement program by the Public Service Board and the Department
of Finance (Commonwealth Government, White Paper 1983, p. 30). This stage of
the reforms was completed by introducing program budgeting.

In April 1984 the Australian Federal Government issued the "Budget Reform" paper
which was concerned with reform of the budgetary system and with financial
management within the Commonwealth sector.

It promoted reforms directed

towards

• improving the processes of decision-making on budget priorities
by the Government itself;
• improving the information base and processes for public and
parliamentary scrutiny of the budget and of the subsequent
implementation of programs funded from the budget; and
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upgrading the financial management of programs in all
Government agencies (Commonwealth of Australia, Budget
Reform 1984, p. 1).

The reforms heralded in the two White Papers were to occur within a tighter
departmental structure. Accordingly, in 1987 the government set about concentrating
activities and responsibilities by reducing the number of departments from 28 to 18.
Codd (1988) has outlined six potential benefits of the 1987 restructuring of
government as:

• enhanced ministerial control (sharing of ministerial workload
within a two level ministerial structure would give increased
scope for Cabinet ministers to attend to policy work and broad
direction of the department's operations);
• better coordination and decision-making processes (coordination
would be more easily achieved through a smaller number of
units, each representing wider, related interests and with
representation in Cabinet);
• broader perspectives and greater coherence in policy advice and
program development (by bringing together policy and program
areas that are linked, policy would be more integrated and would
be beyond the perspective of individual interest groups);
• greater scope for delegation to portfolios (devolution to
departments and increased flexibility of personnel and financial
arrangements would assist in resource management flexibility
and management improvement);
• reduction in duplication and overlap-with consequent savings
(where any duplication of functions or economies of scale (for
example, in corporate services programs) could be removed, cost
savings would result); and
• greater flexibility in portfolio operations and potential stability in
machinery of government (as long as the basic portfolio policy
groupings-and thus the structure-remained relevant, considerable
flexibility for varying the roles of non-Cabinet ministers over
time could be achieved without costly and destabilising
machinery of government reorganisations) (Codd 1988, pp. 26-
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28 quoted in Task Force on Management Improvement 1992, pp.
79-80).
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6.2.4 Commercialisation, Corporatisation and Privatisation

Reforms caused changes in the form of management and administration and, in some
cases, the ownership of government departments and statutory authorities. These
changes are referred to as commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation and
are defined as follows. According to the Department of Finance (1993b) it seems
that there is not a precise and universally accepted definition of "commercialisation"
in the public sector. It is argued that "[t]he term is widely used to describe what
happens when governments decide to allow their agencies or entities to charge the
public (or other agencies and entities) for the goods and services they produce, and to
adopt... other features of the commercial environment" (p. 1). Commercialisation is
also defined by Pallot (1995) as "the adoption of private sector management practices
in government" (p. 1, footnote) whereas corporatisation has been referred to as "the
adoption of the company form of organization" (Pallot 1995, p. 1, footnote). This
definition of corporatisation has been widened by the Commission of Audit to "the
application of commercial principles to a public authority's operations, including
limiting the power of ministers to issue directions" (English 1989, p. 62).
Privatisation has been defined by the Commission of Audit as "the transfer of
activities or ownership of assets and operations from the public sector to the private
sector" (English 1989, p. 62; see also Pallot 1995, p. 1, footnote).

In Australia, public sector changes have included both government departments and
public business enterprises (PBEs) (Guthrie 1993, p. 101). B y their reforms,
"[governments have been turning away from the traditional 'statutory form' and
adopting instead a 'corporate form' for the corporate governance, legal, accounting,
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auditing and accountability regimes" (Guthrie 1993, p. 101; see M c P h e e 1990, p. 6).
According to Guthrie (1993) "[t]hese processes are labelled 'corporatisation' and the
resultant entities are k n o w n as Government O w n e d Corporations ( G O C s ) " (Guthrie
1993, p. 101).

As noted earlier, Australian public sector reforms were dominated by economic
rationalisation and managerialism philosophies. These will be addressed in more
detail in the next section.

6.3 MANAGERIALISM OR LET THE MANAGERS MANAGE

One of the features of the recent reforms in Australia is the emphasis placed on a ne
concept of administration for the public sector environment. The n e w concept is
known as 'managerialism' and involves an approach which emphasises 'letting the
managers manage'. In introducing this n e w concept a broad attempt has been made
to m o v e from a focus on the bureaucratic control of narrow processes to a system of
management flexibility which will allow for greater adaptability to change and an
effective focus on results. Helgeby (1990) states that recent reforms in the Australian
Public Service since 1983 have been managerialist in a sense which has placed a very
considerable emphasis on performance and managing for results. According to him,
reforming the dimension of accountability for performance has also added to
traditional accountability for due process and probity (p. 10; see also Sinclair 1989;
Kerr 1990, pp. 7-8; Pollitt 1986). The n e w form of accountability which is referred
to as 'accountable management', was supported by the Royal Commission on
Australian

Government

Administration's

(RCAGA

1976)

recommendations

regarding the structure, functioning and composition of public sector bureaucracies
(Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 116; see also Sinclair 1989; Mascarenhas 1990, p. 89).
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According

to accountable

management

concepts, organisational

objectives,

particularly government programs, explicitly can be determined and put into practice.
It is possible to measure inputs and outputs and discover "that relevant performance
indicators can be found for all public sector activities. It is assumed that the
information produced will be relevant to decision-makers, and will assist them in
making rational decisions" (Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 116; see also Guthrie 1991a;
Baker 1980, p. 551; Humphry and Waters 1986, pp. 48-49; Gray and Jenkins 1986;
Weller 1991, p. 11; McPhee 1990, p. 3).

An earlier definition of accountable management presented to the British government
by the Fulton Report (1968, p. 149) refers to

the means of holding individual and units responsible for
performance measured as objectively as possible. Its achievement
depends upon identifying or establishing accountable units within
government departments - units where outputs can be measured
against costs or other criteria, and where individuals can be held
personally responsible for their performance (quoted in Parker and
Guthrie 1990, p. 116 ; see also Glynn and McCrae 1986, p. 93).

The values of managerialism as a culture have been presented by Sinclair in 1989.
Performance of the organisation should be measured according to measurable or
quantifiable goals or outputs. The function of management is to establish corporate
mission statements and goals and then break down these goals into progressively
smaller and more realisable objectives and action plans. The process of corporate
planning is essentially top down and centrally driven with hierarchical power and
highly centralised control. The policy development process is a matter of applying

criteria of efficiency and effectiveness to performance goals (Sinclair 1989, p. 383
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Setting the objectives, the measurement of performance and the redefinition of
accountability are the three critical issues for implementing the managerialist
philosophy which have been addressed by Guthrie in 1991 (Guthrie 1991a, p. 11).
He argues that the important problems in objective setting are: a lack of clear
objectives; problems in defining the 'public interest'; and the absence of physical
measures of output. It was envisaged that "objectives are given, can be
operationalised and can be measured" (Guthrie 1991a, p. 11). The problems of
multiple objectives, conflicting objectives and interdependence, and more
importantly the impact of political objectives on programs generally were ignored.
Prior to the reforms of the past decade the basis of resource allocation and ex-post
measurement of an organisation's (management) performance were not shaped by
objective achievement. It has been suggested that objectives should be set with
reference to the 'public interest'. However, several problems arise, such as, "who
defines the public interest? Are all members of the public to be treated equally? And
who determines trade-offs between one sector of the population and another?"
(Guthrie 1991a, p. 11). Identification of outputs is another problem. "What is the

'output' of the education service, the police service, the defence department, foreign
affairs or a hospital?" (Guthrie 1991a, p. 11).

The second critical issue is concerned with the measurement of performance. In
theory, the gains and sacrifices resulting from each of the alternatives, along with
outputs, have to be measured. It is assumed that measurement is objective in nature.
Thus, measurement "becomes a meaningful and purposeful activity which is
'scientific and accurate'" (Guthrie 1991a, p. 11). Guthrie states that the
managerialism model "tends to ignore the difficulties in equating monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits as well as the variations in valuation and measurement
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within monetary units. In fact, much of the measurement rests upon subjective,
normative and value laden assumptions" (Guthrie 1991a, p. 11).

Some risks have been attributed by researchers to the "new managerialist"
philosophy in the public sector. While effectiveness, representativeness, and
responsiveness are the major objectives in public organisations, some cost-controlfocused notions of managerial efficiency may threaten these characteristics.

Overestimation of the priority of private sector models over public sector operation
without modification, may result in a less open and responsive form of government.
This is because private sector methods are unit-efficiency oriented while public
managers also see themselves accountable for values such as equality and fairness in
providing services. "[T]he tendency to emphasise the employment of "hard"
quantitative performance data may result in insignificant factors being accorded
undue managerial attention and zeal, while factors that are crucial to performance
may go unattended due to their more qualitative nature" (Parker and Guthrie 1993, p.
64). Any attempt to impose an unmodified private sector management philosophy
may bring with it an attendant focus on single-index measures of performance
inspired by private sector bottom line thinking (Parker and Guthrie 1993, pp. 64-65;
see also Deegan 1995, p. 14; Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 120). Therefore, important
qualitative features and assessments may be ignored and public sector effectiveness
may once again be impaired.

Managers may resist the application of new accountability systems imposed by the
managerialist framework. Opposition could be avoided by changing the design and
implementation of new accountability systems and by including appropriate levels of
consultation and participation (Parker and Guthrie 1993, pp. 64-65; see also Deegan
1995, p. 14; Parker and Guthrie 1990, p. 120).
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The Financial Management Improvement Program (FMIP) and Program Budgeting
have been the means by which managerialism concepts and, accordingly, the
objectives of reforms have been introduced and exercised. The nature and functions
of these mechanisms in Australian public sector reform are defined and explained
next.

6.4 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
6.4.1 Objectives of the Financial Management Improvement Program

The Financial Management Improvement Program was the major vehicle for
developing, implementing and assessing reforms introduced by the Commonwealth
government in Australia during the 1980s (Schick 1990; Guthrie 1991a; Mascarenhas
1993, p. 324; see also Wanna, O'Faircheallaigh and Weller 1992, p. 101; Guthrie
1989, p. 56; Russell 1993, p. 2; Bartos 1994b, p. 5; Stevenson 1994, p. 2). Program
budgeting was a significant component of the reforms which complemented the
FMIP. The term Program Budgeting was replaced by Program Management and
Budgeting ( P M B ) in 1987-1988. The intention of P M B was to encourage a wider
approach to program management than primarily the derivation of budgets and
management offinancialinformation (Russell 1993, p. 3; see also Bartos 1994a, p.
5). Program Management and Budgeting has been seen as "a vehicle to promote a
greater output focus of public administration and ... a powerful agent for cultural
change" (Bartos 1994b, p. 5; see also Russell 1993, p. 2). Bartos (1994b) says that
by using Program Management and Budgeting managers can be asked "to write
down the objectives of a program and the criteria against which to judge their
achievement, and the resources devoted to back programs and to publish all three" (p.
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In Program Management and Budgeting the attention has been focused on

program objectives and the cost effective achievement of outcomes.

This has

provided an important framework for reporting on accountability to Ministers and the
Parliament (McPhee 1990, p. 6). Schick (1990) argues that

FMIP/PMB is shifting the focus of budgeting from the inputs used
to the results achieved. It seeks to change the operating culture of
Australian public management from one which places a premium on
compliance with externally-imposed rules to one which spurs
managers to do the best they can with the resources at hand (pp. 2829; see also Stevenson 1994, p. 1).

Two fundamental goals have been predicted for the FMIP. First, developing more
effective public services, geared to produce results consistent with government
objectives. Second, developing more efficient public services, and awareness of the
costs to achieve results (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 6). It is
assumed that these aims will be best achieved by giving more authority and
appropriate responsibility to managers w h o are most directly involved in providing
services (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 6; see also Bartos 1994b, p.
1). The budget environment has been streamlined to remove m a n y constraints on
management. There has been a change in the procedures of budgeting to provide
greater incentives to manage for results and to highlight the importance of resource
costs. Performance monitoring and evaluation have been given more emphasis by
the F M I P (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 6; see also Sedgwick 1993,
pp. 15 and 19-20; Crompton 1994). Thus, the budget and regulatory framework for
public sector management has been improved by the F M I P . In this connection, the
F M I P developed a more flexible regulatory environment, developed a more stable,
results-oriented budget process and introduced incentives for greater efficiency and
effectiveness (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 7).
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According to Parker and Guthrie (1990) "the F M I P has been seen as a direct
reflection of the emergence of managerialist philosophy in the public sector" (p.
120). It has been defined as "a comprehensive approach to improving resource
management in the Australian Public Service" (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP
Report, p. 5; see also Stevenson 1994, p. 1). Humphry and Waters (1986) are of the
opinion that

FMIP is a Government initiative which, similar at least in name to
the U K Financial Management Initiative, seeks to integrate the
major strands of management improvement. It differs from previous
attempts to reform Government administration in that is emphasises
the need for improved management practices to be developed, within
a c o m m o n framework, to suit the particular circumstances of
individual departments and agencies (p. 47).

According to the Department of Finance, the F M I P was different from previous
approaches to management reform in several respects. It says that the FMIP

does not just confine itself to trying to reform management practices,
but is a systematic and integrated approach to the public sector's
achievement of Government objectives (Department of Finance
1992a, p. 7).

Three main broad areas are covered and considered by the F M I P : the public sector
environment, management systems, and standards and practices. FMIP sought to
create a public sector which would allow the government to streamline the budget

and regulatory process in order to reduce the need for central controls and encourag
efficient and effective management practices in departments. Introducing techniques
and systems that help departmental and agency managers focus on results would
generate sophisticated management systems. Standards and practices, in the FMIP,

Chapter 6, Recent Reforms...

233

were concerned with changing administrative procedures and practices to give
managers more incentive to manage and greater awareness of resource costs
(Department of Finance 1988, FMIP Report, p. 5; see also Department of Finance
1992a, p. 7; Crompton 1994, p. 2).

The creation and operation of the Management Improvement Advisory Committee
(MIAC) has assisted greatly in recent years with implementing FMIP reforms
throughout the public sector. MIAC was created in December 1989 as a subordinate
body to the Management Advisory Board (MAB) to review significant management
issues and initiatives taking place within the Australian Public Service. The MAB
itself was established in 1987 under the Public Service Act 1922 to advise the
Government on significant issues relating to the management of the public service.
As well as playing a leading role in the implementation of the FMIP, the two
committees also serve as a 'link' between that program and those presently being
overseen by agencies, including the Public Service Commission and the Department
of Industrial Relations (Department of Finance 1992a, p. 8).

Guthrie (1991a) believed that implementation of FMIP in the Commonwealth has

been slow since its establishment in 1984. He referred to some of the critiques of
FMIP as follows. Assessment of the usefulness of FMIP is impossible, mainly
because FMIP is incapable of establishing clear objectives for all organisations.

information provided by FMIP is assumed to be technical and neutral and ignores the
political processes which are involved in selecting and prioritising information.
There are also some problems with the establishment of performance measures. The
emphasis of FMIP is upon economy (lower costs) with not enough attention paid to
effectiveness. Finally, the FMIP systems are costly and should be more closely
scrutinised (p. 6).
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6.4.2 Significant Elements of the F M I P

In Australia the main regulatory

framework

for financial management for

departments and budget dependent agencies is provided by the Constitution, the
Audit Act and annual and standing Appropriation Acts (Department of Finance 1988,
FMIP Report, p. 8). The Department of Finance in the FMIP Report issued in 1988
noted that

[bloth the process of appropriation and detailed regulation of
financial administration have been streamlined over the past four
years - whilst maintaining and strengthening the basic principle of
accountability to Parliament through the provision of information on
outputs and outcomes (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report,
p. 8).

In the appropriation process, the following flexibilities have been given to the
departments and agencies to administer their operating expenditures:

• all 'administrative expenses' (sometimes over 20 items) were
consolidated into one item in 1984-85.
• a further consolidation to a one-item 'running cost' appropriation
was introduced in 1987-88, giving managers some scope to shift
resources between salary and 'administrative expenses'.
• carryover of unspent salaries and administrative expenses to the
following year is n o w permitted (up to 2 percent of total running
costs appropriation).
• 'negative' carryover has been introduced with the 1988/89
budget-departments are allowed one year only borrowing against
next year's appropriation, with the same overall 2 percent limit.
• cash limits apply to running cost appropriations, except for
specified items such as national wage increases (Department of
Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 8; see also Stevenson 1994, p. 2).
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In the F M I P , regulatory reforms have concentrated on simplifying, clarifying and
updating the body of detailed rules governing financial management. A review of
the Finance Directions by inter-departmental teams was done and it showed that
many of the recommended changes eg, interdepartmental charging, have been
implemented. The main recommendations of the review were to:

• replace detailed prescriptions for departments with broad
guidelines in each section of the Directions.
• devolve responsibilities for issue of specific directions to
departmental Secretaries.
• issue specific directions primarily in areas where uniform
standards of service promote efficiency (eg, payment of bills).
• vary levels of checking according to levels of risk to the
Commonwealth
• increase individual responsibilities (eg, travel arrangements).
• modify processes and regulations in line with n e w technology or
n e w policy (eg, introduction of credit cards) (Department of
Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 9).

The implementation of program management and budgeting, integration of the

forward estimates and annual estimates processes, and cohesion of staff and financi
budgeting are the main measures that have been introduced to improve budget
processes and link resource allocation decisions to results (Department of Finance
1988, FMIP Report, p. 10 ; see also Stevenson 1994, p. 2; Sedgwick 1993, p. 16;
McPhee 1990, p. 4). The forward estimates of budget outlays provide detailed
estimates for the three years following the current year. They provide a Financeendorsed estimate of the future cost of carrying out existing policy. The forward

estimates are the starting point for the subsequent years' budgets (Sedgwick 1993, p
16; see also Rosalky 1990, pp. 3-4).

Running costs have been introduced as part of the program budgeting process.
According to this concept, each agency is appropriated one bucket of money each
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year for administrative expenses/operating costs. This results in a cash limitation for

agencies and includes salaries, administration and property expenses. The purpose of
introducing running costs is to enable program managers to spend their salaries and
administration budget in the way which best meets their program objectives without
further recourse to central agencies or Parliament. The previous cost arrangements
included a number of separate appropriations for departmental inputs such as
salaries, postage, travel etc. Moving from one input category to another required
parliamentary approval. Running costs arrangements allow agencies to carry over
underspends or borrow money from the future years and also the authority to carry
forward to the next year up to 6% of those budgets. Program managers also can
make money and keep it for running costs purposes. Agencies must pay an annual

efficiency dividend (Stevenson 1994, p. 2: Barrett 1994a, p. 14; Bartos 1944b, pp. 2
3). According to the 1988 FMIP Report, the main vehicles through which
departmental running costs are considered on a program basis are:

• explanatory Notes for Senate Estimates Committee's
examination of the estimates
• consideration of all n e w policy proposals in relation to their
parent programs
• a program presentation of the Budget in 'Budget Paper N o . 3 Portfolio Program Estimates' (Department of Finance 1988,
F M I P Report, p. 11 ; see also Stevenson 1994, p. 2; Bartos
1994b, pp. 2-3 & 6; Rosalky 1990, pp. 4-5).

Making programs a central focus for strategic management by departments and

agencies is the long-term aim of the reforms. To achieve this aim, it is suggested t
different approaches to program management will be appropriate for different
organisations, and agencies (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP Report, p. 11).
Organisation structure, performance indicators, and evaluation of programs are some
of the important issues in developing program management. According to the
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Department of Finance (1988) "organisation structure m a y not always align program
structure-operational and strategic management roles need to be carefully defined"
(p. 11). Performance indicators, particularly those relating to effectiveness, are

of a qualitative nature. The evaluation of programs is a long-term task that requir
an individual agency approach. The establishment of evaluation planning processes
is intended to assist in upgrading evaluations (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP
Report, p. 11; see also Crompton 1994, pp. 6-9).

To make the budget process more stable and predictable for departmental managers a
number of steps have been taken:

1. forward estimates are considered as the basis of the next year's
budget requests;
2. budget policies are seen as longer term and are put in place
earlier;
3. portfolio targets devolve more budget decisions to Ministers; and
4. financial and staff budget controls are unified (Department of
Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 12 ; see also Stevenson 1994, p.
2; M c P h e e 1990, p. 4; Rosalky 1990, p. 2).

It is believed that the creation of an environment in which good management
performance is rewarded and poor performance penalised will secure the success of
the program of management reform in the long-term (Department of Finance 1988,
FMIP Report, p. 13). To create such an environment some measures have been

introduced, namely: devolution of authority to departments, the efficiency dividend

revenue retention, and use of receipts from asset sales. Efficiency dividend refers
the payment of some of the gains which are achieved through improvements in
management and technology by departments to the Commonwealth. Revenue

retention considerations arise when nev sources of revenues are created by agencies
Arrangements then have to be in place for agreeing on shares of new revenues
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between the budget and such organisations as the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), ANSTO, AIMS and the Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP Report, p. 13).

The Commonwealth government also instituted the FMIP to upgrade the
management skills of those involved in financial management. The 1986 FMIP
Report described management systems within agencies in terms of five elements of
'managing for results' including:

• corporate management
• program management
• organisation design
• management information
• evaluation (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP Report, p. 14; Department of
Finance 1992a, pp. 9-10; Emy and Hughes 1988, p. 361; Crompton 1994, pp. 69).

Corporate management is concerned with "defining the mission and goals of an
agency, determining strategy and priorities, and guiding allocation of resources to
programs." The determination of the precise objectives and targets for programs and
activities is the purpose of second element, program management. It also includes

the strategy for achieving results and the way in which programs are to be monitore
and reviewed. Organisation design is concerned with "the subjects such as

determination of the responsibilities and relationships between different levels of

management and developing authority down the organisation as far as is practicable"
The purpose of management information is to ensure "that managers have
appropriate, accurate and timely information so they know whether or not their

Chapter 6, Recent Reforms...
programs are effective and efficient".

239
Reviewing regularly all aspects of the

organisation's performance and assessing n e w policies, to make sure that the
organisation is on therighttrack, are the aims of the evaluation element (Department
of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 14; see also Department of Finance 1992a, pp. 910; Bartos 1994b, p. 1; Crompton 1994, pp. 6-9).

According to the broad principles of FMIP, departments themselves are responsible
for developing management systems appropriate to their needs (Department of
Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 15). Charging for services, applying commercial
practices to Government and developing n e w accountability standards are some of
the government's other policies which have been introduced through the F M I P to
reform Australian public sector management.

One of the key elements of the FMIP is charging for services. The introduction of
charges for a variety of services has been adopted as a policy since the H a w k e
Government. Improving efficiency by ensuring that managers and users of public
services are fully aware of the costs of public activities is a major objective of
charges. "Providing users have the authority and flexibility to vary the level of
service purchased, both users and providers of services will have a greater incentive
to use resources efficiently" (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 23; see
also Bartos 1994b, p. 4; Stevenson 1994, pp. 2-3; M c P h e e 1990, p. 5).

Charges for a number of services previously provided free to other departments were
introduced by the Government in July 1987. These services included legal services,
design and construction, property management, survey and mapping, workers'
compensation insurance, printing services, transport storage andfreight,and security
services. In some cases, these services have also given the private sector the
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opportunity for competition (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 23; see
also Stevenson 1994, pp. 2-3; Sedgwick 1993, p. 18; McPhee 1990, p. 4). Finance
Directions concerned with interdepartmental charging (section 29) have been
radically changed. In the past, the general convention was that charges should not
made for goods and services provided between departments. But the new section 29

reverses that rule and now the general presumption is that charges should generally
be made for interdepartmental services. The exception is "where a case can be made

that the costs of administering charges are excessive or the service has a signific
'public interest' component" (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP Report, p. 23;
Sedgwick 1993, p. 18).

As part of the machinery of government changes, the Department of Administrative
Services was established for the purpose of consolidating most common services
under a single portfolio. There was a mandate for the new department to introduce
commercial principles throughout its operations (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP
Report, p. 23).

Under FMIP, a range of measures which are commonly associated with the private
sector are being applied to a number of government practices. In addition to the
increased use of charges for services, some of the other commercial practices that
have been adopted by government are:

• accounts processing
Following an Efficiency Scrutiny, accounting procedures have been
streamlined throughout the public service. Duplication of checking
prior to certification has been reduced and the level of checking is
varied according to the level of risk. Corporate credit cards have
been introduced. These changes have brought about direct budget
savings, but equally importantly they have improved efficiency and
effectiveness by requiring more timely payment of bills and
reducing the time taken for processing of accounts.
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•
procurement practices
Similar principles have been used in a Review of Commonwealthwide Procurement. A s a result of this Review, the Commonwealth
has decided to reduce central regulatory control over purchasing.
Departments will be able to establish their o w n procedures and take
responsibility for cost-effective purchasing within Service-wide
guidelines.
• cash management
Better cash management by government agencies reduces the cost of
government's cash holdings by reducing total interest payments and
the need for borrowing. Government agencies have improved their
cash management by reducing the level of advances used to carry
out operations and by obtaining commercial rates of interest on all
accounts. Payment of receipts to the Commonwealth Public Account
is n o w done in 24 hours (compared with 7 days previously)
(Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, p. 24).

6.4.3 Developing N e w Accountability Standards

Making agencies more accountable for their performance rather than simply for

compliance with appropriation and administrative and financial regulations was th
eventual aim of the FMIP reforms. The establishment of such standards is a longterm task which will depend on progress in developing evaluation processes and
systems of reporting on performance (Department of Finance 1988, FMIP Report, p.
25; Crompton 1994, pp. 6-9).

At the time of the first major review of the FMIP in 1988 the following initiative
had been implemented to help establish standards for performance evaluation:

• appraisal of new policy proposals
N e w policy proposals are required to include a statement of
objectives and to set out the key results areas that will provide the
basis of monitoring performance of the n e w initiative. For the 198889 budget, departments were asked for the first time to explain fully
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their strategy for evaluating the ultimate success or otherwise of
each proposal.
• Explanatory Notes for Parliament3
The program format of Explanatory Notes to the Senate Estimates
Committees (SECs) is being progressively developed to enable the
Committees to focus more clearly on the performance of each
program in departmental portfolios.
• Financial Statements4
For 1988-89 and subsequent years, departmental secretaries are
required to prepare detailed financial statements and include them in
Annual Reports tabled in Parliament. The n e w arrangements will
provide for the disclosure of more comprehensive financial
information with respect to departmental operations and improve
accountability (Department of Finance 1988, F M I P Report, pp. 2526).

This last aspect of the F M I P represented a key element in the success of the F M I P ,
for as well as "letting the managers manage" the FMIP had to ensure that the
government could "make the managers manage". To achieve this, deficiencies in
existing accounting practices would have to be addressed. Accordingly, accounting
mechanisms and practices are two of the areas which have been significantly affected
by the recent reform in the Australian public sector. The most notable reform, to be
discussed below, was the introduction of accrual accounting to all agencies of
government.

6.5 ACCOUNTING AND BUDGETING SYSTEMS IN AUSTRALIA POSTREFORM

The basis of the Commonwealth Government accounting framework is embodied in
the Australian Constitution and derives its substance from the Audit Act 1901. The

3
4

See section 6.5.1.2 for a discussion of current procedures.
See footnote No. 3.
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former includes key provisions such as: the power which has been given to the
Parliament to make laws for taxation and borrowing money on public credit and also
the exclusive right to impose customs and excise duties under sections 51 and 90.
The Constitution also requires that all revenue raised or money received by the
Executive Government (that is, the Executive Council, consisting of all Ministers,
acting through the Governor-General) has to form one Consolidated Revenue Fund
to be appropriated for the Commonwealth's purposes (section 81) and no money can
be drawn from the Treasury of the Commonwealth except under appropriation made

by law (section 83). Last, but not the least, under section 56 the Executive has th
sole right to present expenditure proposals to Parliament.

Parker and Guthrie (1990) argue that the adoption of new accounting technologies
has been one of the main means by which the new managerialism has been

introduced to Australia (p. 115). They state that the reforms' "impact is epitomise
by the 'new' accounting technologies being pursued in the name of program
management, including Program Management Budgeting, Financial Management
Improvement Program, changes to performance measurement, enhanced annual
reporting, and a greater emphasis on performance auditing" (Parker and Guthrie
1990, p. 114). Figure 6.2 shows a summary of the major changes relevant to public
sector accounting in Australia.

6.5.1 Organisation of Public Sector Accounting in Australia

Prior to 1976 the form of government accounting in Australia was a modified form of
the Westminster model of government accounting. The Westminster model of
government accounting, which is derived from the powerful traditions and
conventions of London's Great George Street, the home of Her Majesty's Treasury
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(Hardman 1982, p. 25), is based on the assumption of centralised financial and
economic authority. In this model, by convention one entity, usually the Treasury

245

Chapter 6, Recent Reforms...

Figure 6.2
General S u m m a r y of C h a n g e s Relevant to Public Sector Accounting
I. Forward estimates and budgetary processes
•
Budget estimates in program format;
•
Forward estimates of outlays, on a three-forward-years basis;
•
Increased expenditure review processes, linked to focus on cost recovery and
evaluation of programs;
•
Changes to appropriation and special appropriation procedures;
•
Programme performance statements.
II. Financial management
•
Introduction of the financial management improvement program;
•
Financial directives (e.g., banking);
•
Single running costs appropriation;
•
Certain receipts generated within departments can be retained;
•
Greater emphasis on asset management;
•
Introduction of accrual information for identifying "true costs" and "user charges."
III.
•
•
•
•

Expenditure and performance measurement
Changes to the expenditure statements;
Requirement for performance indicators for certain government entities;
Introduction of capital accounting and depreciation;
Recognition of outstanding liabilities (e.g., superannuation, other
entitlements).

employee

IV. Financial and annual reporting
•
Minister of Finance Financial Statement Guidelines required a program statement,
supplementary financial information, disclosure of fixed assets, and so forth;
•
Explanatory notes and performance statements;
•
Various annual reporting regulations and guidelines outlining the form and content for
departments, SA, and PBEs;
•
Department of Finance annual reports trial accrual accounts and the requirement that
all departments will adopt an "accrual method" for financial reporting;5
•
Whole-of-government reporting.6
V. Review and auditing
•
Compulsory evaluation of government programs;
•
Efficiency scrutiny (internal and external);
•
Efficiency and performance audits.
(Source: Parker and Guthrie 1993, p. 76)

5

Accrual accounts are in place now (see section 6.6.2).
Whole of government reporting on an accrual basis is on trial now (see Department of Finance
1996).

6
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Department of the Treasury, is responsible for the two functions of financial
management and control, and economic policy and advice which are centralised
(Hardman 1982, p. 24). The main functions of the Treasury at that time included:

advising [sic] financial, monetary and general economic policy;
controlling the public account, including the authorising of
expenditure;
the collection of revenue and the management of the public debt:
preparing taxation and loan proposals;
administratingfinanciallegislation such as that on banking, foreign
exchange, etc.;
prescribing the rules for government accounting (Commonwealth
Public Service Board 1968, p. 71).

The present Australian Commonwealth model of public sector finance is something

akin to that which is referred to, after the Canadian approach, as the Ottawa model.
In 1976 the second Fraser Liberal Country Party Government transferred some of the

responsibilities of the Treasury to the new Department of Finance (Hardman 1982, p.
30; see also Glynn and McCrae 1986, pp. 91-92). Hardman (1982) says that

[u]nder an Administrative Arrangements Order the functions of
financial management and control at the Commonwealth level were
vested in a newly-created Department of Finance, while the
functions of economic policy analysis and advice to the Government
remained with the existing Department of the Treasury. The
Treasury also retained control over the revenue-but not the
expenditure-side of the Budget (p. 30; see also Glynn and McCrae
1986, pp. 91-92).

According to the Department of Finance (1981, p. 1) the adoption of the Ottawa

model of finance was designed to broaden and strengthen the sources of advice to the
Government and to facilitate more effective budgetary management (in Hardman

1982, p. 30). Of particular relevance to this study, the Department of Finance, wit
the co-operation of the ANAO, was given responsibility for developing
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Commonwealth Government accounting policy and practices and in coordinating and
promoting accounting and financial management practices in all executive
departments and agencies. The major functions of each of these two central
agencies, and their interrelationships, are explained briefly in the following
subsections.

6.5.1.1 The Australian National Audit Office

The Australian Audit Office was established by the Audit Act of 1901 as an Audit
agency of the Commonwealth Government and came into operation on 1 January
1902 (Commonwealth of Australia 1993, Audit Act 1901, Section 2). The Office is

under the control and direction of the Auditor-General of Australia who is appoint
by the Governor-General (Commonwealth of Australia 1993, Audit Act 1901, Section
3).

In 1988, the name of the Australian Audit Office was changed to Australian National
Audit Office (ANAO). Sharpe (1992) states that "[t]he aims of the ANAO are in its
vision statement which sets down its role and purpose as to serve the community as
independent auditor to the Parliament improving Commonwealth public sector

administration and accountability" (p. 13). The ANAO has responsibility to audit t
departments of the Commonwealth Government, departmental commercial
undertakings, statutory authorities, and almost all Commonwealth owned or
controlled companies (Commonwealth of Australia 1993, Audit Act 1901, Section
41). Section 41 of Audit Act 1901 provides that the Auditor-General has
responsibility to audit the accounts and records of the ministries to:

(a) ascertain whether the moneys shown therein to have been
disbursed were lawfully available for expenditure in respect of
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(b) ascertain whether the provisions of the Constitution and of this
and any other Act and the regulations relating to public moneys
have been in all respects complied with (Commonwealth of
Australia 1993, Audit Act 1901, Section 41).
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The responsibility of reporting on the financial stewardship and the economy and
efficiency of the operation of Commonwealth entities to the Parliament is with the
ANAO (Commonwealth of Australia 1993, Audit Act 1901, Section 11 A; see also
Australian National Audit Office 1995, p. 3).

The objectives of the A N A O as set out in the Corporate Plan 1991-92 to 1993-94 can
be summarised as follows:

(a) Performance audits. To provide an independent evaluation to
Parliament, to the Executive, to Boards, to management and to
the public of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of
administration of Commonwealth public sector entities.
(b) Financial Statement Audits.
T o provide independent
assurance to Parliament, to the Executive, to Boards, to
management and to the public on thefinancialstatements of
Commonwealth Public Sector entities.
(c) Audit Support. T o provide audit and management support
services which facilitate the achievement of the corporate
mission of the A N A O .
(d) Executive Support.
T o provide efficient and effective
management support services which monitor and contribute to
the achievement of the A N A O ' s corporate mission; to provide
assistance to parliamentary committees; to effectively
implement, maintain and monitor progress on public service
wide initiatives; to provide a means for appropriately and
effectively deterring fraud against the A N A O , safeguarding
against it and detecting it promptly.
(e) Information Technology.
T o develop and implement
computing systems and facilities to achieve improvement in
the A N A O ' s effectiveness through the use of computer
technology to support all aspects of the management and
conduct of the audits (Sharpe 1992, pp. 13-14).
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Concerning the settlement of accounts and claims, the A N A O has the responsibility
for settling the accounts of disbursing and collecting officers who are accountable
public funds and for making settlements with certifying officers when there are
improper certifications on vouchers.

Further, the Auditor-General is required by law to decide on the legality of
expenditures of public funds. The decisions are forwarded to heads of executive

departments and agencies, or disbursing or certifying officers, who are authorised t
apply for a decision upon any question involving a payment to be made by or under
them or pursuant to their certification. In addition, many legal questions arise in
audit and settlement work of the ANAO which require determination. The decisions

of the Auditor-General are, by law, final and exclusive to the executive branch of t
Government. The decisions establish the validity of the individual payments and, in
some instances, the legality of entire programs.

Finally, the Australian National Audit Office also provides special assistance on
request to the Parliament, its committees, or members and officers. This special

assistance can be in the form of special audits, surveys, and investigations perform
on the request of the committees, members or officers of Parliament; testimony
before Parliamentary committees by the Auditor-General or his representatives on
matters considered to be within the special competence of the Auditor-General

Office; or comments or assistance in drafting proposed legislation or other advice i
legal and legislative matters. The Auditor-General is also responsible to make
recommendations for accounting reform (Audit Act 1901, Section 54).
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6.5.1.2 The Department Of Finance

A s noted earlier, the Department of Finance was created in December 1976 "to
provide for more effective management of the business of government and to
strengthen the Government's decision making process" (Department of Finance,

Annual Report 1995a, p. 3). This department is a part of the executive branch of t
Federal Government, and is headed by the Minister of Finance. Promoting value for
money in the management of the Commonwealth public sector through quality

advice and service to clients has been stated as the Department of Finance's missi
According to the Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO) of 6 June 1994 the
following principal matters have been given to the Department of Finance:

• evaluation and review of governmental programs and associated
expenditure and staffing proposals;
• expenditure and staffing estimates;
• governmental financial administration and accounts, including
administration of the Public Account;
• Commonwealth superannuation schemes;
• general policy guidelines for Commonwealth statutory
authorities and government business enterprises ( G B E ) and
monitoring thefinancialperformance of G B E s ;
• oversight of Commonwealth public sectorfinancialmanagement
policy development; and
• conduct of major asset sales (Department of Finance 1995a,
Annual Report, p. 3).

The Financial Management Division of the Department of Finance is responsible for
the development, operation and control of the central accounting systems. Its
responsibility includes the provision of accounting policy and services to
departments and selected statutory authorities. This Division is also responsible
the administration of the Audit Act 1901 and related financial legislation which
provide the framework for Commonwealth financial administration. Co-ordination
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and preparation of the annual supply and appropriation measures, and administration
and advice on forward obligation procedures and the Advances to the Minister of
Finance are other responsibilities of the Financial Management Division (Department
of Finance 1995a, Annual Report, p. 7).

The Department of Finance provides Guidelines for preparing financial statements by
Government Departments and Commonwealth Authorities, the latest being issued in
1995, in accordance with the requirements of section 50 of the Audit Act 1901.
Consistent with S A C 2, A A S 27 and A A S 29 the objectives of these financial
statements, which are general purpose financial reports, are to disclose information
which is useful in making economic decisions and to satisfy accountability.
Guidelines for preparing financial statements by both Government Departments and
Commonwealth Authorities are based on Australian Accounting Standards and
Statements of Accounting Concepts (Department of Finance 1995c, p. 1; Department
ofFinancel995b,p. 3).

The following statements are required under the Guidelines, "Financial Statements o
Departments7", to be prepared and must be included in a department's annual report:

• an Operating Statement
•

a Statement of Assets and Liabilities

•

a Statement of Program Expenses and Revenues

•

a Statement of Program Assets and Liabilities

•

a Statement of Cash Flows

•

a Statement of Transactions by Fund (Department of Finance 1995b, p. 4).

7

The General Government Sector.
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The Guidelines on Financial Statements of Commonwealth

Authorities* requires two

different financial statements for commercial Commonwealth authorities and noncommercial Commonwealth authorities to be included in their annual reports. For
commercial Commonwealth authorities, the following must be provided:

• a Profit and Loss Statement9;
• a Balance Sheet10; and
• a Statement of Cash Flows (Department of Finance 1995c, p. 1).

Under the Guidelines, non-commercial Commonwealth authorities must prepare the
following statements and include them in their annual reports:

• for Statutory Marketing Authorities, Research and Development Corporations
and Higher Education Institutions-a Statement of Revenues and Expenses;
• for other authorities-an Operating Statement;
• a Statement of Financial Position; and
• a Statement of Cash Flows (Department of Finance 1995c, p. 2).

6.5.2 AAS 29 and Financial Reporting in the Australian Public Sector

In 1983 in response to approaches from Parliamentarians the Public Sector
Accounting Standards Board (PSASB) was established by the two Australian
accounting bodies, the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants and the

8

Commonwealth Authorities include both commercial Commonwealth authorities and noncommercial Commonwealth authorities (Department of Finance 1995c, pp. 1-2).
9
This statement is equivalent to the operating statement of departments.
10
This statement is equivalent to the statement of assets and liabilities of departments.
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Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, State and Commonwealth AuditorsGeneral and public servants. The primary objective of establishing the PSASB was

to improve the quality of external financial reporting in the public sector (Sutcl
al 1991, p. 9; see also Humphry and Waters 1986, p. 48). Since 1983, the PSASB
has issued a number of accounting concepts and accounting standards. These

concepts and standards are based on the objectives, noted earlier in section 6.5.1
defined for financial reporting by public sector entities. According to these

objectives, the purpose of financial reporting in public sector entities is to dis
information:

(a) useful in making economic decisions;
(b) to satisfy accountability (SAC 2, paras 43-45).

To date two accounting standards specifically applicable to the public sector,
Australian Accounting Standard 27 "Financial Reporting by Local Governments"
and Australian Accounting Standard 29 "Financial Reporting by Government
Departments", have been prepared by the PSASB. AAS 27 is not relevant to this
study because it is not concerned with the Australian Commonwealth Government.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to the main features of AAS 29.

Like other overseas countries, an extensive due process has been adopted by the
PSASB for standard setting. In the case of AAS 29, discussion Paper No. 16 was

prepared by AARF staff in conjunction with an external contractor and was issued in
1991. This discussion paper was followed by Exposure Draft ED 55 which was
issued in January 1992 and the deadline for pubic comment was June 1992. During
the period of exposure, seminars were conducted by the AARF and the PSASB in
capital cities. Subsequently a draft Accounting Standard was provided to the ICAA

Chapter 6, Recent Reforms...

254

and the A S C P A for 30-day comment and to the Standing Treasuries Liaison
Committee (STLC) for comment. Finally, Australian Accounting Standard AAS 29
was issued in December 1993 for application by 1996/1997 (McPhee 1994a, p. 3;
Micallef 1994, p. 33; see also Department of Finance 1994; D'Angelo 1992).

The purpose of AAS 29 is "to set out standards for the form and content of general
purpose financial reports of government departments" (AAS 29, para 4) and to be

consistent with SAC 2. SAC 2 requires the disclosure of information "relevant to th

assessment of performance, financial position, and financing and investing, includi
information about compliance" (SAC 2, para 45). AAS 29 requires all the

government's reporting entities to prepare general purpose financial reports (AAS 2

para 17). It also adds that these reports "shall disclose the identity of the legis
or other authority pursuant to which the general purpose financial report has been
prepared" (AAS 29, para 12). Accrual accounting has been accepted by AAS 29 in

the preparation of the general purpose financial reports of a government department
As Micallef (1994) notes, "[t]he PSASB believes that adoption of AAS 29 will
improve significantly the quality of general purpose financial reporting by
government departments in Australia" (p. 33). Although the intentioned coverage of
AAS 29 is explicitly stated there was at one stage some uncertainty about the

determination of particular government departments as reporting entities. According
to Statement of Accounting Concepts SAC 1, "Definition of the Reporting Entity",
"most, [if] it not all, government departments are reporting entities and should

prepare general financial reports in respect of each reporting period" (AAS 29, par
19).

Two criteria have been given by AAS 29 for the materiality of the information in th
general purpose financial reports of government departments. Information is
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material if the omission, non-disclosure or misstatement of information about a
government has the potential to adversely affect:

(a) decisions about the allocation of scarce resources made by users
of the government department's general purposefinancialreport;
or
(b) the discharge of accountability by the government department
( A A S 29, para 6)

Micallef (1994) in a paper, " A N e w Era in Reporting by Government Departments"
concludes that

[t]he concept of accountability reflected in AAS 29 is a broad one: it
is that departments should be accountable not only for the
expenditure of funds in accordance with appropriations or other
spending mandates, but also for the efficient management of
resources under their control and the achievement of their operating
objectives (p. 34).

Parliament has been recognised as the primary user of the general purpose financial
reports of government departments by AAS 29. Providers )of the resources that

departments control (taxpayers and creditors), receiver(s) of goods and services o
those who benefit from the activities of departments (customers), and overseer(s)
reviewer(s) of the services on behalf of members of the community (regulators,
community groups and the media) are other potential users of the general purpose
financial reports of government departments (AAS 29, para 21).

Consistent with the Department of Finance ''''Guidelines on Financial Statements of
Departments" AAS 29 states that government departments shall report the assets,
liabilities, equity, revenues, expenses and cash flows in the financial statements
(AAS 29, para 35). Government departments are required to prepare an operating

Chapter 6, Recent Reforms...

256

statement, a statement offinancialposition and a statement of cash flows ( A A S 29.
para 40). The operating statement shall be prepared in accordance with Australian
Accounting Standard AAS 1 "Profit and Loss or other Operating Statements" and the
revenues and expenses of the government department for the operating period shall
be disclosed (AAS 29, para 42). An example of a general purpose financial report
for a government department has been provided in AAS 29.

6.5.3 Introduction of Accrual Accounting

A decision was announced by the Minister for Finance, in November 1992, that
Commonwealth departments would progressively move to financial reporting on an
accrual basis (Department of Finance 1993a, p. 20; see also McPhee 1993, p. 2;
McPhee 1994b, p. 4; Barrett 1994b, p. 4; JCPA 1995). At the time of announcement
the Minister said that

... the proposed new reporting arrangements build on a series of
reforms introduced by the Government over the past 10 years aimed
at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector,
and its accountability to the Parliament (quoted in J C P A 1995, p.
10)."

The Commonwealth Government decided to introduce accrual reporting by
Departments over a period of some three years (McPhee 1993, p. 11). This included

a trial period in several government departments. Following this introduction, te
departments elected to report on an accrual basis in 1992-93. The number of

agencies that reported on an accrual basis in 1993-94 was sixteen (Barrett 1994b,
4-5). It was expected that 20 agencies would report on an accrual basis for 1993-

Emphases in original.
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1994. The remaining agencies were to report on an accrual basis for 1994-95
(McPhee 1994b, p. 5). Therefore, the strategy was to move all Commonwealth
departments to accrual reporting by the year ended 30 June 1995 (Department of
Finance 1993a, p. 20; see also JCPA 1995; McPhee 1993, p. 11). Accrual
accounting had been used for many years in some statutory authorities and all
government owned companies.

As discussed already, to implement accrual accounting it is essential to keep a re

of long-lived assets. Consequently, this requires valuation of assets to be record
The Department of Finance refers to four valuation methods for Commonwealth
Departments and Authorities' long-lived assets in the "Guidelines on Financial
Statements of Departments" and ""Guidelines on Financial Statements of
Commonwealth Authorities": current market buying price, current replacement cost,
market value and the greater of net present value (NPV) and current market value
(selling price) (Department of Finance 1995b, p. 49, 1995c, p. 59).

6.5.3 An Evaluation of the Implementation of Accrual Accounting

As noted in the previous section, in 1992 the Department of Finance announced the
movement towards using accrual accounting in Commonwealth departments. The

adoption of accrual accounting in the general government sector is part of a broad

public sector reform process and is seen as "one element of [public sector reform]

which is to improve public sector efficiency and effectiveness by introducing aspe
of commercial business practice" (JCPA 1995, pp. xi & 8). In August 1995 the
JCPA prepared a report on the implementation of accrual accounting as a

consequence of concerns expressed in two reports presented to the Parliament by th
Auditor-General in 1994. The reports, Audit Report No. 32, 1993-94, Efficiency
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Audit, Accrual Reporting-Are Agencies Ready? and Audit Report No. 16, 1994-94,
Follow-up Audit, Accrual Reporting-Are Agencies Ready? (ANAO 1994a, 1994b;
JCPA 1995), provided an assessment of whether agencies were adequately prepared
to meet the then emerging requirements of accrual reporting obligations (ANAO
1994a, 1994b; JCPA 1995).

The JCPA reported that the value of accrual information had been recognised only

a few of agencies and that the full potential of accrual information had yet to be
explored by most agencies (p. xii). Audit Report No. 32 found that "while most
agencies saw benefit in moving to accrual accounting, many had not been well
prepared for the accounting reforms ... and were not well prepared for the
introduction of full accrual reporting" (JCPA 1995, p. 13). According to the JCPA

report, at that time, only a few agencies implemented accrual accounting systems a
used accrual information as a management tool (JCPA 1995, p. 38). The follow-up
audit by the ANAO, Audit Report No. 16, 1994-95, found that

[o]nly a small percentage of agencies indicated that their executive
(16%) and program managers (8%) use accrual-based information in
financial management decision-making and program administration
... [and] about 6 0 % [of those surveyed] had not planned for its
introduction in the next twofinancialyears or had no intention to do
so ( A N A O 1994b, pp. 9-10; see also J C P A 1995, p. 53).

The, JCPA (1995) concludes that, in light of the evidence that most managers have

not prepared accrual reports and few understand that accrual information can be u
for day to day management and decision making, the necessary cultural change has
not yet happened (p. 53).
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Contemporaneous with the investigations of the A N A O , the accounting firm Ernst

and Young conducted a national survey of accrual accounting in the public sector in
mid-1994. The survey was set against the recent issue of AAS 27 and AAS 29 which
called for the adoption of accrual reporting at Local, State and Commonwealth
levels. The purpose was to evaluate the process of implementation of accrual

accounting, the nature of obstacles to effective implementation and to identify the

costs and benefits that agencies had identified to date (Ernst and Young 1995, p. 1
JCPA 1995, p. 16).

The results of the survey showed that a high proportion, almost 83%, of respondents
have or were currently implementing accrual accounting. A formal implementation
plan had not been used by 30% of respondents in implementing accrual reporting.
Audit Report No. 16, 1994-95's finding that over 30% of respondents saw that there

was no other use for accrual financial statements in their organisation other than
satisfy a legislative reporting requirement noted earlier, was confirmed by Ernst
Young's survey results. Developing and implementing information systems,
accounting policy directions and accounting procedures manuals were the most
significant problems during the preparation of accrual based financial statements
agencies (Ernst and Young 1995, p. 2; JCPA 1995, pp. 16-17 & 53).

To overcome the problems disclosed by the JCPA, and Ernst and Young in
implementing accrual accounting in the Commonwealth public sector agencies, the
JCPA (1995) specified a number of remedies, categorised according to whether they
would be the responsibility of the Department of Finance or the Government.

Recommendations relevant to the Department of Finance highlighted the need to

market more effectively to managers the benefits of accrual accounting for decision
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making, to institute n e w training programs for senior executive officers and to make
available to a wider audience the Department of Finance's easy to read introduction
to accounting reforms, The New Financial Reports of Agencies. In addition, the
Department of Finance should encourage agencies to pool resources to reduce costs
associated with the implementation process. At the same time, the Commonwealth
Government was urged to provide clear and strong signals to agencies of the
government's commitment to new management information systems based upon

accrual accounting. This could be achieved, at least in part, by providing addition
funding to assist managers to set up the financial management systems designed to
get the best from accrual accounting (JCPA 1995, pp. xiv-xvii).

The Ernst and Young's survey supported some of the JCPA's recommendations. The
survey gave particular importance to the need for agency managers to be more
educated concerning the benefits which are achievable from the systematic use of

accrual information, especially in terms of better resource management. The results
also suggested that "management is not yet convinced of the benefits such as better
resource management decisions and improved asset management including cash"
(Ernst and Young 1995, p. 2). The findings of this study also recommended a need
for investment in accounting systems in order to be able to provide relevant
information regularly for management on both a cash and an accrual basis (Ernst and
Young 1995, p. 2). To achieve the full returns from investments being made in
implementing accrual reporting and accounting, Ernst and Young (1995) also
suggested the full commitment by Government agencies to budgeting, accounting,
managing and reporting on a full accrual basis. In addition, they believed that
"continued control of annual budgets on a cash basis alone offers no incentives to

agencies to pursue the efficiency gains made possible by the increased availability
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relevant information from the regular supply of accrual information" (Ernst and
Young 1995, p. 2).

An essential requirement for countries contemplating reform which seeks to take
advantage of the experiences of countries in the vanguard of reform is the early
recognition of problems encountered by reformers. In the case of developing

countries these difficulties may be far more accentuated as they seek to grapple wit
few resources, an inadequate pool of trained people and opposition from interested
groups. Therefore, reformers of the Iranian public sector should be aware of the
problems facing Australia even after a decade of reform.

A detailed description of the accounting and budgeting systems of the Islamic
Republic of Iran was provided in chapter 5. It was shown how, overwhelmingly, the
accounting system of the general government sector is cash based and designed to
complement the categories of approved expenditure in the budgeting system. It has

also been demonstrated that the accounts are used for the purposes of establishing

legality and regularity of expenditures. These features of traditional public secto
accounting, it has also been noted, are inadequate to meet the needs of governments

in times of fiscal restraint. For Iran the weaknesses of its accounting systems are

the more significant as it seeks to meet the objectives of its Five-Year Plans and
raise the living standards of its people. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter
examine the relevance of the accounting and financial management reforms enacted
in Australia, as covered above, for giving Iran an accounting system which will
provide the necessary management tools and accountability mechanisms to achieve
government goals as expanded in the Five Year Plans. This will then make possible
a list of recommendations in chapter 7 for the reform of the Iranian government
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accounting system. These recommendations will be considered with regard to Iran's
unique social, historical and political context, as developed in chapters 2-4.

6.6 ACCOUNTING REFORM AND THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE

Cultural factors have been seen to play an important role in forming accounting
practices (Tomkins and Abdul Karim 1987; Perera 1989; Belkaoui and Picur 1991;
Hamid, Craig and Clarke 1993; Baydoun and Willett 1994, 1995; Fechner and
Kilgore 1994; Pourjalali and Meek 1995). It is also now well recognised that
accounting "influences are more readily recognised when cultural differences are
clear" (Baydoun and Willett 1994, p. 2). Baydoun and Willett (1994) have remarked
that cultural differences are a key consideration in comparative studies between
Christian Western societies and Islamic societies (p. 2).

Most of the cultural studies in the area of accounting, accountability and finance
within the domain of harmonisation of accounting theories and practices
internationally (for example see Tomkins and Abdul Karim 1987; Hamid, Craig and
Clarke 1993; Baydoun & Willett 1994, 1995; Fechner and Kilgore 1994). The case
is much more narrow when the area of study is limited to public sector or
government accounting. An appraisal of research in public sector accounting in
general in three English-speaking countries, Australia, the UK and the US, was
conducted by Lapsley in 1988 (Lapsley 1988). The results of study, which covered
1980 to 1988, showed that no cultural study had been done in public sector
accounting during that period (Lapsley 1988). Certainly at the time of Lapsley's
research the government accounting systems of developing countries had received
little attention, apart from organisations such as the United Nations (Craner and
Jones 1990). One of the first surveys to consider the effects of culture on
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government accounting systems, as preliminary research for harmonisation of
government accounting standards internationally, was conducted by Chang and
Khumawala in 1994 (Chang and Khumawala 1994). They compared three

developing countries, India, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia in terms of "historical/politic
background", "economic environment" and "government accounting system". The
results of the study show that cultural influences are ubiquitous in government
accounting system development and also "[w]hile a national intervention process
seemed common, cultural factors have lead to different implementation methods,
thus affecting greatly the timing of various development stages" (Chang and
Khumawala 1994, p. 332).

To provide the cultural dissimilarities or differences between two societies, in the
present case Iran and Australia, with different systems of governance, economy,
ideology, religion, language and many other differences is a great task and beyond

the objectives of this study. Instead, this study will attempt a very brief review o
historical/political background, based on discussion provided in chapter 2, as the
prelude to an examination of accounting reform for Iran.

Besides, what is important for the present study are the significant commonalties of

Iran and Australia in governance. This study has established that the requirements o
the Islamic teachings constitute significant cultural differences between the two
countries. However, within these differences emerges a common concern of all
responsible governments for the wise use of resources and accountability to the
people through their elected representatives. Accrual accounting has been shown in
studies not to be culturally specific as an accounting technology (Chang and
Khumawala 1994). Implementation practices which may differ do not affect the key
benefits of accrual accounting.
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6.6.1 Historical/Political Background

Iran is an ancient country with a very old civilisation. The name of 'Iran' means the
land of Aryans, referring to those who settled some four thousand years ago. Chapter
2 provided the main features of the form of government in the Islamic Republic of
Iran established in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution while chapter 3 explored the

implication of this for the accountability of the executive to parliament. As noted
chapter 2, the Iranian Constitution establishes a central government. The Executive
branch is headed by the President, the Vice President, the President Deputies and
Ministers-who collectively act as the effective source of executive power.
Legislative power is independent from the Executive and consists of the Islamic
Consultative Assembly and the Guardian Council. The executive is accountable to

the legislature for the use of funds for the purposes stipulated, and at levels app
when appropriated by the legislature.

In contrast to the very long history of government in Iran, the Australian
Commonwealth Government is less than a century old. The Australian Constitution,
as noted in chapter 2, provides that the Federal government includes the GovernorGeneral, the Houses of Parliament and the High Court. The head of the Executive,
the Prime Minister, comes from the party that holds the majority of seats in the
Lower House or the House of Representatives. Thus, in effect the executive, while it
is accountable to the legislature, has significant control over the process of
accountability. The Legislative power is vested in a Federal Parliament which
consists of the Queen, a Senate or Upper House, and a House of Representatives or
Lower House.
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Based on the above characteristics of the two systems of government, the main
differences and similarities between Iranian and Australian systems of governance
are: the system of government in Australia is Federal whereas the Iranian system is
unitary and in Australia the Executive is part of Parliament while in Iran the
Executive and the Legislative powers are completely separate from each other. The
proclamation in 1979 of Iran as an Islamic State, however, probably provides the

most significant differences in the nature of government between Australia and Iran.
As shown in chapter 2, the Iranian Constitution requires that all civil, financial,

economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulati

in the country are to be based on 'Islamic criteria'. This also includes the Country
General Law of Accounts. The Iranian Constitution notes:

• With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the
Constitution, in order to examine the compatibility of the
legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with
Islam, a council to be k n o w n as the Guardian Council is to be
constituted (Article 91).
• The Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal
status if there is no Guardian Council in existence, except for the
purpose of approving the credentials of its members and the
election of the six jurists on the Guardian Council (Article 93).
• All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly
must be sent to the Guardian Council (Article 94).
• The determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by
the Islamic Consultative Assembly with the laws of Islam rests
with the majority vote of the fuqaha' on the Guardian Council;
and the determination of its compatibility with the Constitution
rests with the majority of all the members of the Guardian
Council (Article 96).
• The authority of the interpretation of the Constitution is vested
with the Guardian Council, which is to be done with the consent
of three-fourths of its m e m b e r s (Article 98).
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The significant similarity between the two countries is that government financial
accountability is exercised through the Legislature. Further similarities are the way
in which the annual budget should be drawn up by the government in the manner
specified by law and submitted to the legislature, in Iran the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, for discussion and approval (Article 52) and the way in which
government accounting and budgeting are dominated by the executive. It is worth
noting here that not only government financial accountability is exercised through
the Legislature in Iran and Australia but also the authority to make any law has been

given to the Legislature in both countries. The only difference here is that in Iran t
Islamic Consultative Assembly does not have authority to enact laws which are
contrary to the ahkam (commandments) of the official religion of the country or to

the Iranian Constitution. Thus, despite differences in the structure of governance and
ideological frameworks, there are sufficient similarities in government roles and
regimes of accountability (see chapters 2 and 3) which allow some Australian public
sector reforms to be considered relevant to Iran.

In chapter 3 accountability is referred to in the broadest sense as the central objec
of democratic government. It has been stated, in chapter 3, that since the public
sector reforms of the last decade accountability has been emphasised which ensures
that the nation's resources are utilised efficiently and effectively. In the section
sources and subjects of accountability in chapter 3 it was noted that receivers),
holder(s), user(s) and expender(s) of public resources should be held accountable for
their decisions and actions with respect to those resources. It is also noted that
government and public officials as trustees have an obligation to be accountable to
the citizens for the state powers and resources entrusted to them. Therefore, as

indicated, in the two countries public officials (in Iran the President and Ministers,
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and Australia the Prime Minister and Ministers) are accountable for using public
resources.

As chapter 2 has shown, it was in the same decade in 20th century that both countries
started to exercise their Constitutions; in Australia it was at the beginning of the
establishment of the Federal Commonwealth Government in 1901 and in Iran after
the Mashruteh Revolution in 1906. Public financial and management accountability
in the two countries were to be according to the traditional form of public sector
accountability. At the heart of this form of public accountability was an input
oriented concept of accountability (see chapter 3) which included checks on
regularity and probity in using public resources. The aim was to ensure that public
money which Parliament, in Iran the National Consultative Assembly and after the
1979 Islamic Revolution the Consultative Assembly, permitted the Executive to raise
and spend was spent according to the clauses in the Appropriation Acts and that
fraudulent use of public sector revenues did not occur. This gave accountability a
very narrow stewardship interpretation. Until the present time, Iran still exercises
this older form of public sector accountability with its concerns for legality and
regularity.

Thus, in both Iran and Australia, until the 1980's, the form of public financial
accountability was the lowest level of accountability namely fiscal or fiduciary
accountability, called Efficiency I by Cutt. Since 1992 Australia has moved to the
third and most sophisticated form of public financial accountability in the
accountability hierarchy by Cutt which is concerned with effectiveness.

As indicated in chapter 4, for any form of accountability there should be a record of

every action taken and every dollar that is spent. Therefore, it requires a system of
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accounting. Until recently, the accounting systems used for implementing fiduciary
accountability in Iran and Australia had the similar essential features of a limited
form of cash accounting. Since 1992, the boundaries of accountability and
consequently accounting in Australia have been expanded beyond the traditional
stewardship function to embrace accountability for efficiency and effectiveness.

In chapter 4 it was noted that a government accounting system exists to furnish
complete and reliable financial information, in proper form on a timely basis, to the
several groups of persons responsible for and/or concerned with the conduct of
government activities and operations. It was also noted that even though the

accountability of organisations to different participants requires the use of differe
information, the provision of financial information is the most important part of the
accounting process.

Until recently government accounting and accordingly public sector financial
reporting in Iran and Australia was according to the cash based accounting. The
limitations of cash accounting were discussed in chapter 4. It was shown that there
were difficulties in measuring asset costs and liabilities in cash accounting. It is
not possible to measure the full costs of goods and services using cash accounting.
These weaknesses resulted in the inadequate disclosures of assets and liabilities for
both decision-making and accountability purposes and, in the case of this study,
accountability for efficiency and effectiveness. Iran still uses cash accounting for
government and financial management. Australia moved to accrual accounting after
1992.

Thus, despite differences in the structure of governance and ideological framework,
clear similarities in government roles and regimes of accountability- (see chapter 3)
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mean that some of the Australian public sector reforms can be seen to be relevant to
the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is worth noting here that any changes to the
government financial management and accountability will have to be approved by
the Islamic Consultative Assembly and then the Guardian Council. Therefore, it is
quite possible that some of changes which are recommended by this study will be
rejected, or fail to pass through the legislation process, by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly or the Guardian Council. The recommendations which are made, in next
chapter, are those which are thought to be consistent with the cultural, social and
political imperatives of Iran, as developed in chapters 2 and 3 and above in this
chapter.

6.7 CONCLUSION

Australia, Britain, and New Zealand have been implementing a range of public sector
reforms, largely based on economic theories of organisation since the 1980s
(Mascarenhas 1993). The pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness, value-for-money and
accountability has been said to be the main reason for change in the public sector
(Guthrie 1991a; Parker and Guthrie 1993; see also Broadbent and Guthrie 1992, pp.
3-4). According to Mascarenhas (1993), bringing efficiency into the public sector by
giving departmental heads greater autonomy and responsibility for managing
departments and holding them accountable for performance were the main objectives
of the reforms (p. 326).

Reform in the Australian federal government was achieved in two systematic phases.
In thefirstphase of reform a manager class within the public service, which would
both rationalise existing activities and accept direction concerning n e w government
policy, was clearly defined and then strengthened (Considine 1990, p. 175). This
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phase came about by introducing the Public Service Reform Act 1984 which, inter
alia, allowed for short-term appointments to senior positions and gave departmental
heads greater responsibility for financial and other management decisions within
their organisations (Considine 1990, p. 175).

The second major phase of federal reforms involved addressing the larger questions
of structure. A major restructuring of all federal departments and of cabinet
arrangements through which they answer to the government was announced in July
1987 (Considine 1990, p. 176).

Reform introduced the new concept of "managerialism" to the public sector. It asked

for greater accountability and also introduced the new accountability dimensions of
efficiency and effectiveness. These dimensions of accountability are much broader
than the traditional legality and regularity. The Financial Management Improvement
Program and Program Budgeting have been introduced in the public sector. As a
result of reform, the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board was created and it
issued a number of accounting concepts and accounting standards. Accrual
accounting has been accepted by the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board for
the general purpose financial reports of government departments.

CHAPTER 7

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis has endeavoured to explore the structure of financial control,
accountability and accounting in the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
to examine the extent to which the present reforms in Australian public sector
accounting techniques, which have been designed to enhance accountability and
management, are relevant to the Islamic Republic of Iran. To address this relevance,
the thesis explored the structure of governance, financial management and
accounting systems of the Iranian and Australian Governments.

Chapters 2, 3 and 5 considered the characteristics of the existing form of
accountability, budgeting and accounting systems and practices of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. One of the conclusions reached in chapter 3 was that the form of
financial accountability in the Islamic Republic of Iran is traditional with an

orientation towards monitoring the legality and regularity of transactions. This form
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of accountability has been the major influence on the accounting and budgeting

practices in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was concluded, in chapter 5, that public
sector accounting in the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been developed to the
extent that it has in the economically developed countries. The study mentioned that
the present accounting, budgeting, financial reporting and auditing practices of the
Iranian Government are essentially those established many years before the Islamic
Revolution in 1979. The Country's General Law of Accounts is also mainly that
instituted in 1907 and has been amended four times since its establishment. The
existing law emphasises compliance with legal provisions and budget allowances,
with little or no regard to essential managerial uses of accounting information. The
current accounting system is not capable of providing managers in the general
government sector with information which, amongst other things, allows them to
measure and provide the full cost of services and goods. Instead, the reports or
financial statements prepared by the Iranian accounting system attempt to show
compliance with parliamentary authorities. This form of reporting can only provide
information which was required by traditional dimensions of accountability, as
discussed in chapter 3.

Discussion in chapter 5 showed that in relation to present-day needs of the Iranian
Government, a traditional concept of accountability is somewhat narrow in its scope,
since in budgeting and accounting it relies upon the exclusive use of the combined
organisation-object classification in order to pinpoint control over expenditures.
Although these information needs are still essential today, accounting is also being
recognised increasingly as a tool of management for efficiency and effectiveness
accountability purposes. This study suggests that it would be to Iran's advantage as
endeavours to achieve the goals of its five year plans to broaden the area of

accountability to include accountability for efficiency and effectiveness in a simila
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manner to that accomplished by the Australian public sector reforms. It would be
also in accordance with the requirements of section f. of Article 43 of the Iranian
Constitution, provided in section 5.2.2 of chapter 5, which prohibits extravagance
and wastefulness in the use of the country's resources. Improvement in the budgeting
and accounting systems to include accrual accounting can provide financial data
necessary for efficiency and effectiveness accountability.

It was explained that the present accounting system of the Iranian Government is
cash based. According to cash accounting, a governmental unit prepares, before the
beginning of a fiscal year, a budget or estimate of revenues and expenditure for the
coming year. During the accounting period, cash receipts and expenditures are
recorded in the appropriations-book and revenue and expenditure ledgers. Referring
to chapter 3, these accounting practices are basically those of the traditional
accountability-oriented public sector accounting framework, in which the accounting

system is designed to satisfy the needs of accountability and administrative control
appropriated funds. Government officials responsible for expenditures have had to
prepare proper accounts of their stewardship to show that the funds were expended in
accordance with the authority received from the legislative body.

It was shown that increased demands on governments, along with pressure from
limited resources for most countries, including Britain, Australia and New Zealand,
in recent decades have resulted in significant reforms to the management of public
sector resources and to the mechanisms by which governments are held financially
accountable. Similar fiscal pressures in Iran recently prompted the Leader, Ayatollah
Sayed Ali Khamenei, and senior government officials to call for an inquiry to bring
about greater fiscal discipline (Enzebat Aqtesadi). Commercialisation,

corporatisation and privatisation in the public sector have been part of public sector
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reform. It was argued that most of these reforms have yet to find their way to the
Islamic Republic of Iran which has devoted most of its energies since the Islamic
Revolution in 1979 to establishing structures of government. Seventeen years after

the victorious Islamic Revolution, and in light of the experiences of other countrie
is particularly appropriate and timely for a review of the Iranian public sector
accounting and budgeting system and that suggestions for its improvement are made.

7.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

To understand the existing budgeting and accounting systems and practices of the
Iranian Government and to identify the users and the kinds of financial information
they need, the structure of the Iranian Government was explained in chapter 2. It
showed that the Iranian government is composed of the Leader or Leadership
Council, the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. In chapter 2 it was

explained that the system of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran is under the
supervision of the Valayat-e Faqih which is elected by the Khobragan Assembly.
The responsibilities and powers of the President, the Islamic Consultative Assembly
and the Khobragan Assembly were clarified and the process by which they are
elected was also discussed. Following discussions of Iran, the nature of the
Australian Commonwealth government was then explained. Reference was made to
the Parliament (Senate and House of Representatives), the Executive and the
Judiciary in Australia. The chapter also referred to the three levels of government
Australia; the Commonwealth, the States, and local government. The processes by
which the Governor-General is appointed, and by which the Prime Minister and
members of the Parliament are elected, along with their responsibilities and powers
were also highlighted.
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It was shown that the Iranian Government differed from the Australian Government
in that it is a unitary system of government with one Central Parliament (Majlis).

Australia is a Federation that consists of three tiers of government. It was noted t
the thesis was limited to comparing and contrasting the central government of
Australia (Commonwealth) with the Iranian government.

The structures of government established in chapter 2 were drawn upon, in chapter 3,
to examine concepts of accountability which followed in theory and practice. The
importance of accountability in the public sector and its role in a changing modem
society were discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 3 showed that in recent years the
dimensions of accountability given prominence in the public sector were expanded in
Australia, New Zealand and England to include efficiency and effectiveness rather
than just emphasising the traditional dimensions of accountability, in particular

accountability for legality and regularity. Interpretations of accountability, as fo
in theories of governance and in practice, are the primary determinates of the
mechanisms used to ensure accountability. This chapter also provided a historical

overview of accountability as it has been understood in Australia and in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Finally, the nature of accountability was examined, followed by a
discussion of how it functions in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Australia

Chapter 4 provided a comprehensive discussion of an efficient and appropriate
accounting system as a provider of useful and adequate information for implementing
accountability processes in the public sector. It was explained that government
performance is judged with a heavy reliance on financial information provided by
accounting systems. Chapter 4 also included a discussion of the systems of public
sector accounting, including cash accounting, accrual accounting and fund
accounting. Reference was made to the benefits of cash accounting and accrual
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accounting and their differences. It also considered why accounting in the public
sector has been neglected by many governments and why little attention has been
devoted to standards setting until recent years.

Some of the significant issues currently confronting public sector accounting, in
particular determination and allocation of costs, depreciation and amortisation of
fixed assets, financial reporting and development of a public sector conceptual
framework were covered in chapter 4. It showed how a system of accounting is the
most important mechanism to allow financial accountability to be exercised in the
public sector. Chapter 4 concluded that accrual accounting is an appropriate basis of
accounting for both management and accountability purposes. Further, without the
implementation of accrual accounting it is not possible to give the full costs of
services provided which are necessary for management decision making and
accountability reporting.

Chapter 5 was devoted to the examination and consideration of the characteristics
and the weaknesses of the existing budgeting and accounting practices of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. It was concluded in chapter 5 that the Iranian accounting system is
cash based and that, although information provided by this system met some external
financial reporting needs, it was not sufficient for management decision making
purposes. It was established in chapter 5 that little has been written about
accounting, especially public sector accounting, in Iran by academics and
practitioners. It also stated that there is no active organisation, outside government
departments, responsible for developing public sector accounting in Iran. Chapter 5
also noted that the Iranian accounting systems do not require the Ministries and
Government Institutions to report fixed assets at the end of fiscal years nor are they
expected to depreciate long lived assets.
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A n examination of the Australian public sector reforms in recent decades,
emphasising changes in financial management and accountability and focusing on
new accounting technologies as a means to perform accountability practices in the
public sector, was the theme of chapter 6. This was followed by a discussion of the
relevancy of the Australian reforms to help meet accounting and accountability

deficiencies in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was found that, despite the cultura

differences between the two countries, the similarities in the form of governance an

accountability make it possible for Iran to benefit from Australian experiences and
implement accrual accounting in the general government sector in order to enhance

accountability for efficiency and effectiveness. For the purposes of this study, the
knowledge of these changes was needed as a source of reference in order to make
suggestions in the current chapter for the reform of the accounting system of the

Islamic Republic of Iran. This study suggests that, based on the discussion provided

in chapter 6, some of the Australian public sector accounting reforms are applicable
to the Iranian Government. Following is a list of recommendations applicable to the
Islamic Republic of Iran based on the discussions in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations can be offered in light of the comparison obtained
from this study:

1. Considering that the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has recently

improved greatly, compared to the situation in 1979, with the implementation of Firs
and Second Five-Year Plans, more political and economic stability, and increased
demands for the efficient and effective use of public resources, it is appropriate
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the Iranian General Government Sector give careful consideration to adopting accrual
accounting. As discussed in the section on the benefits of accrual accounting in
chapter 4, an accrual accounting system will provide better disclosure of both the
activities that have been performed and the costs of works and services that have
been incurred by government operating units during each fiscal year. In addition,
accrual accounting would provide more useful information for planning and

accountability for legality, regularity, efficiency and effectiveness purposes. It w
also enhance decision making in a ministry's management as well as contribute to
legislative review and evaluation of government activities.

2. The Iranian Government should establish a set of government accounting
objectives which are broader in scope than those operating and which are more
suitable to the present day needs of modern government administration. The
Objectives of General Purpose Financial Reporting presented by SAC 2, and
discussed in chapters 4 and 6, which the writer considers more comprehensive than
the present objectives of Iranian government accounting, should be adopted.
Providing mandated information in accordance with the objectives contained in SAC

2 will allow not only the adequate provision of information on, and effective control
over, Government revenues, expenditures and property, but also the adequate
provision of financial information necessary for management of government

resources and operations, and effective control over accountability . These also wil
help to broaden the dimensions of accountability to include concepts of efficiency
and effectiveness.

3. It would be appropriate if the Iranian Government maintained financial records of

fixed assets as a part of its accounting system, instead of leaving it to each minist
or government institution to protect the fixed assets under its jurisdiction. More
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importantly, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4, recording assets meets the preliminary
requirements for using accrual accounting which is necessary for the implementation
of efficiency and effectiveness accountability.

4. It is recommended that a complete set of accounts, comprising both budgetary and
property accounts, be established and maintained in each ministry or government
institution in Iran. These sets of accounts can provide the information needed for
preparing the Operating Statement, the Statement of Financial Position and Cash
Flow Statement at the end of each fiscal year. Then the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Finance can consolidate the accounts to prepare the financial statements
for the State. The necessary accounts for ministerial accounting systems could
follow the principles provided in A A S 29 and Commonwealth Department of
Finance Guidelines discussed in chapter 6.

5. If the Iranian Government were to establish and maintain an accounting system
similar to that n o w used in Australia (discussed in chapter 6), the system would be
able to produce accounting data necessary for the preparation of both reports on
budget execution and State balance sheets. In this connection, it is recommended
that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance prepare the following reports as
well as the reports required by A A S 29:

1. Reports on Government cash balances at the end of each month,
2. Monthly and quarterly reports on the execution of the State budget,
3. Annual report ("Budget Settlement") on the execution of the State budget, and
4. State balance sheet at the end of the fiscal year for the General Government
Sector.
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6. To meet the needs for ministerial financial and operating reports, it is
recommended that each ministry and government institution prepare and submit the
following reports to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance as well as the
reports required by AAS 29:

1. Quarterly and annual balance sheets,
2. Quarterly and annual statements showing the status of appropriations,
3. Quarterly and annual statements showing the actual and estimated receipts
classified by source,
4. Quarterly and annual reports showing comparisons between budgeted and actual
costs for each ministerial program, and
5. Annual inventory reports on supplies and fixed assets.

For management use within each ministry and government institution the preparation
of the following monthly reports is recommended:

1. Individual project cost reports,
2. Activity cost reports (consolidation of project reports under each activity),

3. Division cost reports (consolidation of activity cost reports in each division of
ministry or government institution), and
4. A cost summary for all activities and programs of the ministry or government
institution.

7. It is recommended that a new Country's General Law of Accounts be established
to meet the present-day needs of financial management. The new law should contain
the important basic principles and requirements governing the custody of and
accounting for the Government's funds and property. It should leave the details for
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regulations and procedures to be prescribed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance, possibly after consultation with the Court of Accounts about the more
important regulations. Changes to the Country's General L a w of Accounts also
should replace a Treasury Officer in the ministries and government institutions by an
accounting officer to be appointed by the ministers or the head of government
institutions. The accounting officer should be accountable to the minister or the head
of a government institution and the Court of Accounts.

8. The study recommends using single running costs appropriation which will give
managers more flexibility. It m a y also create an environment for implementing the
other features of the Australian Financial Management Improvement Program in the
long-term.

Implementation of these suggestions for reform to the accounting system of the
general government of Iran should:

• give managers greater flexibility in the management of their resources
•

give greater visibility to assets and their use

•

facilitate assessment of financial position by reporting all assets and liabilities

•

provide information for management decision making

•

measure the cost of services provided.

7.4 CONCLUSION

This study showed that there is substantial need for change in accounting systems in
the Islamic Republic of Iran. The results also indicated that the implementation of
the present government accounting techniques and procedures in the financial
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management of the Iranian Government cannot adequately accomplish the several
goals of the public financial program of the nation. For example, the existing
accounting system in each administrative ministry or government institution does not
provide necessary information for economical management of the resources and
operations within the ministry or government institution concerned. In addition, the
existing government accounting system does not provide adequate information
necessary for effective control over and accountability for all government funds and
property. The author believes that if the Iranian Government accepted the
recommendations presented in this chapter, improvements in its accounting practices
would be realised and its accounting system would be able to serve more efficiently
and effectively the management of Iran's public resources.

The study showed that the Islamic Republic of Iran can benefit from the public sector
accounting techniques and practices introduced in Australia since 1983. It suggested
the use of accrual accounting by the Iranian Government to broaden public financial
accountability from regularity and legality to include accountability for efficiency
and effectiveness. In this connection, it was recommended that it would be
appropriate to maintain financial records of fixed assets as a part of the accounting
system maintained by the Iranian Government.

An accounting system, according to the recommendations above, would meet various
information needed of the executive and legislative authorities, such as, the
information needs for evaluating ministries programs and operations, for determining
compliance with legal provisions and budgetary restrictions, for determining

stewardship, efficiency and effectiveness accountability of the various administrativ
ministries and government institutions, and for analysing the economic impact of
government revenues and expenditures. The recommended accounting techniques
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and procedures selected from those that have proved useful in Australian
Commonwealth accounting practices can be maintained either manually or by

appropriate electronic application. Finally, a set of uniform accounts and procedure
should be employed in the administrative ministries and government institutions in
order to achieve simplicity and to facilitate the provision of government financial
information needed for national income accounting.

Any consideration of the relevance of accrual accounting for the general government

sector of Iran should be aware of the criticisms of its introduction into the Austra
public sector. The survey of accrual accounting by the JCPA and the AuditorGeneral pointed to its limited use in management planning and decision making. To
avoid this problem and the other problems facing implementation of accrual
accounting in Australia, Iran should run adequate training courses for public sector
accountants. This should also include preparing some training courses for managers

to train them in the use of accrual information. To ensure the successful adoption of
accrual accounting its introduction should be strongly supported and encouraged by
the Iranian government.

This study is the first and only comprehensive examination of Iranian general
government sector accounting since the introduction of budgeting and accounting in
Iran 1907. One avenue of research for future researchers is to conduct comparative
studies between the Iranian public sector financial management and control and other
developed countries such as America, Britain, Canada, Japan.

A brief discussion of the cultural differences between Islamic Republic of Iran and
Australia was made in section 6.6 of chapter 6. In this connection, it is suggested
that future studies could be a pure survey of the public sector cultural differences
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between Western, particularly Westminster, societies and Islamic societies in
general.

There is a lack of accounting standards for the public sector accounting practices in
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Further research to find out the required process for
public sector accounting standards setting could be another future research project.
Research of the application of performance program budgeting to Iranian public
sector accounting is also suggested for the future.

GLOSSARY
Adala

Justice.

Adalatkhaneh/adalatkhana

House of justice.

Adel/Adl

Just; To put every things in its place; to be
moderate in social life; Justice.

Ahkam

Commandments.

Alem/Alam

One who is most learned.

Amin

Trustee.

Bast

Strike; Sanctuary.

Faqih

A jurisprudent.

Fatwa

A legal ruling; an expression of opinion, by on
of the ulama, on a point of religious law or on
a legal case.

Fiqh

Jurisprudence.

FoqahalFuqaha

Plural oi Faqih.

Halal

Lawful, Permitted.

Haram

That which is prohibited by the law of Islam,
Unlawful, Prohibited.

Ijtihad

Exegesis of divine law on matters of theology
and law.

Imam

Religious Leader.

Iqtisad/Ightadad

Literally means "to be moderate". It is used
as equivalent to economics.

Ithn' ashairi

'Twelver' Shiism branch of Islam.

Khalifa

Vicegerency.

Khobragan

Experts.

Maddaress

Plural oi Madreseh.

Madhhab

Religion.
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Madrese/Madreseh

Islamic teaching institution.

Majede/Masjid

Mosque.

Majlis/Majles

Parliament.

Marja

Source.

Marja' taqlid

A source of imitation.

Marjeyeh taqlid

A religious leader chosen by believers as 'a
source of imitation' wisest and ultimate
authority for interpreting quranic laws.

Mashruiyat/Mashrutiyat/
Mashruteh

government according to the law of Islam,
justice and equality, or according to science
and civilisation.

Mujtahed/Mujtahid

Islamic scholar who does Ijtihad.

Mujtaheds/Mujtahids

Plural of Mujtahed/Mujtahid.

Muttaqi

Virtuous; Pious.

Ozma

Grand.

Quran

The Holy book of Islam.

Sadre-azam

The Prime Minister.

Sayyed

Descendant of the Prophet Mohammad.

Shahid

Martyr.

Shari'a/Shariah

Islamic Teachings.

Tallabeh

A student at a madrese.

Taqlid

The process of following the practices and
pronouncements of a scholar more learned than
oneself in matters relating to the religious law,
with faith in his correctness and without
independent investigation of his reasons.

Tullab

The students at a madrese.

Ulama

Those learned in the religious law.

Ummah

Muslim nation.

Vazier

A Minister.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahamian, E. 1979. "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran".
International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, 10,381-414.
Abrahamian, E. 1982. Iran: Between two Revolutions. Princeton University Press,
N e w Jersey.
Abrahamian, E. 1985. The Crowd in Iranian Politics, 1905-53. In H. Afshar (ed.)
Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, Macmillan, London.
Aghalu, Y. 1992. In debate with the Accountant "Hesabdar" "Government
Accounting in Iran" (in Persian) (Hesabdari Dolati dar Iran). Hesabdar, 8586,20-31.
Aghvami, D. 1992a. "Accounting in Government and Non-profit Organisations:
History, Principles, Standards, Objectives and Current Issues" (in Persian).
Hesabdar, 85-86, 14-19.
Aghvami, D. 1992b. In debate with the Accountant "Hesabdar" "Government
Accounting in Iran" (in Persian) (Hesabdari Dolati dar Iran). Hesabdar, 8586,20-31.
Aghvami, D. and J. Babajani. 1988. The Principles and Application of Accounting
Non-Profit and Government Institutions (in Persian). Sazemane motale-a v
tadveena kotoba ulooma ensani-e daneshghah, Tehran.
Aiken, M. and M. McCrae. 1992. "Full Cost Pricing and Public Sector Reporting:
Alleviating Undisclosed Short-run Measurement Bises of 'User to Pay'
Policies". Financial Accountability and Management in Governments, Public
Services and Charities, 8, 1, 13-34

Aitkin, D., B. Jinks and J. Warhurst. 1989. Australian Political Institutions (4
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.
Algar, H. 1969 (reprinted 1980). Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, The role
the Ulama in the Qajar Period. University of California Press, London.
Algar, H. 1980. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (translated from
Persian). Mizan Press, Berkeley.

Allan, P. 1988. Accrual Accounting to be or not to be? Paper presented at New So
Wales Public Accounts Committee's, Accrual Accounting Seminar Parliament
House, February 5, 1988, Sydney.

Bibliography

288

Amin, M . 1994. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (2nd ed.). In M . Amin
(ed.) A Collection of Constitutional and Civil Laws (in Persian) (Majmooae'
ghavanin-e asasi v madani). Entesharat-e khorshid, Tehran.
Amjad, M. 1989. Iran From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy. Greenwood Press,
USA.
Anderson, J. and M. Poole. 1994. Thesis and Assignment Writing (2nd ed.). John
Wiley and Son, Brisbane.
Anthony, R. N. 1978. FASB Research Report, Financial Accounting in Nonbusiness
Organizations: An Exploratory Study of Conceptual Issues. Stamford,
Connecticut.

Apostolou, N. G., R. C. Brooks and W. B. Hildreth. 1992. "Research and Trends i
Government Accounting and Reporting". International Journal of Public
Administration, 15, 5, 1121-1149.

Aijomand, S. A. 1992. "Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order: A S
in the Mondernization of Political Traditions". Archives and europeennes de
sociologie, 33, 39-82.
Astaneh, A. 1994. Kayhan Havai (The International Weekly for Iranians Abroad),
No. 1069, February 9, 1994, 24.

Australian Accounting Standard (AAS) No. 27. 1995. Financial Reporting by Loca
Governments. Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria.
Australian Accounting Standard (AAS) No. 29. 1995. Financial Reporting by
Government Departments. Australian Accounting Research Foundation,
Victoria.
Australian Accounting Standard (AAS) No. 4. 1993. Definition of Non-Current
Assets. Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria.
Australian National Audit Office. 1994a. The Auditor-General Audit Report No.
1993-94: Efficiency Audit-Accrual Accounting-Are Agencies Ready? Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Australian National Audit Office. 1994b. The Auditor-General Audit Report No.
1994-95: Follow up Audit-Accrual Reporting-Are Agencies Ready? Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Australian National Audit Office. 1995. The Auditor-General Annual Report 1994
95. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Bibliography

289

Babajani, J. 1992a. In debate with the Accountant "Hesabdar" "Government
Accounting in Iran" (in Persian) (Hesabdari Dolati dar Iran). Hesabdar, 8586,20-31.
Babajani, J. 1992b. "A Survey of Government Accounting in Iran" (in Persian)
(Hesabdari Dolati dar Iran). Hesabdar, 85-86, 32-39.

Babajani, J. 1992c. "Government Accounting in Iran" (in Persian) (Hesabdari Dola
dar Iran). Hesabdar, 87-88, 67-87.
Baker, W. A. 1980. "Accountability, Responsiveness and Public Sector
Productivity". Canadian Public Administration, 23, 4, 542-557.
Barrett, P. J. 1990. Managerialism-Good or Bad Politics. Paper presented to the
Defence Annual Training and Development Symposium, October 24, 1990,
Canberra.

Barrett, P. 1994a. Contributing to Public Sector Accountability-An Accounting Ro
Paper presented to the 10th National Accountants Conference "Prospects in a
Open Market-The Accountant as a Catalyst", August 2, 1994, Kuala Lumpur.
Barrett, P. 1994b. Success in Managing Accrual Accounting-More Gain that Pain.
Paper presented to the A S C P A seminar, December 9, 1994, Canberra.
Bartos, S. 1994a. An Outcomes Oriented Approach to Performance Information.
Paper for A I C Conference on Performance Indicators and Information in the
Public Sector, March 23, 1994.
Bartos, S. 1994b. APS Management Improvement in the 1990s. Presentation Notes,
M a y 5, 1994.
Baydoun, N. and R. Willett. 1994. Islamic Accounting Theory. Paper presented to
the A A A N Z annual conference, July 3-6, 1994, Wollongong, Australia.
Baydoun, N. and R. Willett. 1995. "Cultural Relevance of Western Accounting
Systems to Developing Countries". ABACUS, 31,1, 67-92.
Bazaei, M. B. 1993. Shi'ism and Politics in Iran: The Role of Ulama and Shi'i
Political Ideology in Contemporary Iran, with a Particular to the Reference to
the 1979-Islamic Revolution. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Santa Barbara.
Belkaoui, A. and R. D. Picur. 1991. "Cultural Determinism and the Perception of
Accounting Concepts". The international Journal ofAccounting, 26,118-130.

Bibliography

290

Bird, P. 1973. Accountability: Standards in Financial Reporting. Haymarket
Publishing, London.
Birkett, W. P. 1988. Public Sector Accountability in Transition in Australia.
University of N e w South Wales, Working Paper No. 84, Sydney.

Boston, J. 1987. "Transforming the New Zealand Public Sector: Labour's Quest fo
Improved Efficiency and Accountability". Public Administration, 65, 423-442.
Bourn, M. 1993. "Should We Go the Kiwi Way?: Should the British Government
Follow N e w Zealand and Produce Accruals-based Financial Statements".
Accountancy, 111, 1194, 88-89.
Bowsher CA. 1996. "Budget and Financial Management: Progress & Agenda for the
Future". The Government Accountants Journal, Fall 1996, 13-17.
Broadbent, J. and J. Guthrie. 1992. "Changes in the Public Sector: A Review of
Recent 'Alternative' Accounting Research". Accounting, Auditing and
Accountability Journal, 5, 2, 3-31.
Browne, E. G. 1966. The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd,
London.
Burke, W. L. 1982. Commercial and Government Accounting - A Comparative
Study. In D. J. Hardman (ed.) Government Accounting And Budgeting,
Prentice-Hall Pty Ltd, Australia.
Burritt, R. L., M. McCrae and C. Benjamin. 1994. What is a Public Sector Asset,
Unpublished paper.

Burritt, R. L., M. McCrae and C. Benjamin, 1996. "What is a Public Sector Asset?
The Australian Accounting Review, 6, 1,23-28.
Carpenter, G. J. 1990. Accrual Accounting - Issues and Policy Implications for
Departments and Non-Business Government Entities. In J. Guthrie, L. Parker
and D. Shand (eds). The Public Sector-Contemporary Readings in Accounting
and Auditing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Australia.
Chan, J. L. 1985. The Birth of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board-How?
W h y ? What next? In J. L. Chan (ed.) Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting, Vol. 1, JAI Press Inc, London.

Bibliography

291

Chan, J. L. and R. H. Jones. 1988. Comparative Governmental Accounting: A n
Introductory Note. In J. L. Chan and R. H. Jones (eds). Governmental
Accounting and Auditing-International Comparisons, Routledge, London.
Chang, S. Y. and S. B. Khumawala. 1994. "Cultural Influences and Governmental
Accounting Systems: A Comparative Analysis of three Developing Countries".
Journal ofAdvances in International Accounting, 6, 329-334.
Chowdhury, A. I. and A. K. Chowdhury. 1995. Corporate Accountability and
Financial Reporting in Islamic Society. Paper presented to the Fifth
International Conference on Business and Economic Development in MiddleEastern and Mediterranean Countries, November 7-9, 1995, Sydney.

Churchill, M. 1992a. "The Winds of Change". Australian Accountant, 62, 2, 17-20.
1992b. "Asset Valuation". Australian Accountant, 62, 3, 35-39.
1992c. "Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector". Australian Accountant,
62, 5, 39-42.
Commonwealth Government. 1983. Reforming the Australian Public Service, White
Paper. Australian Government Printing Office, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia. 1984. Budget Reform. Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.

Commonwealth of Australia. 1989. The Constitution. In J. A. Pettifer (ed.) Hous
Representatives Practice (2nd ed.), Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra.

Commonwealth of Australia. 1993. Audit Act 1901 (Reprinted as at 30 April 1993).
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia. 1994. The Constitution. Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Commonwealth Public Service Board. 1968. The Commonwealth Treasury. In W.
R. C. Jay and R. L Mathews (eds). Government Accounting in Australia, A
Book ofReadings, Cheshire Publishing Pty Ltd, Melbourne.
Connolly, D. M. 1982. Accountability and Financial Reporting: Commonwealth
Government Activities. In R. C. Clift and G. J. Harris (eds). Issues in
Government Accounting, The University of Melbourne, Australia.

Bibliography
292
Considine, M . 1988. "The Corporate Management Framework as Aclministrative
Science: A Critique". Australian Journal of Public Administration, March
1988,4-18.
Considine, M. 1990. "Administrative Reform 'Down Under': Recent Public Sector
Change in Australia and N e w Zealand". International Review ofAdministrative
Science, 56, 1, 171-184.

Country's General Law of Accounts. 1987. In G. Hojati-e Ashrafi (ed.) A Collecti
of Fiscal's Laws and Regulations (in Persian) (Majmuey-e Ghavanine Mali va
Muhasebati), 1994, Vol. 1, Ketabkhanehe Ganjeh Danesh, Tehran.
Court of Accounts. 1994. "The 1991/92 Budget Settlement Presented to the Islamic
Consultative Assembly" (in Persian). In Kayhan Havai (The International
Weekly for Iranians Abroad), No. 1111, December 14,1994, 24.
Court of Accounts. 1995. "The 1992/93 Budget Settlement Presented to the Islamic
Consultative Assembly" (in Persian). In Kayhan Havai (The International
Weekly for Iranians Abroad), No. 1162, December 27, 1995, 18.
Craner J. and R. Jones. 1990. Accrual Accounting for National Governments: The
Case of Developing Countries. In R. S. Olusegun, J. M . Samuels and R. J.
Briston (eds). Research in Third World Accounting, JAI Press Ltd, London.
Crompton, M. 1994. APS Reform - Continuing to Make it Work. Presentation Notes,
Adelaide, February 23, 1994.

Cutt, J. 1977. "Accountability, Efficiency and the Royal Commission on Australia
Government Administration". Australian Journal of Public Administration, 36,
4, December 1977, 333-349.

Cutt, J. N. 1982. "Accountability, Efficiency, and the 'Bottom Line' in Non-Profi
Organisations". Canadian Public Administration, 25, 3, 311-331.
D' Angelo, J. 1992. Financial Reporting in the Commonwealth Likely Directions.
Paper presented at the Improving Program Budgeting & Financial
Management, A I C Conference, December 7-8,1992, Sydney.
Dawkins, J. S. 1985. "Reform in the Canberra System of Public Administration".
Australian Journal ofPublic Administration, 54, 1, 59-72.
Day, P. and R. Klein. 1987. Accountabilities Five Public Services. Tavistock
Publications, London.

Bibliography
293
Deegan, S. 1995. "Managerialism: A Review of the Debate and A Consideration of
its Potential Impact on Innovation in Public Sector Agencies". The Journal of
Contemporary Issues in Business and Government, 1,1,11-19.
Department of Finance. 1988.1988 FMIP Report. Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1992a. Commonwealth Financial Management Handbook.
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1992b. Supplementary Financial Statements 1991-92.
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1992c. Annual Report 1991-92. Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1993a. Annual Report 1992-93. Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1993b. A Policy Framework for Commercialisation. Draft
discussion paper, August 1993.
Department of Finance 1994 (reprinted 1995). The New Financial Reports of
Agencies. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1995a. Annual Report 1994-95. Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Department of Finance. 1995b. Guidelines for the Financial Statements of
Departments.
Department of Finance. 1995c. Guidelines for the Financial Statements of
Commonwealth Authorities.
Department of Finance. 1996. Financial Statements of the Commonwealth
Government of Australia for the year ended 30 June 1995 (Trial and
Unaudited): Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Dewar, D. 1992. The Pursuit of Accountability: A Celebration of the Exchequer a
Audit Departments Act 1866. National Audit Office.

Douglas, P. P. 1991. Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting: Theory and Practice
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, U S A .

Bibliography

294

Douglas, P. P. and R. N. Anthony. 1991. " A n Analysis of the Government
Accounting Model". The Government Accountants' Journal, 40, 2, 25-34.

Downey, G. 1986. "Public Accountability: fact or myth?" Public Money, June 1986
35-39.

Drebin, A. R., J. L. Chan and L. C. Ferguson. 1981. Objectives of Accounting an
Financial Reporting for Governmental Units: A Research Study. National
Council on Governmental Accounting, Michigan.
Dyer J.L. 1996. "The Bowsher Years". The Government Accountants Journal. Fall
1996, 18-23.
Egol, M. 1988. Sound Financial Reporting by Nation-States: A Prerequisite to
Worldwide Fiscal Stability. In J. L. Chan and R. H. Jones (eds). Governmental
Accounting and Auditing: International Comparisons, Routledge, London.
Emy, H. V. 1978. The Politics of Australian Democracy (2nd ed.). The Macmilian
Company of Australia Pty Ltd, Melbourne.
Emy, H. V. and O. E. Hughes. 1988. Australian Politics: Realities in Conflict.
Macmillan Company of Australia Pty Ltd, Hong Kong.

Encel, S. 1974. Cabinet Government in Australia (2nd ed.). Melbourne University
Press Carlton, Victoria.

English, L. 1989. "NSW Public Sector Reforms". Australian Accountant, 59, 8, 60
66.
English, L. and J. Guthrie. 1991. "Public Sector Auditing: A Case of Contested
Accountability Regimes". Australian Journal of Public Administration, 50, 3,
347-360.

Ernst and Young. 1995. Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector: A National Sur
Ernst and Young, February 1995, Australia.
Exposure Draft 62. 1995. Financial Reporting by Governments. Australian
Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria.
Fechner, H. H. E. and A. Kilgore. 1994. "The Influence of Cultural Factors on
Accounting Practice". International Journal of Accounting, Education and
Research, 29, 3,265-277.

Bibliography

295

Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1980. Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts No. 3: Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises.
Stamford, Connecticut.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1987. Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 93. Recognition of Depreciation by Not for Profit
Organizations. Stamford, Connecticut.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1993. Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 117: Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations.
Norwalk, Connecticut.
Firouzbakhch, H. 1994. Population Dynamics in the Revolutionary Process: A
Historical Interpretative Approach to the Tension between Social Structure and
Ideology, the Iranian Revolution, 1979. Unpublished P h D dissertation, The
University of Utah, U S A .

Fitzgerald, A. 1968. Controversial Issues in Governmental Accounting. In Jay, W
C. and R. L Mathews (eds). Government Accounting in Australia, A Book of
Readings, Cheshire Publishing Pty Ltd, Melbourne.

Foley, K. J. 1982a. Issues in Governmental Accounting: A Victorian Perspective.
R. C. Gift and G. J. Harris (eds). Issues in Government Accounting,
Proceedings of a Seminar on Government Accounting, February 12, 1982,
University of Melbourne, Australia.

Foran, J. 1991. "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance: A Cla
Analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911". Theory and Society,
20, 795-823.
Forell, C. R. 1978. How We are Governed (8th ed.). Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.

Freeman, R. J. and C. D. Shoulders. 1993. Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting:
Theory and Practice (4th ed.). Prentice Hall, N e w Jersey.
Funnell, W. 1990. The Framework of Public Sector Accountability in NSW and the
Commonwealth: A n Overview of Current Developments and Antecedents.
Working Paper N o . 14, Department of Accountancy, University of
Wollongong, Australia.

Funnell, W. 1994. "Independence and the State Auditor in Britain: A Constitutio
Keystone or a Case of Reified Imagery?" ABACUS, 30,2,175-195.
Gamer, C. W. 1991. Accounting and Budgeting in Public And Non-profit
Organisations. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.

Bibliography

296

Ghartey, J. B. 1993. Education, Accountability and Development in the Third World.
In R. S. O. Wallace, J. M . Samuels and R. J. Briston (eds). Research in Third
World Accounting, Vol. 2, JAI Press Ltd, London.
Ghods, M. R. 1989. Iran in the Twentieth: A Political History. Lynne Rienner
Publishers, U S A .
Glover, T. R. 1944. (reprinted 1948). The Ancient World, A Beginning. Penguin
Books, London.
Glynn, J. J. 1985. Value for Money Auditing in the Public Sector. Prentice/Hall
International, United Kingdom.
Glynn, J. and M. McCrae. 1986. "Australian Federal Financial Control and
Accountability-A Review". Financial Accountability & Management, 2, 2, 89104.
Goldman, G. and E. Brashares. 1991. "Performance and Accountability: Budget
Reform in N e w Zealand". Public Budgeting and Finance, 11, A, 75-85.
Goode, R. 1984. Government Finance in Developing Countries. The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D. C.
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 1987. Concepts Statement No.
1: Objectives of Financial Reporting, Stamford, Connecticut.

Governmental Accounting Standards Board. 1988. Statement No. 8. Applicability o
FASB Statement No. 93, Recognition of Depreciation by Not for Profit
Organizations, to Certain State and Local Government Entities. Stamford,
Connecticut.
Governmental Accounting Standards Board. 1993. Statement No. 17: Measurement
Focus and Basis of Accounting-Governmental Fund Operating Statements:
Amendment of the Effective Dates of GASB Statement No. 11 and Related
Statements, Government Accounting Standards Board, Norwalk.

Gray, A. and B. Jenkins. 1993. "Codes of Accountability in the New Public Sector
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 6, 3, 52-67.
Gray, A. and W. Jenkins. 1986. "Accountable Management in British Central
Government: S o m e Reflections on the Financial Management Initiative".
Financial accountability and Management, 2, 3, 171-186.

Bibliography
297
Greiner, N . 1990. Accountability in Government Organisations. In J. Guthrie, L.
Parker and D. Shand (eds). The Public Sector-Contemporary Readings in
Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Australia.
Gunn, L. 1988. "Public Management: a third Approach?" Public Money &
Management, 8,1 & 2, 21-25.
Guthrie, J. 1990a. The Adoption of Corporate Forms for Government Business
Undertaking-Critical Issues and Implications. In J. Guthrie, L. Parker and D.
Shand (eds). The Public Sector-Contemporary Readings in Accounting and
Auditing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Australia.

Guthrie, J. 1990b. Current Developments in Public Sector Accounting and Auditing
Standard Setting in Australia. In J. Guthrie, L. Parker and D. Shand (eds). The
Public Sector-Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Australia.
Guthrie, J. 1991a. The 'New' Accounting and Managerialism: Reforming
Accounting and Auditing Practices in the Australian Public Sector. Griffith
University, Research Paper N o . 22, M a y 1991.
Guthrie, J. 1991b. The Adoption of Corporate Forms for Government Undertakings:
Accountability Issues for the 1990s', Biennial Conference of Public Accounts
Committees, Darwin, M a y 22-26, 1991.
Guthrie, J. 1989. "The Contested Nature of Performance Auditing in Australia".
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 2, 3, 56-66.
Guthrie, J. 1993. "Australian Public Business Enterprises: Analysis of Changing
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Regimes". Financial Accountability
and Management in Governments, Public Services and Charities, 9, 2, 101114.
Guthrie, J. 1994. Understanding Australian Federal Public Sector Accounting
Developments in Their Context. Unpublished P h D dissertation, The University
of N e w South Wales, Australia.
Haerian Ardakani. M. 1996. The Role of Oil Exports in the Economic Development
of Iran 1960-92. Unpublished P h D dissertation, University of Wollongong,
Australia.
Hague, D. C. 1971 (reprinted 1973). Accountability, Independence and Management
Science. In B. L. R. Smith and D. C. Hague (eds). The Dilemma of
Accountability in Modern Government, Macmillan, London.

Bibliography

298

Halligan, J. 1987. "Reorganising Australian Government Departments". Canberra
Bulletin of Public Administration, 52,40-47.

Hamid, S., R. Craig and F. Clarke 1993. "Religion: A Confounding Cultural Elemen
in the International Harmonization of Accounting". ABACUS, 29, 2, 131-148.
Hardman, D. J. 1982. "Models of Government Accounting". Accounting and
Finance: Journal of the Accounting Association ofAustralia and New Zealand,
M a y 1982,23-40.
Harris, A. C. 1990. Commentary on Accrual Accounting - Issues and Policy
Implications for Departments and Non-Business Government Entities by G. J.
Carpenter. In J. Guthrie, L. Parker and D. Shand (eds). The Public SectorContemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Australia.
Helgeby, S. 1990. Understanding the Performance of the Public Service.
Unpublished paper, Presented to the Centre For Australian Public Sector
Management, National Conference, Improving Public Sector Management.
Griffith University, July 5-7, 1990.

Henley, D., A. Linkierman, J. Perrin, M. Evans, L. Lapsley and J. Whiteoak. 1992
(reprinted 1993). Public Sector Accounting and Financial Control (4th ed.).
Chapman & Hall, London.

Higgins, P. J. 1986. Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran. In A. Banuaz
and M . Weiner (eds). The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan,
Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse University Press, U S A .
Hiro, D. 1985. Iran Under The Ayatollahs. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Melbourne.
Holmes, M. R. G. 1990. Recent Developments in Program Management. In J.
Guthrie, L. Parker and D. Shand (eds). The Public Sector-Contemporary
Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Australia.

Hood, C. 1989. "Public Administration and Public Policy: Intellectual Challenge
the 1990s". Australian Journal ofPublic Administration, 48,4, 346-358.
Hood, C. 1990. "De-Sir Humphreyfying the Westminster Model of Bureaucracy: A
N e w Style of Governance?" Governance, 3,2,205-214.

Hopwood, A. 1984. Accounting and the Pursuit of Efficiency. In A. Hopwood and C.
Tomkins (eds). Issues in Public Sector Accounting, Philip Allen, Oxford.

Bibliography

299

Hopwood, A. G. 1990. "Accounting and Organisation Change". Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability Journal, 3, 1, 7-17.
Humphry, R. G. 1992. Developments in budgeting reporting and accounting of
governments. Paper presented to the XIV World Congress of Accountants in
Washington D C , U S A , October 12,1992.
Humphry, R. G. and T. R. Waters. 1986. "Reforming Government Administration".
Australian Accountant, (May 1986), 45-50.
Hurwitz, L. 1981. The State as Defendant-Governmental Accountability and the
Redress ofIndividual Grievances. Westport, C T : Greenwood Press.
IRNA new agency, Tehran, in English 1116 gmt November 26, 1995.

Islamia Bid Goli. 1992. In debate with the Accountant "Hesabdar" "Issues Affect
Changing the Government Auditing in Iran" (in Persian) (Moshkelate Ijad-e
Tahavol Dar Hesabresi-e Dolati dar Iran). Hesabdar, 85-86, 70-75.

Islamic Consultative Assembly. 1995a. A Brief of 1991/92's Budget Settlement (
Persian). Centre for Research of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Markaze
Pazhoheshehay-e Majles Shoray-e Islamei), Tehran.

Islamic Consultative Assembly. 1995b. "Considering the Budget Bill" (in Persian
In Kayhan Havai (The International Weekly for Iranians Abroad), No. 1152,
October 18, 1995, 19.
Islamic Consultative Assembly. 1995c. "1995/96 Budget Bill: Reviewing with A
N e w Pattern" (in Persian). Majles and Pajohash, 15, 51-85.

Issawi, C. (ed.) 1971. The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914. The University o
Chicago, U S A .

Javadi Amoli, A. 1992. "The Philosophy and Objectives of the Islamic Governmen
Public Administration Review (Modiriyat Doulati), 18, Autumn 1992, 1-12.
JCPA. 1995. Report 338: Accrual Accounting-A Cultural Change. Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Johnson, N. 1971 (reprinted 1973). Financial Accountability to Parliament. In B
R. Smith and D. C. Hague (eds). The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern
Government, Macmillan, London.

Bibliography

300

Johnson, G. G. and S. A. Langsam. 1991. "Historical Sources and Current Status of
G A A P for State and Local Governments". Government Accountants Journal,
40, 6, 54-64.

Jones, R. 1992. "The Development of Conceptual Frameworks of Accounting for the
Public Sector". Financial Accountability and Management in Governments,
Public Services and Charities, 8, 4, 249-264.
Jones, R. and M. Pendlebury. 1985. Public Sector Accounting. Pitman, London.
Jones, R. H. and M. Pendlebury. 1988. Governmental Accounting, Auditing and
Financial Reporting in the United Kingdom. In J. L. Chan and R. H. Jones
(eds). Governmental Accounting and Auditing: International Comparisons,
Routledge, London.
Keating, M. S. 1990. Quo Vadis ? Challenges of Public Administration. In J.
Guthrie, L. Parker and D. Shand (eds). The Public Sector-Contemporary
Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Australia.

Kerr, A. 1990. Future of the Public Sector. Unpublished paper, Canberra, 3 Apri
1990.

Kerr, J. St. G. 1984. The Definition and Recognition of Liabilities. Australian
Accounting Research Foundation, Accounting Theory Monograph No. 4,
Melbourne.

Khamenei, S. A. 1995. "New Iranian Year's Message to the Iranians" (in Persian).
Kayhan Havai (The International Weekly for Iranians Abroad), No. 1125,
April 12,1995,3.

Khamenei, S. A. 1996. "New Iranian Year's Message to the Iranians" (in Persian).
Kayhan Havai (The International Weekly for Iranians Abroad), No. 1185,
April 10,1996,4.
Khodadoust Foroughi Tehrani, Tahirih. 1975. Private Industrial Development and
Evolution and Change of Accounting Education and Profession in Iran.
Unpublished P h D Dissertation, the University of Oregon, U S A .

Khomeini, R. 1981. Mam and the Revolution. Translated by Hamid Algar. Berkeley,
Mizan Press.
Kropp, J. F. 1989. Government Companies: Their Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability. Paper presented to the I C A and A S A seminar, November 1989.

Bibliography
301
Kuniholm, B. R. 1980. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East. Princeton
University Press, N e w Jersey.
Lambert, M. 1992. Implementation of Financial Management Reforms in the Budget
Sector: the N e w South Wales Experience. Paper presented to the Royal
Institute of Public Administration Australia, Conference on Financial
Reporting for the Australian Public Sector, November 5, 1992, Sydney.

Lapsley, I. 1988. "Research in Public Sector Accounting: An Appraisal". Account
Auditing and Accountability Journal, I, 1-2,21-33.
Leonard, H. B. 1985. Measuring and Reporting the Financial condition of Public
Organizations. In J. L. Chan (ed.) Research in Governmental and Non Profit
Accounting, Vol. 1, JAI Press, INC, London.
Lourens, L. T. 1993. Accountability and the Concept of Effectiveness in Public
Sector Management.
Unpublished P h D dissertation, California Coast
University, U S A .
Mackenzie, W. J. M. 1966. In Foreword to E. L. Normanton (1966), The
Accountability and Audit of Governments, Manchester University Press,
Manchester.
Mackintosh, I. 1992. Accrual Accounting, For Departments and the Whole of
Government: Costs, Benefits and opportunities. Australian Society of Certified
Practising Accountants, Canberra.
Management Advisory Board-Management Improvement Advisory Committee
(MIAC). 1991. Accountability in the Commonwealth Public Sector: An
Exposure Draft. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Marshall, G. 1984. Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political
Accountability. Clarendon Press, Oxford, London.
Mascarenhas, R. C. 1990. "Reform of the Public Sector in Australia and New
Zealand". Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration,
3,1,75-95.
Mascarenhas, R. C. 1993. "Building an Enterprise Culture in the Public Sector:
Reform of the Public Sector in Australia, Britain, and N e w Zealand". Public
Administration Review, 53,4, 319- 328.
Mautz, R. K. 1981. "Financial Reporting: Should Government Emulate Business?"
Journal ofAccountancy, 152, August 1981, 53-60.

Bibliography

302

Mautz, R. K. 1989. "Not-for-Profit Financial Reporting: Another View". Journal of
Accountancy, 168, August 1989, 60-66.
McBride, P. and G. Peirson. 1996. "Developments in Public Sector Financial
Reporting". CPA's Communique, Number 66, 1996.

McCandless, H. E. 1993. "Auditing to Serve Public Accountability". Internation
Journal of Government Auditing, 20, 2, 14-16.
McCrae, M. 1991. The Financial Accountability Structures of Australian Public
Enterprise-A Descriptive Model. Occasional Paper, Deakin University.
Australia.
McPhee, I. 1990. What's Happening in Government Sector Accounting - A Look at
Current Directions. Paper presented to the Public Sector Accounting
Conference in Sydney, October 24-25, 1990.
McPhee, I. 1993. Accrual Accounting Commonwealth Timetable-What is Next on
the Agenda? Paper presented to the Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector
Conference, Canberra, April 5, 1993.
McPhee, I. 1994a. Accounting Standards in the Public Sector. AIC Conference,
March 1994, Sydney.
McPhee, I. 1994b. Accrual Accounting-Progress and Prospects. Department of
Finance Briefing, Lakeside Hotel, Canberra, July 14, 1994.
Micallef, F. 1994. "A New Era in Reporting by Government Departments".
Australian Accountant, 64, 2, 33-34.
Miller, M. C. and M. A. Islam. 1988. The Definition and Recognition of Assets.
Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria.

Moaddel, M. 1992. "Shi'i Political and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movem
of 1890-1892". Sociological Forum, 1, 3, 447-468.
Moaddel, M. 1986. "The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran". Theory and Society,
519-556.
Nobes, C. 1988. An Historical-Comparative Perspective of Governmental
Accounting. In J. L. Chan and R. H. Jones (eds). Governmental Accounting
and Auditing: International Comparisons, Routledge, London.
Normanton, E. L. 1966. The Accountability and Audit of Governments. Manchester
University Press, N e w York.

Bibliography

303

Normanton, E. L. 1971 (reprinted 1973). Public Accountability and Audit: A
Reconnaissance. In B. L. R. Smith and D. C. Hague (eds). The Dilemma of
Accountability in Modern Government, Macmillan, London.
NSW Treasury. 1989. Accounting Guidelines for Reporting Physical Assets in the
Budget Sector. November 1989, Sydney.
NSW Treasury. 1990. Microeconomic Reform: the NSW Government's
Achievements. June 1990, Sydney.
NSW Treasury. 1990. Policy Guidelines for Valuation of Physical Non-Current
Assets in NSW Public Sector. September 1990, Sydney.
. 1993. Excellence in Financial Management: Budget Sector Reform. Sydney.
. 1991. Financial Reporting Code under Accrual Accounting for inner Budget
Sector Entities. July 1991, Sydney.
Painter, M. 1988. "Public Management: Fad or Fallacy?" Australian Journal of
Public Administration, Al, 1, 1-3.

Pallot, J. 1990. Public Sector Assets: A Study in Connotative Meaning. Unpublished
paper, presented to the A A A N Z Conference in Perth, Australia, July 8-11.
1990.

Pallot, J. 1991. Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability. In J. Botson, J. Martin
Pallot, and P. Walsh (eds). Reshaping the State New Zealand's Bureaucratic
Revolution, Oxford University Press, Auckland.
Pallot, J. 1992a. "Educating Accountants for the New Public Sector". Accountant's
Journal, 71, 5, 59-62.
Pallot, J. 1992b. "Elements of a Theoretical Framework for Public Sector
Accounting". Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 5, 1, 38-59.
Pallot, J. 1995. The Role of Accounting in the Privatization of State Trading
Enterprises in N e w Zealand. Unpublished paper, presented to the first AsianPacific interdisciplinary research accounting conference, July 2-5, 1995,
Sydney.
Parker, L. and J. Guthrie. 1990. Public Sector Accounting and the Challenge of
Managerialism. In J. Forster and J. W a n n a (eds). Budgetary and Management
Control, The Macmillan Company of Australia Ltd, Melbourne.

Bibliography

304

Parker, L. and J. Guthrie. 1993. "The Australian Public Sector in the 1990s: N e w
Accountability Regimes in Motion". Journal of International Accounting
Auditing and Taxation, 2, 1, 59-81.

Parsa, M. 1989. Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. Rutgers University Pre
N e w Brunswick and London.
Patten, D. M. and J. R. Wambsganss. 1991. "Accounting for Fixed Assets in a
Nonprofit Environment: A Recommendation". The Government Accountants
Journal, 40, 3, 44-47.
Patton, J. M. 1992. "Accountability and Governmental Financial Reporting".
Financial Accountability and Management in Governments, Public Services
and Charities, 8, 3, 165-180.
Perera, M. H. B. 1989. "Towards a Framework to Analyze the Impact of Culture on
Accounting". The International Journal ofAccounting, 24, 42-56.
Perrin, J. R. 1984. Accounting for Public Sector Assets. In A. Hopwood and C.
Tomkins (eds). Issues in Public Sector Accounting, Phillip Allan Publishers,
Oxford.
Pesaran, M. H. 1985. Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran.
In H. Afshar (ed.) Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, Macmillan, London.

Plan and Budget Organisation. 1995. Supplementary for the Country's Budget for t
fiscal year 1996/1997 (Payvastha-ea Bakhshnameh Boojehe Sal 1375 Kole
Keshvar). Plan and Budget Organisation, Tehran.
Plan and Budget Organisation. 1996. The Second Economic, Social and Cultural
Development Plan Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1994/1995-1998/99)
(4th ed.). Plan and Budget Organisation, Tehran.
Pollitt, C. 1986. "Beyond the Managerial Model: The Case for Broadening
Performance Assessment in Government and the Public Services". Financial
Accountability and Management, 2,3, 155-170.
Pourjalali, H. and G. Meek. 1995. "Accounting and Culture: The Case of Iran". In
M . Samuels, R. J. Briston and S. M . Soudagaran (eds). Research in Accounting
in Emerging Economics, JAI Press Ltd, Greenwich, Conn.
Public Service Board. 1986. An Introduction to Australian Government
Administration. Canberra Publishing & Printing Co., Canberra

Bibliography

->Q?

Rakhshandehrou, A. 1995. In Kayhan Havai (The International Weeklv for Iranians
Abroad) (in Persian), N o . 1129, M a y 10, 1995, 12-13.
Redburn, F. S. 1993. "How Should the Government Measure Spending? The Use of
Accrual Accounting". Public Administration Review, 53, 3,228-236.
Reid, J. B. 1983. Review of Commonwealth Administration. Commonwealth
Government Printer, Canberra.
Roberts, J. and R. Scapens. 1985. "Accounting Systems and Systems of
Accountability: Understanding Accounting Practices in their Organizational
context". Accounting Organizations and Society, 10, 4, 443-456.
Robson, K. 1987. Views on Accrual Accounting. Unpublished paper presented at
Accrual Accounting Seminar, P A C , N S W , Australia.
Rosalky, D. 1990. Budgetary and Financial Reforms. Unpublished paper, First
Assistant Secretary of the General Expenditure Division of the Department of
Finance, M a y 27, 1990.
Rowles, T. 1991. "Infrastructure and Heritage Asset Accounting". Australian
Accountant, July 1991, 69-73.
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration. 1976. Royal
Commission on Australian Government Administration: Report. Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Russell, D. 1993. An Overview of the Role of Performance Measurement in Public
Sector Reform. Paper presented to IIR Conference on Performance Indicators
in the Public Sector, February 22-23, 1993, Sydney.
Rutherford, B. A. 1992. "Developing a Conceptual Framework for Central
Government Financial Reporting: Intermediate Users and Indirect Control".
Financial Accountability and Management in Governments, Public Services
and Charities, 8, 4,265-280.

Sadeghzadeh, A. 1995. Social Responsibility Accounting, Sustainability Accounting
and Islam. Unpublished P h D dissertation, University of Wollongong, Australia.
Sassani, A. H. K. 1963. Education in Iran. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington.
Sawer, G. 1975. The Australian Constitution. Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra.

Bibliography

^06

Schick, A. 1990. "Budgeting for the Results: Recent Developments in Five
Industrialized Countries". Public Administration Review, 50, January/February,
26-34.
Scott, G. and P. Gorringe. 1989. "Reform of the Core Public Sector: The New
Zealand Experience". Australian Journal of Public Administration, 48, 1, 8192.
Scullion, B. 1993. Reporting and Interpretation of Financial Information. NSW
Government Printing Service, Sydney.
Sedgwick, S. 1993. Integration of the Resource Management Framework in the
Australian Public Service, Speech for Department of Finance Secretary's Visit
to Western Australia, M a y 21,1993.
Shahbazi, K. 1995. "The Court of Accounts in Respect of the Rights" (in Persian).
Majles va Pazhoohesh, 13, 143-160.
Shand, D. A. 1987. Can Accrual Accounting work in Government: A View on
Accrual Accounting in Government. Unpublished paper, December 1, 1987.
Canberra.
Shand, D. A. 1990a. Public Sector Accounting Standards - Progress on
Implementation in Australia. In J. Guthrie, L. Parker and D. Shand (eds). The
Public Sector-Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Australia.
Shand, D. A. 1990b. Australia Moves to Accrual Accounting: Problems and
Prospects. In J. Forster and J. W a n n a (eds). Budgetary Management and
Control, Macmillan, Melbourne.
Sharpe, M. 1992. Report of the Independent Auditor on an Efficiency Audit of the
Australian National Audit Office in accordance with the Audit Act 1901.
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Sherer, W. J. and D. B. Kent. 1983. Auditing and Accountability. Pitman, London.
Sinclair, A. 1989. "Public Sector Culture Managerialism or Multiculturalism?"
Australian Journal ofPublic Administration, 48,4, 382-397.
Sinclair, A. 1995. "The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses".
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20,2/3,219-237.

Bibliography

307

Smith, B. L. R. 1971 (reprinted 1973). Accountability and Independence in the
Contract State. In B. L. R. Smith and D. C. Hague (eds). The Dilemma of
Accountability in Modern Government, Macmillan, London.
Snodgrass, W. R. 1993. "Is Fund Accounting Appropriate for Governmental
Accounting and Reporting?" Government Accountants Journal, 41, 1, 33-35.
Spann, R. N. 1979. Government Administration in Australia. George Allen & Unwin,
Sydney.
State's Properties Regulations. 1971. In G. Hojati-e Ashrafi (ed.) A Collection
Fiscal's Laws and Regulations (in Persian) (Majmuey-e Ghavanine Mali va
Muhasebati), 199A, Vol. 1, Ketabkhaneh-e Ganjeh Danesh, Tehran.
Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) No. 2. 1990. Objective of General Purpose
Financial Reporting. Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria.
Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) No. 1. 1990. Definition of the Reporting
Entity. Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria

Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) No. 4. 1995. Definition and Recognition o
the Elements of Financial Statements. Australian Accounting Research
Foundation, Victoria.
Stevenson, J. 1994. Financial Management in A Re-invented Government: The case
of Australia. Luncheon Addressed to the International Consortium on
Government Financial Management, March 2,1994, Washington D C .
Stewart, J. D. 1984. The Role of Information in Public Accountability. In A.
Hopwood and C. Tomkins (eds). Issues in Public Sector Accounting, Philip
Allen, Oxford.
Stewart, J. and Ranson, S. 1988. "Management in the Public Domain". Public Money
and Management, 8, 2, 13-19.
Sutcliffe, P. 1985. Financial Reporting in the Public Sector - A Framework for
Analysis and Identification of Issues. Accounting Theory Monograph No. 5.
Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Victoria.
Sutcliffe, P., F. Micallef and L. D. Parker. 1991. Financial Reporting by
Governments Departments. Australian Accounting Research Foundation,
Victoria.
Tabatabai, A. A. 1983. Government Accounting In Iran (4th ed.) (in Persian)
(Hesabdarie Doulati dar Iran). Ketabkhaneh-e Farvardyn, Tehran.

Bibliography

308

Task Force on Management Improvement. 1992. The Australian Public Service
Reformed: An Evaluation of a Decade of Management Reform. Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
The First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan Act 1990. In G. Hojati-e
Ashrafi (ed.) A Collection of Fiscal's Laws and Regulations (in Persian)
(Majmuey-e Ghavanine Mali va Muhasebati), 199A, Vol. 1, Ketabkhaneh-e
Ganjeh Danesh, Tehran.
Tisdall, W. 1992. "Public Sector Reform: Local Government, Removing the
Shackles-Local Government Financial Reform". Accountants' Journal, 71, 5,
32-33.
Tomkins, C. and R. A. Abdul Karim. 1987. "The Shari'ah and its Implications for
Islamic Financial Analysis: A n Opportunity to Study Interactions A m o n g
Society, Organization, and Accounting". The American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences, A, 1, 101-115.

Van Peursem, K. A. 1990. A Definition for Public Sector Accountability. Discussio
Paper N o . 105. Massey University, N e w Zealand.
Walker, R. G. 1990a. Should there be Common Standards for the Public and Private
Sectors. In J. Guthrie, L. Parker and D. Shand (eds). The Public SectorContemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Australia.
Waller, M., G. Antioch, K. Mackay. and G. M. Miller. 1990. Commonwealth
Government Business Enterprises Reforms: Some Implementation Issues.
Unpublished paper, A presentation given to Finance officers, February 1990.
Wanna, J., C. O'Faircheallaigh and P. Weller. 1992. Public Sector Management in
Australia. Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, Griffith
University.
Weller, P. 1991. "Financial Management Reforms in Government: A Comparative
Perspective". Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, (November 1991),
9-17.
Weller, P. and R. F. I. Smith. 1977. Inside the Inquiry: Problems of Organising a
Public Service Review. In C. Hazlehurst and J. R. Nethercote (eds). Reforming
Australian Government, The Coombs Report and Beyond Australian National
University Press, Canberra.

Bibliography
309
Wettenhall, R. 1989. "Country Report-Recent Restructuring in Canberra: A Report
on the Machinery of Government Changes in Australia". Governance, 2, 95106.

Wholey, J. 1993. "Evaluation and Performance". Australian Accountant. 63. 11, 2833.
Wilenski, P. 1981. "Efficiency or Equity: Competing Values in Administrative
Reform". Policy Studies Journal, 9, 1239-1249.
Wilenski, P. 1986. "Administrative Reform-General Principles and the Australian
Experience". Public Administration, 6A, Autumn 1986, 257-276.
Wilenski, P. 1988, "Social Change As A Source of Competing Values in Public
Administration". Australian Journal of Public Administration, Al, 3, 213-222.
Wilson, J. L. 1991. "Toward a Vision for Government Resource Management".
Government Accountants Journal, 40, 6, 97-100.
Wright, F. K. 1956. "The British Army Cost Accounting Experiment". The
Australian Accountant, November 1956, 463-470.
Yeatman, A. 1987. "The Concept of Public Management and the Australian State
in the 1980s". Australian Journal of Public Administration, 339-353.

